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I. Abstract 
The German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) system provides medical services 
for the majority of the German population. Thereby the treatment with prescrip-
tion drugs does play a major role for the health of insurants. However, with the 
increasing possibility for the treatment of illnesses with prescription drugs, also 
the expenditures for such drugs have increased in the past decade. While in 2000, 
expenditures for prescription drugs amounted to 19.4 billion euro, in 2010, these 
expenditures have increased to 30.2 billion euro. Therefore, prescription drugs are 
a large cost driver of the SHI system. In reaction to this development, various 
regulative instruments were implemented to reduce the drug expenditures.  
The thesis analyzes, both theoretically and empirically, the impact of reference 
pricing, the possibility to exempt drugs from patient related co-payments, and 
rebate contracts on the pricing behavior and the demand reaction of different 
kinds of pharmaceutical producers, the prescription behavior of physicians and the 
negotiation strategies of sickness funds.  
The presented papers add to the existing literature in various ways. For the first 
time, the price setting reactions of patent, original, and generic producers, follow-
ing the implementation of a joint reference price are evaluated. Also, for the first 
time, the effects of the implementation of reference pricing, exemption from pa-
tient related co-payments, and rebate contracts on the demand of branded and 
non-branded generic drugs are estimated. Shifting the perspective towards the 
physician, the effects of the implementation of the previously mentioned regula-
tive instruments on the prescription behavior of SHI physicians is shown for the 
first time. Lastly, the thesis includes a new theoretical approach to explain the 
strategic behavior of different types of sickness funds and generic drug producers 
in the negotiation process of rebate contracts.  
  10 
First, the effects of the implementation of reference prices, a maximum reim-
bursement limit for prescription drugs, on the prices of patent drugs, off-patent 
original drugs and generic drugs are analyzed. Using the simultaneous introduc-
tion of patent, original and generic statins and proton pump inhibitors to the refer-
ence price system in 2005, the price reactions of the different types of producers 
to reference price policy changes were examined. As expected in the theoretical 
framework, patent drugs producers lower their prices to a lesser account than pro-
ducers of original drugs. Also, increasing competition, measured by the number of 
competitors within an active ingredient, has an overall negative effect on prices, 
where the impact is stronger for generic products than for patent or originals. At 
last, the role of competition increases after the reference price implementation.  
Following this, the next part of the thesis analyzes the impact of the introduction 
of reference pricing, the possibility to exempt drugs from patient related co-
payment, rebate contracts and price freezes on the market shares of generic and 
the corresponding original drugs. Also, in an extended model, the effects of the 
considered regulative instruments on the market shares of brand name and non-
branded generic drugs were shown. Both analyses included data of 93 drugs of six 
different active ingredients between the years 2004-2007. The strongest increase 
of demand is found for generic drugs that were participating in rebate contracts 
with sickness funds. The observed effect is weaker for branded than for non-
branded generics. The demand for generic drugs, that have been exempted from 
patient related co-payments also increases. The effect is smaller than in the case of 
rebate contracts and not significantly different for branded and non-branded ge-
neric producers. The weakest market share increase for a generic drug is found 
after the introduction of reference pricing. In this case, the demand reaction is 
stronger for branded than for non-branded generic drugs. At last, the demand for 
generic drugs is lower in time periods with price freezes. 
The next chapter the focus of analysis is shifted from the pharmaceutical producer 
towards the prescribing physician. It analyses the effects of physician, patient, and 
drug characteristics as well as the implementation of regulatory schemes on the 
prescription behavior. In detail, the probability of a change of the dispensed drug 
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for a patient was estimated as a function of physician, patient and drug related 
characteristics and habits. Thereby, a particular emphasis was given on the effects 
of the implementation of various regulatory instruments. The analysis used rou-
tine data of a large German sickness fund, that included prescription data on pa-
tient level for three major indication areas. Our results show the significance of 
both patient and physician habits al well as drug related characteristics on the 
probability for a change in the dispended drug. These results give evidence for the 
existence of persistence in drug choices by both the physician and the patient. In 
addition, we find evidence for a significant impact of regulatory regimes on the 
probability of a drug switch for the patient. The strongest effect on a change of the 
dispended drug was found for rebate contracts, followed by reference pricing and 
exemption from patient related co-payments.  
The last part of the thesis analyses the interaction between generic drug producers 
and sickness funds concerning the introduction of rebate contracts, which guaran-
teed market exclusivity in the market of the sickness fund. Using a theoretical 
model, the paper answers the question if rebate contracts are a way to safe costs, 
without reducing the level of medical care, or if they lead to (collusive) oligopo-
listic structures with a higher price level in the long term. We model the effects of 
the introduction of two different types of rebate contracts, contracts only consider-
ing a specific active ingredient (API contracts) and contracts including the whole 
product portfolio of a producer (portfolio contracts). There are two generic pro-
ducers, but only one can offer a portfolio contract and two types of sickness funds 
representing different groups of insurants. For one group, products, offered by 
both producers, are seen as homogenous, while the other group has a preferred 
producer. We find that the preferred producer has an advantage in three out four 
possible scenarios. It can outrival the other firm, due to its monopolistic power 
and its portfolio. Following these results, competition seems to diminish. How-
ever, sickness funds can still save money as producers cannot only threaten to 
enter a rebate contract. Therefore, as long as mismatch and access cost are low 
and portfolio contracts are not allowed, competitors will not be able to use their 
(potential) monopolistic power in the market to diminish competition. 
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II. Introduction 
In 2010, over 90 % of the German citizens were insured in the German Statutory 
Health Insurance (SHI) system.
1
 These insurants received both outpatient (ambu-
lant care) and inpatient (hospital care) services in various forms.
  
Thereby, the supply with drugs plays an important role in the German Statutory 
Health Insurance (SHI) system. On their own or in combination with treatments of 
illnesses in hospitals or by resident physicians, drugs help to cure diseases or ease 
pain and suffering. While drugs can be classified in various ways, for example by 
their effectiveness for diseases or their patent protection status, it is also possible 
to focus on the expenditure side, and differentiate between over-the-counter 
(OTC) drugs and pharmaceutical products requiring a prescription by a physician. 
While the former drug type is usually not fully reimbursed by the SHI, and thus 
financed out-of-pocket by the patient, prescription drugs are usually fully reim-
bursed, leading to expenditures within the SHI system. In 2010, these expendi-
tures amounted to 30.2 billion euro.
2 
Therefore, prescription drugs were the sec-
ond largest cost driver of the SHI system in 2010. The other two areas that cause 
the majority of expenditures are medical services in ambulant care (29.1 billion 
euro in 2010) and hospital treatments (58.1 billion euro in 2010).
3 
  
However, as Figure 1 shows, prescription drugs show the strongest increase of all 
three sectors between 2000 and 2010. The annual average growth rate of the ex-
penditures for prescription drugs was 4.5 %. The rate is substantially higher than 
for medical services in ambulant care (2.1 %) and hospital treatments (2.8 %).  
                                                     
1
 See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011b) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2010) 
2
  See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011b) 
3
  See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011b) 
  13 
Figure 1: Development of expenditures in the SHI system in billion euro, 2000-2010 
 
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011b) 
In addition, per annum, the expenditures for prescription drugs increased even 
more than the overall expenditures of the SHI system (2.8 %).  
In response to the rising drug expenditures in the last decade, the German Federal 
Ministry of Health, responsible for the regulation of the drug market, imple-
mented various cost control instruments.  
The instruments were part of several health care reforms, implemented by the leg-
islator. As there are several stakeholders like sickness funds, physicians, pharma-
cies and pharmaceutical producers involved in the process of supplying patients 
with prescription drugs, the regulative instruments targeted one or several of these 
parties.
4
  
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the effects of a selection of the most important  
regulative instruments on key stakeholders within the SHI system between 2004 
and 2007. The papers, presented in the next chapters, display the effects of the 
                                                     
4
  See Busse et al. (2004) and Denda (2010) 
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instruments on pricing decisions and the development of market shares various 
pharmaceutical producers, the impact of on the prescription behavior of physi-
cians as well as the strategic behavior in negotiations between pharmaceutical 
companies and sickness funds. The majority of the presented papers are of 
econometric nature, using three different dataset which will be explained in detail 
later.  
Following the abstract (Part I), the first part of the thesis (Part II) describes the 
system of ambulant care in the SHI system and also introduced the most import 
stakeholders of the SHI system involved in the supply with prescription drugs. 
Also, the major regulative instruments of drug market will be discussed in detail. 
Special attention will be paid to the regulative schemes analyzed in following 
parts of the thesis. At last, Part II gives an overview about the various datasets and 
statistic and mathematical software tools used in the following chapters.  
Part III describes the effects of the introduction of reference prices (RP), a maxi-
mum reimbursement limit for prescription drugs, on the pricing strategies of vari-
ous kinds of pharmaceutical producers competing with each other. The simultane-
ous inclusion of patent, original, and generic drugs in a shared reference price 
group in 2005 was used to examine the price setting behavior of the different pro-
ducers in reaction to the reference price policy implementation.  
Part IV uses an econometric model to estimate the effects of the introduction of 
reference pricing, exemption from patient related co-payment, rebate contracts, 
and price freezes on the demand of generic and corresponding original drugs. The 
overall dataset included 93 drugs, distributed over six different active ingredients. 
In addition, the different demand reactions of non-branded and brand name ge-
neric drugs following the implementation of the selected regulatory instruments 
are analyzed.  
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Part V examines the effects of physician, patient and drug characteristics on the 
probability for a change in the dispended drug of a patient.
5
 Using a patient-level 
panel dataset from a large SHI sickness fund covering three major therapeutic 
groups, the probability for a switch of the dispended drug for a patient is esti-
mated as a function of physician, patient and drug related characteristics and hab-
its. Following the overall goal of the thesis, the effects of the introduction of regu-
latory instruments, in particular reference pricing, the possibility to exempt drugs 
from patient related co-payments, the lead compound rule, and rebate contracts 
are emphasized in the paper. 
The last part of the thesis (Part VI)
6
 analyses the concept of two different kinds of 
direct rebate contracts between sickness funds and pharmaceutical companies for 
generic drugs on a theoretical base. In detail, the goal of the analysis is to show if 
rebate contract are a way to save drug expenses or if they lead to oligopolistic 
drug supply structures, followed by an long-term increase of drug expenses. 
Therefore, the provided model examines the strategic interaction between two 
types of generic producers and two kinds of consumers/sickness funds. The con-
sidered generic producers differ only in the range of their product portfolio, as one 
of them provides a larger variety of active ingredients while the other only offers 
one active ingredient. The demand side is represented by consumers/sickness 
funds of a first type, for whom the two offered generic products are homogenous, 
and consumers/sickness funds of a second type, holding a preference for a specific 
generic producer. Considering the differences in the consumer preferences using a 
Hotelling approach, the possibility of Nash equilibra in pure strategies for the re-
sulting strategic interactions in the negotiation process of rebate contracts between 
the firms and consumers/sickness funds are shown. Thereby two types of rebate 
contracts, single active pharmaceutical ingredient contracts and portfolio rebate 
contracts are analyzed.  
                                                     
5
  This part of the thesis is a joint work with Christoph de Millas 
6
  This part of the thesis is a joint work with Christoph de Millas 
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II.1 The supply of prescription drug in the Statutory Health Insurance 
II.1.1 The system of ambulant care in the SHI and its major stakeholders 
Figure 2 gives an overview about the ambulant care system in the Statutory 
Health Insurance. It shows the various stakeholders, their relationship (with each 
other), and the organization of the supply of prescription drugs in the SHI system.   
Figure 2: The SHI system of ambulant care 
 
Source: Illustration by the author based on Fünftes Buch Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB V)  
The central position in the SHI system is inherited by the patient who is insured 
by a SHI sickness fund. In return for the membership and the associated financial 
contributions the patient has a claim for benefits in kind. The patient receives 
these benefits in kind from SHI physicians who are in charge of the ambulant care 
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treatment for the patient.
7
 At the end of 2009 over 137.000 physicians treated pa-
tients in ambulant care. About 43.9 % of them were general practitioners, while 
56.1 % of the SHI physicians were specialists.
8
  
SHI physicians are also responsible for the prescription of drugs.
9
 The patient 
submits these prescriptions in pharmacies to receive the drugs. Thereby, the pa-
tient only has to pay a maximal co-payment of ten euro, depending on the retail 
price of the drug. Beside these co-payments, prescription drugs are fully reim-
bursed in the SHI system by the sickness funds.
10
 The pharmacies are supplied 
with products by wholesalers or directly by pharmaceutical producers. They re-
ceive payments for the dispended drugs by the sickness funds following the exact 
documentation about which drugs were dispended to the patients of each sickness 
fund. In this way, sickness funds can also monitor the observance of several regu-
lations that target the pharmacies.
11
  
In contrast to pharmacies, SHI physicians are reimbursed for the provision of the 
benefits in kind by the Regional Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physi-
cians (RASHIP).
12 
 
Each RASHIP is responsible for the medical supply of compulsorily insured per-
sons in a specific geographic region of Germany. Currently there are 17 of such 
regions which are mostly identical to the federal states (Bundesländer).
13
 Physi-
                                                     
7
  See § 73 (2) SGB V for an overview of services in ambulant medical care of the SHI 
system. 
8
  See Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung (2010) 
9
  See § 73 (2) SGB V 
10
  See § 61 SGB V 
11
  See § 129 (6) SGB V 
12
  See § 72 (2) SGB V 
13
  See § 77 (1) SGB V 
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cians who want to treat persons insured by a SHI sickness fund have to be mem-
bers of the responsible RASHIP.
14
  
Therefore the RASHIP acts as an intermediary body between sickness funds and 
SHI physicians, distributing the budget for ambulant care services between their 
members that provide ambulant medical services for compulsorily insured pa-
tients. 
The SHI sickness funds are responsible for the reimbursement of the benefits in 
kind that are provided by the SHI physicians. The sickness funds transfer an an-
nually adjusted overall remuneration to RASHIPs. It includes all benefits in kind 
for all insured persons that are provided by SHI physicians within a year for the 
specific region.
15
 The payment of the remuneration has liberating effects for the 
SHI sickness funds, as the responsibility for the provision of ambulant medical 
services for their insurants is transferred to the RASHIPs.
16
  
As the relationships between the different stakeholders in the SHI system, shown 
in Figure 2, indicate that the German Statutory Health Insurance is organized as a 
system of the joint self-government. Therefore the stakeholders of the systems, 
especially physicians and sickness funds, define the range of services the system 
provides for the insurants, while the Federal Ministry of Health is not directly 
involved in the organization of the healthcare system. However, the Federal Min-
istry of Health is, among other duties,
17
 responsible for the formulation of bills, 
ordinances and administrative regulations to improve the effectiveness of the SHI 
system.  
The highest decision making body of the joint self-government is the Federal Joint 
Committee. It consists of representatives of ambulant care SHI physicians, ambu-
                                                     
14
  See § 73 (1a) SGB V 
15
  See § 85 (1) SGB V 
16
  See § 85 (2) SGB V 
17
  See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011a) for an overview of the duties of the 
Federal Ministry of Health.  
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lant care SHI dentists, hospitals, and sickness funds in Germany.
18
 It issues direc-
tives for the benefit catalogue of the SHI system and specifies which medical ser-
vices are reimbursed by the SHI.
19 
 
The National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (NASHIP) 
represents the SHI physicians working in ambulant care on the national level. It is 
the head organization of the Regional Associations of SHI Physicians, represent-
ing the interests of all SHI physicians in ambulant care on the political stage. The 
NASHIP also keeps the federal registry of physicians, advocates the physician 
related positions in legislative processes, and concludes contracts with the um-
brella organization of the SHI sickness funds. In addition, representatives of the 
NASHIP are members of the Federal Joint Committee.
20
   
The umbrella organization of the SHI sickness funds is the National Association 
of Statutory Health Insurance Funds. It represents the interests and political ambi-
tions of SHI sickness funds on the national level. It is also responsible for compli-
ance and the enforcement of several regulative instruments. Similar to the 
NASHIP, it sends representatives to the Federal Joint Committee.
21
  
Following the short presentation of the key stakeholders in ambulant care of the 
SHI system, the question arises, which of them are primary targeted with regula-
tive instruments to contain the expenditures for prescription drugs. As indicated, 
especially pharmacies, pharmaceutical producers, physicians, and patients are the 
objective of various regulations. The next section gives an overview about the 
regulative instruments aiming at these key players on different levels.  
                                                     
18
  See § 91 (1) SGB V 
19
  See § 92 (1) SGB V 
20
  See § 77 (1) SGB V  
21
  See § 217a SGB V 
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II.1.2 Instruments of drug regulation in the German SHI system  
The instruments to contain the growth of drug expenditure for can be classified in 
various ways. Following Schreyögg and Stargardt (2006), regulation schemes can 
be separated into three groups of instruments. While the first type of instruments 
affects the price of prescription drugs, the second type of regulatory instruments 
targets the drug volume dispended in the SHI system. The third category of regu-
latory instruments restricts total expenditures for prescription drugs. 
In addition, it is also possible to classify regulatory instruments as regulative 
schemes targeting the supply side (pharmaceutical producers, pharmacies or the 
wholesalers), and instruments aiming at the demand side (patients, physicians).
22
 
The approach in Figure 3 distinguishes the regulative schemes by the effect level 
of the regulation (macro-, meso-, and micro- level) and the targeted parties of the 
SHI drug market.
23
 Most of the regulative instruments are included in the “Fünftes 
Buch Sozialgesetzbuch” (SGB V), which defines the content and the legal re-
quirements of the Statutory Health Insurance system. 
                                                     
22
  See Busse et al. (2005) 
23
  Figure 3 does not include the possible changes from reforms after December 2007. 
However all amendments to the cited laws and regulative instruments were included 
until the end of 2010.  
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Figure 3: Instruments of drug expense restriction between 2004 and 2007 
 
Source: SGB V 
Macro level regulations 
Following Figure 3, several regulative instruments affect the SHI drug market at 
macro level. They are described in detail in the following for each stakeholder 
group. 
For every prescription drug sold within the SHI system, the corresponding phar-
maceutical producer has to a pay manufacturer’s discount to the sickness funds
24
. 
The percentage of discount differs for drugs with and without patent protection. 
Both discounts are regulated in SGB V.
25
  
Unlike in other European countries (e.g. Great Britain
26
), one of the most restric-
tive form of regulation on the macro level, direct drug price setting by a govern-
mental institution, is not applied in the German SHI system. While statutory 
charges for whole sellers and pharmacies do exist, pharmaceutical producers are 
                                                     
24 
 In reality, the process is slightly more difficult. In the first step, the pharmacies have 
to pay the discount to the sickness funds. Following this, the pharmaceutical produc-
ers have to reimburse this discount to the pharmacies.  
25
  See § 130a (1) and (3b) SGB V for pharmaceutical producer related discounts. 
26
  See Mossialos et al. (2004) 
Effect level Pharmaceutical producer Physician Patient Pharmacy
Macro level
(overall SHI drug market; all 
pharmaceutical producers; 
physicians; patients or 
pharmacies)
• Manufacturer discount
• Price moratorium
• Framework
agreement
• Co-payments for
prescription drugs
• Pharmacy specific
discounts
• Predetermined price
margin for prescription
drugs
• Import quota
• Prohibition of natural
discounts
• Aut-Idem rule
Meso level
(Groups of pharmaceutical 
producers or drugs; 
physicians; patients or 
pharmacies)
• Reference price
• Exemption of OTC drugs from
reimbursement
• Exemption of Lifestyle drugs
from reimbursement
• Medical specialist
group specific pre-
scription limits
• Regional drug agree-
ments
• Bonus malus rule
• Additional co-payments
for drugs in reference
price groups
Micro level
(singular pharmaceutical 
producers or drugs; 
physicians; patients or 
pharmacies)
• Exemption or limitation
from reimbursement
following cost - effectiveness
analysis
• Off-Label use
• Exemption from co-payments
• Rebate contracts
• Price ceilings
• Second opinion procedure
• Physician specific
prescription limit
• Exemption from co-
payments for prescript-
ion drugs
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allowed to set their manufacturer's price freely. Following this, the retail price for 
each drug dispensed at the expense of the SHI system is identical in every phar-
macy.  
While direct price regulation is not applied in the SHI drug market, drug prices 
and therefore pharmaceutical producers are targeted indirectly. One way of doing 
this are temporary price moratoria, freezing drug prices on a specific level for a 
limited time period. The instrument has been frequently used in the past, for ex-
ample between May 1992 and December 1994, October 2002 and December 
2004, November 2005 and March 2008. The latest price freeze comes into effect 
in August 2010 and is planned to last until December 2013.
27
 During the price 
freezes pharmaceutical companies are still able to set their prices freely. However, 
they are obliged to render any additional profits resulting from price increases 
above the pre-determined price level, to the sickness funds of the SHI system as 
an additional rebate.
28
 
Physicians hold a central role within the SHI system, ultimately deciding about 
the drug a patient receives. Although therapeutic freedom when choosing medica-
tion is existent in theory, various regulative instruments affect the decision of the 
physician. As most of physician related regulations are established on the regional 
(meso) or individual (micro) layer, only the framework agreement
29
 between SHI 
sickness funds and the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physi-
cians affects physicians on the macro level. The agreement includes the agreed 
growth rate for outpatient drug expenditures for the following year as well as sup-
ply and efficiency goals for the SHI system. An example for the second goal are 
suggestions about possible lead compounds for selected therapeutic areas. It has to 
be noted, that these goals and suggestions are refined on the regional level, lead-
                                                     
27
  See § 130a (3a) SGB V 
28
  See Busse et al. (2005) 
29
  See § 84 (1) SGB V 
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ing to regional drug agreements between the local sickness funds and the 
RASHIPs. 
One of the few regulative instruments which target insurants of the sickness funds 
within German SHI system as a whole, are prescription charges. Following the 
latest change of patients co-payments,
30
 implemented in 2004, patients are forced 
to make a prescription related co-payment – currently between five and ten euro, 
depending on the price of the drug prescribed. Drugs priced lower than five euro 
have to be paid completely by the patient. Consequently, the price sensitivity of 
patients is assumed to be weak, especially in regard to other European countries
31 
as patients receive any drugs for a maximal co-payment of ten euro – independent 
of the actual price of the drug. However, co-payments are regarded as a mode of 
limiting the Moral Hazard problem – related with the consumption of drugs.
32 
Also, the co-payments are a considerable source of funding amounting to 1.650 
million euro in 2009 and 1.701 million euro in 2010.
33 
 
There are several exemptions from the co-payment rule. Patients suffering from a 
chronic disease, minors and patients with a low income are or can be excluded 
from co-payments. Also, the implementation of certain regulative instruments on 
the micro level can result in the exemption from patient related co-payments.
34
  
Pharmacies inherit the role of a intermediary between pharmaceutical companies 
and patients. Following their importance as the distributer of drugs, they are faced 
with a set of regulations. In addition to the pharmacy specific discounts and the 
predetermined price margins,
35
 pharmacies have to follow guidelines that urge the 
                                                     
30
  See "Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Gesundheitssystems" (2003) 
31
  See Merino-Castelló (2003) 
32
  See Thomson et al. (2004) 
33
  See Häussler et al. (2011) 
34
  See § 43 (1) SGB V 
35 
 See § 130 (1) SGB V  
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dispense of cheaper imported drugs.
36
 These so-called parallel imports differ by 
the prices set within the different markets / countries. Following this, parallel im-
porters buy drugs on the cheaper market (Market 1), import them to the more ex-
pensive market (Market 2), switch the packaging and patient information sheet, 
and sell the drug for a lower price than of the domestic drug in Market 2.
37
 Also, 
pharmacies are able to utilize specific wholesale rebates, which include the supply 
of additional drugs free of charge ("buy two get one for free"). This "habit" was 
stopped through a legal change in May 2006,
38
 which prohibited the so-called 
"natural rebates" to pharmacies.  
At last, the Aut-idem
 
rule
39
 mandates pharmacies to exchange expensive with 
cheaper drugs of the same active ingredient if these are available in the same 
strength and package size. Following the legal requirements that were imple-
mented in 1989,
40
 the pharmacist has to choose between the three drugs with the 
lowest price. For the case that the physician writes a specific drug name on the 
patient’s prescription instead of the name of the chemical substance, the pharma-
cist is allowed to choose between the three cheapest drugs and the named drug 
instead.
 
However, physicians can suspend this procedure by adding a reservation 
to the prescription. If a physician opts for this, pharmacies are prohibited to sub-
stitute the prescribed drug with another, possible cheaper, drug. 
While the already presented regulative schemes aim at stakeholder groups as a 
whole, the instruments depicted on the meso level in Figure 3 target specific sub-
groups of drug manufacturers, physicians, patients, and pharmacies.  
 
                                                     
36
  See § 129 (2) SGB V 
37
  See Hancher (2004) 
38
  See "Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Arzneimittelversorgung" 
(2006) 
39
  See § 129 (1) SGB V 
40
  See "Gesetz zur Strukturreform im Gesundheitswesen" (1988) 
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Meso level regulations 
Groups of pharmaceutical producers are affected by several regulative instruments 
on the meso level. An instrument which has a strong impact on the pricing of pre-
scription drugs is reference pricing – an indirect price regulation mechanism, im-
plemented in 1989.
41
 It sets a uniform reimbursement limit – the reference price 
(RP) – for one or several active ingredients. Therefore all producers providing 
drugs containing the included active ingredient are affected by the regulative in-
strument, and in addition physicians and patients. If the price of a product exceeds 
the reimbursement level, patients have to pay the difference between the RP and 
the retail price by themselves.
42
 Originally, only original drugs and their generic 
versions were included in the RP system.
43
 Since 2004, patent protected drugs can 
also be set into reference price groups. In this case, the reference price groups 
consist either of various patent protected drugs or of a mixture of patented origi-
nals, off-patent original drugs and their generic versions.
44
 Therefore reference 
pricing can affect multiple active ingredients at once. The level of the specific 
reference prices are set by the Association of Sickness Funds in agreement with 
the Federal Ministry of Health and revised annually. While the reference price 
differs from group to group, it is always set below the price of original brand 
name drugs.  
In addition, specific sub-groups of pharmaceutical producers were affected by 
changes in the reimbursement system. Especially producers of Over-the-counter 
drugs are confronted with a changed market environment, as OTC drugs have 
generally been excluded from reimbursement since 2004.
45
 Also, unlike in the 
case of prescription drugs, price setting is unrestricted on every step of the distri-
                                                     
41
  See "Gesetz zur Strukturreform im Gesundheitswesen" (1988) 
42
  See Giuliani et al. (1998)  
43 
 See "Gesetz zur Modernsierung des Gesundheitssystems" (2003) 
44
  See Stargardt et al. (2005) 
45
  See § 34 (1) SGB V 
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bution chain for OTC drugs.
46
 Therefore, it is possible for pharmacies to set dif-
ferent prices for the same OTC drug, leading to a possible price competition be-
tween pharmacies. At last, producers are faced with the risk that their products are 
declared to be lifestyle drugs
47
 and thus to be excluded from SHI reimbursement.  
As mentioned before, the majority of regulative instruments affecting physicians 
are located on the meso level. A regulative instrument which targets physicians of 
different medical specialties is the physician specific prescription drug budget. 
The limit, in its current form, was implemented in 2001.
48
 It restricts the drug ex-
penditures per patient, depending on socioeconomic variables like age and gender 
of the patient, but also on the speciality of the physician. It also differs between 
the federal states. The actual, physician specific drug budget is calculated on the 
individual level, concerning the described variables as well as the number of pa-
tients treated in the past year. The effects of overstepping this budget for the sin-
gular physician (micro level) will be discussed later. 
Other regulative instruments target physicians at regional level, such as the men-
tioned regional drug agreements between sickness funds and the Regional Asso-
ciation of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians. These regional agreements can 
include specific rules concerning efficiency goals. One of the most important 
regulative instruments in this context is the lead compound rule, implemented in 
2007.
49
 Following this regulative scheme, the prescription of preferred active in-
gredients for certain indication areas is promoted. Therefore, regional drug 
agreements include quotes, determining that a certain percentage of dispended 
drugs in the indication area should belong to the chosen active ingredient (lead 
                                                     
46
  See Schreyögg et al. (2006)  
47
  Lifestyle drugs are defined as drugs primarily used to increase the quality of life. 
This includes drugs used against erectile dysfunction, regulation of body weight and 
smoking cessation. See § 34 (1) (7) SGB V.  
48
  See "Gesetz zur Ablösung des Arznei- und Heilmittelbudgets" (2001) 
49
  See "Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Arzneimittelversorgung" 
(2006) 
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compound). The foremost intention of this regulation is to increase the market 
share of cheaper molecules in relation to therapeutic comparable active ingredi-
ents that are more expensive.  
Another regulative instrument, that is part of the regional drug agreements, is the 
bonus-malus rule. Implemented following a legal change in 2007,
50
 the bonus-
malus regulation forces payments by physicians in case they overstep fixed daily 
therapy costs for certain illnesses (malus).
51
 If physicians stay below the fixed 
average daily therapy costs, a bonus will be paid to all physicians by the Regional 
Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians. While the regulation was 
implemented in 2007, it has already been discharged in 2008, conflicting with 
other regulatory instruments making the calculation of the actual daily therapy 
costs difficult.
52
 
On the meso level, as Figure 3 shows, certain groups of patients were affected by 
the implementation of reference pricing. This is the case when patients receive 
drugs priced above the reference price, as they have to pay the difference between 
the reference price and the more expensive drug on their own. While such cases 
are rather uncommon,
53
 as pharmaceutical manufactures normally decrease their 
prices at least to reference price level, the case of additional, patient related pay-
ment is only mentioned for the sake of completeness. 
Micro level regulations 
The last row (micro level) of Figure 3 shows that also the singular pharmaceutical 
manufacturer can be affected by a variety of regulative instruments.  
                                                     
50
  See "Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Arzneimittelversorgung" 
(2006) 
51
  See § 84 (3) SGB V 
52
  See Rieser (2007) 
53
  An example is the case of atorvastatine (brand name Sortis®), whose producer 
Pfizer® did not reduce the price onto the reference price or below after the inclusion 
of the active ingredient in a reference price group. 
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Especially producers of high priced patent drugs are possible targets of cost-
effectiveness analysis, conducted by the Institute for Quality and Economic Effi-
ciency (IQWiG) on behalf of the Federal Joint Committee.
54
 Following a cost-
effectiveness analysis, active ingredients and therefore the corresponding drugs, 
can be excluded from reimbursement or limited to certain patient groups.  
The Federal Joint Committee can also allow or deny the so-called off-label use of 
prescription drugs.
55.
In the case of a positive decision of the committee, testifying 
an additional utility for patients, the corresponding drugs can be prescribed in 
medical indication areas without being accredited for the specific indication. This 
practice is mostly utilized for serious illnesses such as various forms of cancer or 
HIV.  
Another important regulative instrument, targeting the singular manufacturer is to 
exempt the manufacturer's drugs from patient related co-payments. This can lead 
to demand increases, since patients, as well as physician, usually prefer drugs 
without co-payments. The exemption can result from two regulative instruments:
56
 
The first option is based on the reference price system. Following a health care 
reform in 2006,
57
 the Federal Association of the Health Insurance Funds,
58
 is able 
to exempt drugs in certain reference price groups from the patient prescription 
charge. To be able to utilize this exemption, producers have to lower their prices 
to a certain level below the reference price.
59
 
                                                     
54
  See § 35b (1) SGB V 
55
  See § 35b (3) and § 35c SGB V  
56
  Beside these two options, patients can be exempted from drug related co-payments if 
the sum of their yearly co-payments exceeds a certain yearly level, the so-called 
“Belastungsgrenze”. The various regulations and special cases for chronically ill pa-
tients can be found in § 62 (1) (2) SGB V 
57
  See "Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Arzneimittelversorgung" 
(2006) 
58
  See § 213 (2) SGB V 
59
  See § 31 (3) SGB V 
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The second option for manufactures to exempt their drugs form the patient pre-
scription charge follows the conclusion of a rebate contract with a sickness fund. 
Rebate contracts, comprise of agreements on additional discounts between pro-
ducers and sickness funds and usually cover a specific active ingredient or the 
whole product portfolio of the producer. Introduced in 2003, rebate contracts were 
not common until 2007. Following legal changes in that year,
60
 rebate contracts 
now overwrite the previously stated Aut-idem rule. Therefore pharmacists are 
forced by law to dispense the drugs which are part of the rebate contract unless 
the physician has not prevailed substitution. Following the conclusion of a rebate 
contract, sickness funds can exempt the rebated drugs half or fully from patient 
prescription charges.
61
  
Another regulation that was implemented following another health care reform in 
2007,
62
 are price ceilings for drugs which are not included in the reference price 
system.
63
 The price ceilings are either negotiated between the pharmaceutical 
companies and the Federal Association of the Health Insurance Funds on a volun-
tary base or are set after cost-effectiveness analysis has been conducted. However, 
until December 2010, the instrument has not been used in the SHI system.  
At last, drugs of singular producers that are associated with huge yearly therapy 
costs or a strong risk potential can be targeted by the second-opinion procedure.
64
 
In this case, the drug treatment can only be performed by the attending physician 
after the consultation of an specialist for pharmacotherapy. Until now (December 
2010), only drugs containing specific active ingredients for the treatment of pul-
monary hypertension are affected by this regulation.  
                                                     
60
  See "Gesetz zur Stärkung des Wettbewerbs in der gesetzlichen Krankenversiche-
rung" (2007) 
61
  See § 31 (3) SGB V 
62
  See "Gesetz zur Stärkung des Wettbewerbs in der gesetzlichen Krankenversiche-
rung" (2007) 
63
  See § 31 (2a) SGB V 
64
  See § 73d SGB V 
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The most important regulative scheme, targeting the singular physicians, is a con-
sequence of the individual prescription limit that was explained on the meso level 
section. In case of overstepping the individual prescription budget the physician 
can be forced to undergo a verification process, determining the reasons for the 
budget excess. This procedure, enforced by the responsible RASHIP, can lead to 
various results. In the worst case, the physician can be made liable for excess pre-
scriptions. Fearing the negative financial consequences, physicians usually try to 
avoid the verification process by prescribing less expensive drugs, e.g. generic 
drugs to relieve their prescription budget.  
II.2 Datasets and econometric software  
The empirical analyses conducted in this thesis are based on three different data-
sets.  
The first dataset, provided by the German market research company INSIGHT 
Health, contains approximately 99 % of the drug prescriptions in the German SHI 
market, covering the time span from January 2004 to December 2007 on a 
monthly basis. For each manifestation, in terms of strength, package size and dos-
age form, of every drug prescribed in the SHI system the data includes informa-
tion on sales volume and the amount of dispensed Defined Daily Doses (DDD).
65
 
The dataset also contains information on the producer and the status of the drug as 
a generic or original drug with or without patent protection. For the analysis con-
ducted in this thesis, several active ingredients were chosen from the dataset.  
The use of the INSIGHT Health data has some advantages. First of all, as 99 % of 
the SHI prescription drug market is covered, the risk for misleading results, fol-
lowing a possible bias of the database is small. Secondly, as the dataset is not lim-
ited on certain active ingredients, the SHI drug market can be analyzed in more 
detail.  
                                                     
65
 Defined Daily Doses (DDDs) are a WHO statistical measure of drug consumption 
used to standardize the comparative usage of various drugs between themselves or 
between different health care environments. 
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The second dataset, provided by a large German sickness fund, includes informa-
tion on the complete prescription history of patients and their physicians between 
January 2004 and December 2007 on a monthly basis for three different indica-
tions. The identity of patients and physician was made anonymous. The dataset 
also includes socio economic variables like age, gender and the employment 
status of patients, as well as information on the nature and the dispatch date of the 
drug. In opposition to the first dataset, these so-called routine data represent only 
a share of the SHI market. Since only the dataset of a singular sickness fund was 
available – even though it comprises of a large number of members (>1.5 million 
insured persons) – the results could be biased. This is due to the historically de-
termined differences in the sickness funds risk profiles, as before 1993, each sick-
ness fund contracted specific population subgroups.
66
 Therefore, the dataset col-
lected from a singular sickness fund cannot be regarded as representative for the 
overall German population.
67
 Thus, the results of the analysis in Part IV should to 
be interpreted considering this limitation.  
The third dataset was created from different sources. As a main focus of the thesis 
are regulative instruments, a dataset was constructed containing information on 
the inclusion of drugs in rebate contracts,
68
 reference price groups
69
 and the corre-
sponding possible exemption from patient related co-payments.
70
 Also drugs with 
active ingredients which were part of the lead compound regulation were identi-
fied through the framework agreement between sickness funds and the National 
Association of Statutory Health Insurance. The third dataset is connected to the 
                                                     
66
  For example, the TK (Techniker Krankenkasse) contracted only individuals with 
technical professions like engineers or master craftsmen.  
67
  See Holle et al. (2005)  
68 
 Information provided by INSIGHT Health 
69
  Information provided by the Federal Joint Committee and the German Institute of 
Medical Documentation and Information  
70
  Information provided by the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
Funds 
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first and the second one through the central pharmaceutical number (PZN) that 
identify a drug uniquely within the SHI system.  
All econometric analysis in part III - V were conducted using the STATA 10.1® 
software package (StataCorp LP). In some parts of the thesis user-written com-
mands for the STATA software were used. These commands were in detail 
"xtivreg2" in Part IV
71
 and "margeff." in Part V.
72
 For the theoretical analysis of 
the rebate contracts, conducted in Part VI, Mathematica 5.0® was applied.  
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III. The influence of reference price policy changes 
on the pricing of patent, original and generic 
pharmaceuticals 
III.1 Introduction 
The increase in drug expenditures is one of the biggest challenges for the German 
healthcare system. In 2010, the expenditures for prescription drugs (also called Rx 
drugs) amounted to 30.2 billion euro.
1
 In comparison with the expenditures for Rx 
drugs in 2010 (19.4 billion euro), the expenditures increased strongly in the last 
decade. While the overall expenditures in the SHI system also have increased be-
tween 2000 and 2010 from 133.7 billion euro to 176.0 billion euro, the share of 
the expenditures for Rx drugs has increased over time.
2
 In 2000, 14.5 % of the 
overall expenditures in the SHI system were drug related. In 2010 the share had 
increased to 17.1 %.  
Rx drugs can be divided into three different groups, depending on their patent 
status. The first group are drugs under patent protection, called patent drugs. It is 
not allowed to produce and sell drugs with the same active ingredient without the 
permission of the patent holder. The second type of drugs consists of active ingre-
dients whose patent protection has expired. These drugs, called original (off-
patent) drugs,
3
 can be produced by other companies without legal issues. The 
pharmacological identical versions of these original (off-patent) products are 
called generic drugs. They form the third kind of drugs.  
                                                     
1 
 See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011) 
2 
 See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011)  
3
 In the following, the terms original drugs and original (off-patent) drugs are used 
synonymously.  
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The German government introduced different instruments to control the rising 
cost for prescription drugs. One of the most important instruments, implemented 
in 1989, are reference prices. 
The reference price system is an indirect method for controlling prices of prescrip-
tion drugs. Unlike for other prescription drugs, the reimbursement of drugs be-
longing to a reference price group through the Statutory Health Insurance is lim-
ited. This ceiling price is called reference price. If the price of the reference drug 
is above that amount, the consumer has to pay the difference.  
Until 2004 drugs under patent protection were excluded from the reference price 
system. As a consequence only original (off-patent) drugs and their generic com-
petitors were included in reference price groups. The approach was changed in 
2005. Since then it is possible to establish reference price groups which include 
therapeutically and pharmacologically comparable patent, original, and generic 
drugs. The reference price, which is set below the prices of original and patent 
drugs,
4 
let producers choose to either decrease their prices at least to the reference 
price level or, by denying this, forcing patients to pay the difference between the 
retail price and the reference price.  
Market data from various European countries shows that most producers choose 
to decrease their prices to be competitive as the results of the studies of Schnee-
weiss et al. (1998), Aronsson et al. (2001), Lexchin (2004), Puig-Junoy (2007) 
and Kaló et al. (2007) show. However, these studies do not determine, which 
share of price reduction was caused by reference pricing and not due to the com-
petitive situation in the various European markets.  
Pavcnik (2002) was the first author who compared the price development of 
therapeutic groups after the introduction of a reference price system, distinguish-
ing between original (off-patent) drugs
 
and their generic competitors while con-
trolling for the degree of competition in the observed markets. Her results for two 
                                                     
4
 The reference price is located above the price level of the generic competitors, which 
are cheaper than their original counterpart.  
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indication areas in the German SHI market indicate a larger price decrease for 
original drugs with increasing competition through additional generic drugs.  
Brekke et al. (2009) used the introduction of the reference price system in Norway 
in 2003 to estimate the effects of the policy change on the pricing strategies of 
pharmaceutical firms. The results show that the prices of generics and original 
(off-patent) drugs decrease significantly. The effect is stronger on the prices of 
original (off-patent) drugs.  
The theoretical framework of Pavcnik (2002) and Brekke et al. (2009) can be 
found in Danzon and Lui (1996), and Zweifel and Crivelli (1996). The first au-
thors argue that all prices within a reference price cluster converge towards the 
determined reference price. They conclude that the prices of original drugs de-
crease to the level of the reference price, while the prices of generic drugs in-
crease.  
Zweifel and Crivelli (1996) developed a theoretical model that suggests that the 
reference price system has a primary effect on the prices of original products 
while the prices of generics remain stable. Both motivations are not completely in 
line with the recent results of Pavcnik (2002) and Brekke et al. (2009). While both 
studies find that the prices of original drugs decline after the implementation of 
reference prices, the prices of generics did not remain stable but also decreased.  
At last, Augurzky et al. (2009) showed the effects of the German reference price 
system on ex-factory prices. The results indicate that ex-factory prices do not ad-
just fully to changes of reference prices, as a change of reference prices of 1 % 
leads to a 0.3 % change of market prices. In addition, the authors found that the 
introduction of reference prices leads to a 7 % reduction of market prices for af-
fected drugs. 
All presented empirical studies suggest that the reference price system has an im-
pact on the prices of original and generic products. However, while these studies 
analyze the effects of reference pricing on original products, none of the works 
distinguishes between on-patent drugs and original drugs with an expired patent 
protection. Yet, the differentiation between these types of original drugs seems 
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crucial for the explanation of differences in price reactions on the introduction of 
reference pricing.  
As the research of Ellison et al. (1997) and Morton (1997) showed, the main com-
petition occurs between original and generic products with the same active ingre-
dient and not between products with different but comparable active ingredients. 
Consequently, it seems reasonable that the producers of on-patent drugs have a 
lower price elasticity than producers of original drugs. Thus, the price response of 
patent drugs on the introduction of reference pricing should be weaker than price 
reactions of original drugs.  
Since none of the existing studies
5
 considered this aspect, the main contribution of 
this paper is the analysis of differences in the price reactions of patent, original 
and generic drugs following the implementation of a joint reference price.  
Thereby, the inclusion of two major therapeutic groups in the reference price sys-
tem is used to investigate, for the first time, the effects of a joint reference price 
on the pricing of patent, original, and generic drugs. The included therapeutic 
groups, HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (statins) and proton pump inhibitors (PPI) 
were chosen for various reasons. Most important, both therapeutic groups include 
patent, original, and generic drugs. In addition, they provide treatment for major 
diseases in civilized countries and are widely prescribed.  
Statins are used in the therapy of high cholesterol levels to reduce the risk of car-
diovascular diseases. PPIs are applied to treat dyspepsia, peptic ulcer disease, and 
the laryngopharyngeal reflux disease.  
The results indicate that prices of patent, original, and generic drugs decreased 
after the reference price implementation. The price decrease for original (off-
patent) drugs was stronger than for patent drugs although patent drug prices were 
higher than original drug prices before the introduction of the reference price sys-
tem. The results also indicate that competition reduces the prices of drugs. The 
                                                     
5
  See López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000) for an overview on additional studies 
concerning reference pricing.  
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effect is weaker for branded (patent or original) drugs than for generics. More-
over, the impact of competition on prices is stronger after the introduction of ref-
erence prices. Again, branded drugs are less affected by additional competitors. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section gives information about the 
German SHI market for Rx drugs mainly focusing on the systematic of the refer-
ence price system. Section III.3 shows the theoretical motivation behind the dif-
ferent price reactions of the three drug types. The description of the database and 
the descriptive statistics for both therapeutic groups are provided in Section III.4 
and III.5. The econometric model and the discussion of the empirical results are 
presented in Section III.6. The article concludes with a résumé of the results and 
possible explanations of the pricing strategies for the different types of drugs. 
III.2 Reference Pricing in the German market for pharmaceuticals 
The German Health System features a statutory health insurance (SHI) which 
covers most of the German population (about 90 %).
6 
The insurance system reim-
burses the costs for the majority of consumed drugs. Only over-the-counter drugs 
(OTC-Drugs) and certain specific drugs are excluded from general reimburse-
ment.  
The German market for Rx pharmaceuticals is highly regulated.
7 
The legal frame-
work regulates the market entry and distribution of drugs. Also, several statutory 
regulations concerning the restriction of drug expenditures in the SHI market ex-
ist. The regulation authority of the German SHI market, the Federal Ministry of 
Health, uses several of such instruments to contain the drug expenditures.
8
 The 
regulations include mandatory discounts for drugs to the Statutory Health Insur-
                                                     
6
 See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2010a) 
7
 This analysis is focused on the Statutory Health Insurance Market. The private health 
insurance market is not part of the analysis.  
8
  For an overview of these instruments, see Busse et al. (2005), Greß et al. (2007), and 
Denda (2010) 
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ance, restricting the retail pharmacist to dispense one of the cheapest comparable 
drug to the customer (aut-idem), and affecting the prescription behavior of physi-
cians through physician specific drug budgets. Especially the drug budget
9
 en-
courages physicians to prescribe cheaper drugs as overstepping of the budget 
leads to discussions with sickness funds and the Regional Association of Statutory 
Health Insurance Physicians.
10
 Following this discussion, the physician can be 
made financially responsible for the difference between his drug budget and his 
overall amount of prescribed drugs in the quarter.  
Another important regulative instrument is the reference price scheme, imple-
mented in 1989. It represents a maximal reimbursement schema for Rx pharma-
ceuticals. If the price of a drug which is included in a reference price group ex-
ceeds the stipulated reference price, the patient is forced to make out-of-pocket 
payments, covering the difference between the retail price and the reference 
price.
11
 
The Federal Joint Committee
12
 decides which drugs are covered by the reference 
price system. The implementation of the reference prices is left to the National 
                                                     
9
  The drug budget that restricts the drug expenditures per patient and quarter, depends 
on socioeconomic variables like age and gender of the patients, but also on the spe-
cialty of the physician. It also differs between the federal states. The actual, physi-
cian specific drug budget is calculated based on the described variables as well as the 
number of patients treated in the previous year.  
10 
 The Regional Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (RASHIP) are 
responsible for the medical supply of compulsorily insured people. Each physician 
who wants to treat compulsorily insured persons has to be a member of the compe-
tent RASHIP. 
11 
 See Stargardt et al. (2005) 
12
 The Federal Joint Committee is the highest decision -making body of the joint self-
government of physicians, dentists, hospitals, and health insurance funds in Ger-
many. It issues directives for the benefit catalogue of the SHI system and specifics 
which services in medical care are reimbursed by the SHI. 
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Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds
13
 that also decides on the level of 
the reference price in agreement with the Federal Ministry of Health. The refer-
ence price levels are determined in different steps.
14
  
First, the reference price for a standard package/strength is set within a corridor 
between the manufacturer prices and a price level set by the Federal Joint Com-
mittee based on legal requirements of the Book V of the Social Code. Following 
this, a quasi-hedonic regression equation (Cobb Douglas form) is used to estimate 
coefficients that are applied to determine the relative reference prices for different 
package sizes and strengths. After the implementation of the reference prices, they 
are revised annually and adjusted, if necessary.  
In contrast to other countries the German SHI system includes both generic and 
therapeutic reference pricing.
15
 This fact is reflected in the different types of refer-
ence price groups. A drug which is proposed to be covered by the reference price 
system can be sorted into one of three different types of reference price groups: 
 Phase 1: Drugs with the same active ingredient (generic reference pricing) 
 Phase 2: Drugs with therapeutically and pharmacologically similar active 
ingredients (therapeutic reference pricing) 
 Phase 3: Drugs with comparable therapeutic effect, especially 
combinations (therapeutic reference pricing) 
Until 2004 patent protected drugs were excluded from reference pricing. The spe-
cial status of patent drugs ended with the introduction of the SHI Modernization 
                                                     
13
 The National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds is the central lobby of 
the statutory health insurance and long-term care insurance funds. It shapes the out-
line conditions for healthcare in Germany and represents the interests of the SHI 
sickness funds in the Federal Joint Committee.  
14 
 For a more detailed explanation, see Stargardt et al. (2005) 
15
  Generic reference pricing allows only the inclusion of drugs with the same active 
ingredient in a joint reference price group. In therapeutic reference pricing, it is pos-
sible to assemble drugs of different active ingredients that are therapeutically or 
pharmacologically similar in a joint reference price group. 
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Act
16
 in 2005. Following the legal change, it is possible to create joint Phase 2 
reference price groups that include patent drugs as well as original drugs and their 
generics consisting of similar active ingredients. Examples for such joint refer-
ence price group are the therapeutic groups of statins and proton pump inhibitors. 
The various active ingredients belonging to this group became subject to reference 
pricing in January 2005. The established reference price group includes patent 
protected active ingredients like atorvastatin but also active ingredients like sim-
vastatin whose patent status is already expired.  
Following the policy change, pharmaceutical manufacturers of patent drugs were 
facing a new market situation. Instead of having the security of a full reimburse-
ment and a monopolistic position during the patent protection period, patent drugs 
are forced to compete with possible considerable cheaper drugs.  
The next chapter shows a theoretical motivation, how the producers of patent 
drugs (P), original drugs (O), and generic drugs (G) react to the implementation of 
a joint reference price.  
III.3 Theoretical Motivation 
Motivating the empirical approach, the following section presents a simple theo-
retical model which explains the impact of reference price policy changes on the 
pricing of patent, original and generic drugs. The model is inspired by Brekke et 
al. (2009).  
We assume a therapeutic market with a patent drug (drug P), an off-patent origi-
nal (drug O) and a generic drug (drug G).  
Patients are assumed to be fully insured and only have to make a co-payment of 
ic  where i= P,O,G  with 0
i
i
c
>
p


where ip  is the price of drug i. 
                                                     
16
  See "Gesetz zur Modernisierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung" (2003) 
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The parameter jc  describes the co-payment for a substitute drug with j= P,O,G  
with 0
j
j
c
>
p


 where jp  is the price of drug j. 
The demand for drug i  is i p O GD(c ,c ,c ), where 0
i
i
D
<
c


 and 0i
j
D
>
c


. The reve-
nue of company i is given by i i i p O Gπ = pD(c ,c ,c ) .  
The demand response on rising drug prices is assumed to be different for patent, 
original, and generic drugs.  
In the German Health System the prescribing physician can choose the drug that 
will be dispensed by the pharmacies. In the case of bioequivalence the choice be-
tween original and generic product should not be difficult for the physician. The 
prescription of the cheaper generic product should be the rational choice for the 
physician, as both patients (lower co-payment) and physicians (lower burden for 
the drug budget) benefit from the dispense of generic drugs.  
Still, original drugs are normally higher-priced than generics without losing their 
complete market share.
17
 This suggests that original drugs have an additional sub-
jective utility for physicians and/or patients.
18
 Such potential additional benefits of 
original drugs could be the reduction of side effects for patients or the long term 
experiences of the physicians with the original drug.  
Consequently it seems reasonable to assume that an original drug can have a 
higher price without a complete loss of demand, suggesting that O G
O G
D D
>
c c
 
 
.  
This coherence should be even more distinctive for patent drugs. Since patent 
drugs contain a unique active ingredient it is possible that the effectiveness or the 
                                                     
17
 See Aronsson et al. (2001). The argument is also supported by the results in Section 
III.5.2III.5.2. 
18
 See Hellerstein (1998) and Coscelli (2000) for results on physician's persistence for 
prescribing brand-named drugs.  
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range of side effects is better than of any comparable original or generic drug. 
This aspect can be used by the pharmaceutical companies to apply higher prices 
than original and generic drugs without losing demand completely. This leads to 
the following assumption concerning the demand reactions of all three drug types: 
0G O P
G O P
D D D
< < <
c c c
  
  
.  
Even though patent, original and generic drugs are considered therapeutic similar 
due to the inclusion in a joint reference price group, they are no perfect substi-
tutes. The price reaction on the implementation of a reference price should be dif-
ferent for the three types of drugs.  
Let the reference price ( )RPp  be set below the price of the original and patent 
drug but above the price of the generic drug: 
 G RP O Pp p p p    (1) 
If the price of a drug exceeds the reference price, the difference between ip  and 
RPp  has to be paid by the patient. This type of co-payments
19
 has to be differenti-
ated from regular co-payments per drug, which are independent of the reference 
price. The regular co-payments per drug are defined as a rate 0 1<α<  of the re-
tail price ( ip ). Thus, patient related costs can be expressed as: 
 
                          
( )    
i i RP
i
RP i RP i RP
p if p p
c
p p p if p p



 
  
 (2) 
where   is considered to be equal for all drugs. 
The introduction of reference pricing leads to higher co-payments for patent and 
original drugs. Prior the introduction of reference pricing, patients only had to pay 
the co-payment rate   independent of the drug type. After the implementation of 
                                                     
19
  The German expression for this type of co-payment is "Aufzahlung".  
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the regime, the situation changes for patent and original drugs. Patients have to 
make additional co-payment of ( ip - RPp ), given constant prices.  
Following this, the first order conditions for the patent, original and generic drugs 
are: 
 
[ ]
( , , )P PP P O G P
P P
D
D c c c p
p c
  
 
 
 (3) 
 
[ ]
( , , )O OO P O G O
O O
D
D c c c p
p c
  
 
 
 (4) 
 
[ ]
( , , )G GG P O G G
G G
D
D c c c p
p c


  
 
 
 (5) 
The demand for patent and original drugs should therefore be lower for given 
prices. Since it is assumed that 
O
O
P
P
c
D
c
D





, the demand reaction for patent drugs 
should be weaker than for original drugs.  
The situation of generic drugs is more ambiguous. Since the reference pricing 
leads to higher co-payments for patent and original drugs for given prices, the 
demand for generic drugs should increase. Consequently, generic producers 
should increase their prices in reaction. However, if patent and original producers 
decrease their prices following the reference price implementation to reduce the 
additional patient related co-payments, generic producers also should respond 
with a price reduction. Also, it should be noted that cheaper generic prices are 
preferred by physicians because of their prescription restrictions due to the physi-
cian specific drug budget.  
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Finally, the following hypotheses can be derived from the model: 
H 1. Producers of patent drugs as well as producers of original drugs are 
 stimulated to reduce their prices after the introduction of reference 
 prices. 
H 2. The price reduction should be stronger for original drugs than for 
 patent drugs. 
H 3. The price reaction of generic drug producers is assumed to be weaker 
 and potentially ambiguous.  
III.4 Data set 
The empirical analysis is based on data of the SHI market for prescription drugs. 
The dataset, provided by the German market research company INSIGHT Health, 
contains approximately 99 % of the drug prescriptions in the German SHI market. 
It covers the relevant market from January 2004 to June 2006 on a monthly base.  
The study uses the data for two therapeutic groups, HMG-CoA reductase inhibi-
tors (statins) and proton pump inhibitors (PPIs). Both groups were included in 
reference price system in January 2005. For that, all drugs containing the active 
ingredients with the ATC-Code
20
 C10AA* (for statins) and A02BC* (for PPIs) 
became part of the respective reference price group.  
Important for this study, both therapeutic groups contain patent, original, and ge-
neric drugs. Therefore, the established reference price groups are Phase 2 refer-
ence price groups, containing drugs with therapeutically and pharmacologically 
similar active ingredients.  
                                                     
20
 In the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system, the drugs are 
divided into different groups according to the organ or system on which they act and 
their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. Drugs are classified in 
groups at five different levels. The drugs are divided into fourteen main groups (1st 
level), with one pharmacological/therapeutic subgroup (2nd level). The 3rd and 4th 
levels are chemical/pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups and the 5th level is the 
chemical substance. 
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The first group, statins, are applied to reduce cholesterol levels and therefore to 
reduce the risk of cardiovascular diseases. The prescriptions of statins in the SHI 
system lead to expenditures of 583 million euro in 2006, ranked under the 20 
therapeutic groups with the most revenues in 2006. Overall, 1.7 billion Defined 
Daily Doses (DDD)
21
 of statins were dispensed in 2006, making them one of the 
most dispensed therapeutic groups in 2006.
22 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics statins 
Active ingredient Total N Patent Original Generics 
Simvastatin 33 - 5 28 
Lovastatin 19 - 5 14 
Pravastatin 2 - 2 - 
Fluvastatin 2 2 - - 
Atorvastatin 1 1 - - 
N is the number of products for the active ingredient in the balanced panel. In case of columns (2) 
- (4), N is the number of patent, original, and generic products for the active ingredient (including 
re-imports). Source: INSIGHT Health 
The second therapeutic group, proton pump inhibitors (PPI), is used in the treat-
ment of acid secretion. In 2006, 996 million DDD of PPIs were dispensed in the 
German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) market, leading to drug expenditures of 
993 million euro. Therefore PPIs were the therapeutic group with the highest 
revenues in the German SHI market in 2006. 
                                                     
21
 Defined Daily Doses (DDD) are a WHO statistical measure of drug consumption 
that are used to standardize the comparative usage of various drugs between them-
selves or between different health care environments. 
22
 Based on NVI Dataset, provided by the German market research company INSIGHT 
Health, which contains approximately 99 % of the drugs prescriptions in the German 
SHI market. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics PPIs 
Active ingredient Total N Patent Original Generics 
Omeprazole 19 - 1 18 
Pantoprazole 6 6 - - 
Lansoprazole 6 - 6 - 
Raboprazole 7 7 - - 
Esomeprazole 1 1 - - 
N is the number of products for the active ingredient in the balanced panel. In case of columns (2) 
- (4), N is the number of patent, original, and generic products for the active ingredient (including 
re-imports). Source: INSIGHT Health 
The dataset contains the sales volume and the quantity of dispensed drugs for both 
therapeutic groups. For each version
23
 of a drug, the sales volume was expressed 
in euro. The quantity was delivered in the number of dispensed prescriptions per 
drug. The quantity then was transformed to the amount of dispensed Defined 
Daily Doses (DDD) using the official measured value of DDD per package of the 
drug from WiDO.
24
 Following this procedure the sold quantities of all versions of 
a drug with a specific active ingredient were added up for each producer. This 
standardization enables a price and volume comparison between different package 
sizes, strengths, and also across different active ingredients.
25
  
                                                     
23 
 Most drugs are sold in different versions, which differ in package size and/or 
strength.  
24
 The "Wissenschaftliches Institut der Ortskrankenkassen" (WIdO) is the scientific 
institute of the Local Health Care Fund (AOK), Germany’s largest health insurance 
fund. One of its task is the adjustment of the international DDD levels, issued by the 
WHO on a yearly base, for the German health care market. 
25
 For example, a product x of a specific manufacturer has a DDD of 6 g. This is 
equivalent to 12 standard (500mg) tablets. If a patient consumes 48 (500mg) tablets 
(i.e. 24g of the drug in total) over six days, this equals a consumption of 4 DDDs of 
the drug. For more information see Häussler et al. (2007). 
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Following the suggestions of Stern (1995), Ellison et al. (1997), Pavcnik (2002) 
and Augurzky et al. (2009), the prices per period were derived in the following 
way: 
 
         
Price
          
Cumulated sales of all versions of a drug per producer
Cumulated dispended DDD of all versions of a drug per producer
   
In the following, the calculated average price per DDD will be referred to as price. 
Taking inflation into account a price deflator from the German Federal Statistical 
Office was used to express the prizes in 2005 euro prices.
26
  
The dataset contains additional information about the name of the manufacturer 
and drug status (patent, original, or generic drug).  
In the estimation process a balanced panel data set was used. It only includes 
products that were available during the whole time period. Following this, the 
number of observations is identical for every year. The influence of newly 
launched products on the results is considered by controlling the degree of compe-
tition in the estimation.  
III.5 Descriptive Results 
III.5.1 Average weighted prices  
It seems useful to start with an overview on the summarized statistics of the two 
different therapeutic groups which are covered in this research. Since the dataset 
is constricted, outliers could strongly bias the descriptive results when using non 
weighted prices. To solve this problem the prices were weighted with their 
monthly market share in the corresponding ATC7 group. Table 3 shows the aver-
age weighted prices for the different types of statins. 
                                                     
26
  See Statistisches Bundesamt (2010b) 
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Table 3: Prices of statins 
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Overall drug price  0.089 0.013 0.074 0.107 
Price patent drugs 0.473 0.044 0.41 0.532 
Price original drugs 0.242 0.05 0.188 0.304 
Price generic drugs 0.021 0.001 0.018 0.022 
Average weighted prices per DDD (in 2005 euro), Observation period January 2004 - June 2006, 
Source: NVI, Price Deflator from Federal Statistical Office 
The results in Table 3 indicate that patent drugs have the highest average 
weighted price of all three drug types. As assumed in Section III.3, the average 
price of original drugs is lower. At last, the average price of generic drugs is lo-
cated far below the prices of the patent and original drugs. 
Table 4 shows the summarized statistics for proton pump inhibitors. 
Table 4: Prices of PPIs 
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Overall drug price  0.249 0.031 0.201 0.292 
Price patent drugs 0.412 0.048 0.341 0.486 
Price original drugs 0.410 0.064 0.321 0.481 
Price generic drugs 0.257 0.032 0.207 0.302 
Average weighted prices per DDD (in 2005 euro), Observation period January 2004 - June 2006, 
Source: NVI, Price Deflator from Federal Statistical Office 
The mean average weighted price in the therapeutic group of proton pump inhibi-
tors is higher than in the group of statins. Thus, PPIs can be denoted as the more 
expensive therapeutic group. Still, the price pattern observed for the group of stat-
ins is valid for PPIs, as patent drugs are the most expensive drug type, followed 
by original and generic drugs. However it should be noted, that the average price 
of patent drugs is only slightly higher than the average price of original drugs. 
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This is different for the therapeutic group of statins, where the average price dif-
ference between patent and original drugs is much larger. 
The summarized statistics support the theoretical motivation of Section III.3. For 
both statins and PPIs the average weighted price of patent drugs is higher than the 
average weighted prices of their therapeutic competitors. The average weighted 
price of original drugs is lower than that of patent drugs but above the average 
weighted price of generic compeitors.  
III.5.2 Price development of statins and PPIs 
Following the implications in Section III.3, prices of patent drugs should decrease 
less than the prices of original or generic drugs after the implementation of refer-
ence price groups.  
Figure 4 shows the development of the average weighted prices
27
 during the ob-
servation period for the therapeutic group of statins. Figure 5 does the same for 
the therapeutic group of PPIs. In both figures, the vertical line at month 13 (Janu-
ary 2005) indicates the inclusion of the observed therapeutic groups in the refer-
ence price system.  
                                                     
27
  Denoted as average weighted sales per DDD in the figure. 
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Figure 4: Average weighted prices of patent, original and generic statins 
 
 
Figure 5: Average weighted prices of patent, original and generic PPIs 
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The price development for the therapeutic group of statins indicates that the aver-
age weighted price of patented drugs is always located above the average 
weighted price of original drugs, while the average weighted price of generic 
drugs is located below the level of branded (patent or original) drugs.  
The situation is different for the therapeutic groups of PPIs. Before the introduc-
tion of reference prices in January 2005, the average price of patent drugs was 
slightly below the average price of original drugs. The reason for this was the 
large number of re-imported patent drugs, which were sold on a lower price level 
than the original drug. Since the line represents the average weighted price of all 
patent drugs, the existence of these re-imports lowers the average prices for patent 
drugs in Figure 5. However the price difference diminishes within the observation 
period before the reference price implementation. 
The results in Figure 4 and Figure 5 also confirm the hypotheses, formulated in 
Section III.3. Both, the weighted prices of patent and original drugs decreased 
sharply after the introduction of the reference price system. Also, as expected in 
the theoretical motivation, the price drop was stronger for original drugs than for 
patent drugs. At last, in line with the third hypothesis, the changes in the average 
price level for generic drugs were rather small, compared to the price changes of 
patent and original drugs.  
Additional conformation of the hypotheses for the group of statins can be found in 
Table 5. It shows the average weighted prices for statins before and after the in-
troduction of reference prices in January 2005. 
Table 5: Average weighted prices for statins before and after reference price           
introduction  
 
Prices before RP    
introduction 
Prices after RP       
introduction % price change 
Overall 0.106 0.079 -25.3 
 (0.001) (0.008)  
Patent drugs 0.523 0.439 -16.0 
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 (0.007) (0.015)  
Original drugs 0.296 0.197 -33.4 
 (0.006) (0.004)  
Generic drugs 0.021 0.019 -8.6 
 (0.001) (0.001)  
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
As indicated in Table 5, the overall average weighted price for statins decreased 
by 25.3 % following the establishment of a reference price group for statins. The 
decrease is strongest for original drugs (33.4 %), followed by patent protected 
statins (16.0 %). The lowest price decrease can be found for generic drugs 
(8.6 %), which seems reasonable as generic statins were already on a very low 
price level before the reference price introduction.  
The results are similar for the therapeutic group of the proton pump inhibitors, as 
shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Average weighted prices for PPI before and after reference price introduction  
 
Prices before RP    
introduction 
Prices after RP       
introduction % price change 
Overall 0.258        0.232    -20.9 
 (0.008) (0.012)  
Patent drug 0.466        0.376    -19.2 
 (0.018) (0.017)  
Original drug 0.486        0.362    -25.6 
 (0.004) (0.019)  
Generic drug 0.294        0.232    -21.0 
 (0.007) (0.012)  
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Following the introduction of the reference price system for PPIs in 2005 the 
overall average weighted price decreased by 20.9 %. The strongest decrease can 
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be found for original PPIs (25.6 %), followed by generic (21.0 %) and patent pro-
tected drugs (19.2 %). As in the case of statins, the price drop of original drugs is 
stronger than for patent drugs. The results support the first and second of the hy-
potheses, formulated in Section 3. 
Interestingly, the average price decrease for generic PPIs is much stronger than in 
the case of generic statins (21.0 % for PPI, 8.6 % for statins). A possible explana-
tion for the different price reactions is the diverse competitive environment of 
both therapeutic groups.  
While the number of generics was large in the market of statins from the outset of 
the observation period, only a few generic proton pump inhibitors were available 
during the observation period. Thus, the stronger competition between generic 
producers leads to lower prices of generic statins even before the introduction of 
the reference price system. As a consequence, the price drop was smaller for ge-
neric statins than for generic PPI, which faced less generic competition. These 
results are in line with hypothesis 3, as the price reaction of generic drugs seems 
to be ambiguous.  
III.5.3 Sales volume development for statins and PPIs 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the sales development of prescribed DDD for both 
therapeutic groups. Since physicians are motivated to use generic drugs,
28
 it is 
comprehensive that generic drugs were sold most in both therapeutic groups. The 
results also indicate that the number of patent drugs DDD sold exceeds the num-
ber of original drugs DDD in both therapeutic groups, although the average price 
of patent drugs is higher than that of original drugs. This could be due to the fact 
that patent drugs possibly have an additional utility that is acknowledged by both 
patients and prescribing physicians. In the case of original drugs, physicians and 
                                                     
28
 There are various incentives for physicians to prescribe generics, for example the 
already mentioned physician drug budget. See Hellerstein (1998), Coscelli (2000), 
and Zweifel and Crivelli (1996). 
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patients have the alternative to choose the cheaper generic version. While there 
could be utility differences in the subjective perception of generic drugs, a medi-
cal benefit of the corresponding original drugs should not exist.  
Figure 6: DDD sales of statins 
 
Figure 7: DDD sales of PPIs 
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The impact of reference pricing on the sales of generic, patent and original drugs 
was different for the two observed indication areas.  
The sales of original drugs were not affected strongly due to the reference price 
implementation. In both indication areas they remained the group of drugs with 
the lowest number of sales compared to patent and generic drugs. 
The demand for generic drugs continued to increase for both statins and proton 
pump inhibitors even after the reference price implementation. However, the sales 
increase was stronger for statins than for PPIs during the observation period.  
Similar to the case of original products, the sales figures of patent PPIs remained 
on the same level throughout the remaining observation period In contrast, the 
sales of patent statins decreased permanently to a lower level. This development 
was primary caused by the active ingredient atorvastatin. It lost over 80 % of its 
sales after the introduction of reference prices due to the refusal of the manufac-
turer of atorvastatin to reduce the retail price to the reference price level. 
III.6 Empirical Analysis 
III.6.1 The econometric model 
The descriptive statistics in Section III.5 indicate different price reactions of pat-
ent and original drugs which are exposed to reference pricing. Following this, the 
price decrease should be stronger for original drugs than for patent drugs. These 
effects are analyzed more carefully with the help of an econometric approach that 
based on the models of Lavy (2002), Pavcnik (2002), and Brekke et al. (2009).  
Since all statins and PPIs were included into the reference price system at the 
same time period, a control group of therapeutic competitor drugs that are not part 
of the reference price system, does not exist. Therefore the relationship of refer-
ence pricing and price setting behavior of pharmaceutical producers is considered 
by analyzing the variation in prices before and after the implementation of refer-
ence prices.  
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For this purpose a semi logarithmic approach
29
 of the following form is used:  
 
1 2 3ln( ) ( * ) ( * )it it it i it i
i t it
p RP RP P RP O
FE
   
 
   
  
 (6) 
where itp  is the retail price of product i, as defined before, in month t.  
itRP  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if drug i in month t is included in a 
reference price group, and 0 otherwise
30
.  
The dummy variable iP  takes the value of 1 if drug i is a patent protected drug 
and 0 otherwise. The variable iO  takes the value of 1 if drug i is an off-patent 
original drug, and 0 otherwise. If both variables posse the value of 0, drug i is a 
generic drug.  
Since a two way fixed effect panel regression model
31
 is estimated, the variable 
iFE  captures product specific attributes of drug i that are not observable.
32
 These 
attributes could be product brand name effects due to yearlong marketing efforts, 
a special appreciation of the product by the physicians or subjective drug attrib-
utes like the form or color of the pills.   
The variable t  controls for possible unobserved time-variant shocks. It takes the 
form of a month indicator with the value 1,..,30 for t = 1,...,30. I also calculated 
                                                     
29
  The reason for using a semi logarithmic approach lies in the interpretation of the 
coefficient i . Through the use of a logarithmic depending variable, i  can be in-
terpreted as the change of the depending variable in percent, when changing an inde-
pendent variable i about one unit.  
30
  As all products of every observed active ingredient entered the reference price at the 
same time, itRP  is 0 for t = 1,..,24 and 1 for t = 25,..,48 for each product i.  
31 
 The applicability of the fixed effect model was tested, using the Hausman-test. The 
test results indicate that the Null Hypotheses can be rejected on the 1 % significance 
level. Therefore the use of fixed effects instead of random effects is suggested.   
32
  Fixed effects were captured by using dummy variables for each product, following 
Wooldridge (2002) p.422-433. 
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the models using year indicators and quarter-year indicators instead.
33
 The results 
do not differ much and can be found in Appendix 1. Therefore I use the month 
indicator in the following estimation process.  
The effect of the reference price introduction is therefore identified by the varia-
tion in prices of the year before the reference price introduction and the prices of 
the first year following the implementation. Using (6), it is possible to explore the 
total effect of the introduction of reference pricing on generics, patent drugs and 
original drugs.  
The variable 1  estimates the total effect of the reference price introduction on 
the prices of generic drug.  
The interaction term between itRP  and iP , 2  captures the additional effect of 
reference pricing for patent drugs. Thus, the complete effect of the reference price 
introduction on the price of a patent drug is 21   .
34
  
The coefficient 3  prescribes the additional effect of a reference price policy 
change on prices, if the drug is an off-patent original drug ( )iO . Similar to the 
case of patent drugs, the total effect of the reference price introduction for original 
drugs is 1 3  . 
At last, it  represents unobserved effects that affect prices. The error term it  is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). Also, it is assumed 
that the error term is normal distributed.  
                                                     
33
  See Pavcnik (2000) for a similar approach. 
34 
 For example, if the coefficient of the interaction between itRP  and iP , 2 , is nega-
tive and 1  is also negative, the price of an on-patent drug would decrease more 
than the price of a generic drug.  
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III.6.2 The effect of price moratoria  
While the focus of this research is the effect of the introduction of reference pric-
ing on the pricing of patent, original, and generic drugs, there are other changes in 
regulations that could influence the price development. These factors have to be 
controlled in the estimation. During the observation period, especially a regulation 
scheme called price moratorium falls into this category. This instrument freezes 
the prices of prescription drugs on a certain price level of an earlier time period 
that is determined by the Federal Ministry of Health.  
It has to be noted, that price moratoria do not eliminate the free pricing mecha-
nism in the SHI prescription drug market. Drug manufacturers are still allowed to 
set their prices freely during the price moratorium. However, they have to give 
any additional profits through a price increase above the pre-determined price 
level to the sickness funds in form of an additional rebate. Therefore manufactur-
ers generally would not increase their prices during a price moratorium, as it 
would not lead to additional revenues in the SHI market.
35
 During the study pe-
riod, two price moratoria occurred. The first price freeze ended in December 
2004, while the second one started in April 2006. To control the possible effects, 
the dummy variable tPF  is included.
36
 It takes the value of 1 if a price moratorium 
is in effect in month t, and 0 otherwise.  
III.6.3 The effect of competition 
Since competition could possible affect the prices of patent, original drugs and 
generics,
37
 the degree of competition is controlled in the estimation. Following 
Morton (1997) and Pavcnik (2002) the level of competition is measured by the 
                                                     
35
  See Busse et al. (2005) 
36 
 The variable lacks the index i, as all drugs are covered by a potential price morato-
rium. 
37
 Patent drugs per definition normally do not have competition through other products 
with the same active ingredient. Still they face competition through re-importers. 
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number of competitors itNC  in the active ingredient group for each product i in 
month t.
38
 Also, the differences in the effects of competition on prices of patent 
and original drugs, summarized under the term branded drugs in the following, 
and generic drugs are captured by interaction terms.  
In addition, several interaction dummies, capturing the effects of competition be-
fore and after the reference price introduction, are included in the model. All vari-
ables capturing the effects of competition on the reference price introduction are 
found in the competition control vector itCC . 
The use of the number of competitors to capture the impact of competition on the 
price development of drugs can cause problems. The most common objection is 
the possibility of endogeneity, as the number of competitors within an active in-
gredient could be a function of the price. This would be the case, if a high price 
level on the market influenced the probability of a market entry. While this factor 
should be considered, the problem can be toned down in this analysis, as a pro-
ducer cannot enter a market immediately.
39
 Thus, the entry of competitors is not 
necessarily connected to present prices but to prices in past periods or patent expi-
rations.  
Another possibility to control for the level of competition is the use of the Herfin-
dahl index, as proposed by Pavcnik (2002). However, the number of competitors 
within an active ingredient is chosen to measure the degree of competition due to 
                                                     
38
  Instead of using the number of competitors within an active ingredient, the degree of 
competition can also be measured by taking into account the competition between 
different active ingredients. In this case, every drug i is facing the same number of 
competitors in month t, independent of the active ingredient the drugs belong to. 
However as Morton (1997) and Pavcnik (2002) proclaim, the primary competition 
occurs between drugs consisting of the same active ingredient. Following their ad-
vice, the number of competitors within an active ingredient is used as the measure-
ment of the degree of competition.  
39 
 See Pavcnik (2002) 
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the better interpretability of the results. Also, as noted in the latest literature
40
, the 
use of the Herfindahl index as a measurement of the degree in competition in 
combination with a depending price variable can cause endogeneity problems.  
Including the additional variables in (6), the estimation equation takes the follow-
ing form: 
 
1 2 3 4ln( ) ( * ) ( * )it it it i it i t
it i t it
p RP RP P RP O PF
CC FE
    
  
    
   
 (7) 
Since the database used in the study is a product level panel, the data was checked 
for first-order serial correlation in errors, as Woodridge (2002) proposes. The test 
rejected the Null-hypothesis that there is no first-order serial correlation (p<0.01). 
In addition, the data was tested for heteroskedasticity of the residuals, using a 
modified Wald-Test. The results indicate group wise heteroskedasticity (p<0.01). 
For controlling both problems, product-clustered robust standard errors are esti-
mated. These standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, as well as to any 
form of autocorrelation.
41 
III.7 Estimation results  
A similar set of models is estimated for both therapeutic groups. Model (1) only 
measures the effects of reference pricing on patent, original and generic drugs. 
Model (2) includes the possible effects of a price moratorium. The models (3) - 
(6) include additional sets of interaction variables, estimating the impact of com-
petition on the pricing of generic and branded (patent and original) drugs. 
                                                     
40 
 See Brekke et al. (2009) 
41
 See Kezdi (2005) for additional information about cluster robust standard errors in 
fixed effect models  
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III.7.1 HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (statins) 
The first empirical results describe the effects of reference pricing for the thera-
peutic group of statins. Since the introduction of statins in 1987,
42
 the number of 
different active ingredients, belonging to the therapeutic group has increased.
43 
The market is characterized by a large number of generic drugs, whose numbers 
increased after 2005, and nearly no re-imports. The effects of increasing competi-
tion are captured, using the methods presented in Section III.6.1.  
Table 7 shows the results of the panel data regression for the price effects of the 
introduction of reference prices for statins in 2005, using data from January 2004 
to June 2006.  
Table 7: Effects of the introduction of reference prices on prices of statins, Fixed effect 
estimation with data from January 2004 - June 2006 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficient
44
       
RP -0.021*** -0.059*** -0.043*** 0.028 -0.036*** 0.096*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.045) (0.013) (0.022) 
RP*O -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.265*** -0.282*** -0.280*** -0.466*** 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.043) (0.051) (0.039) (0.078) 
RP*P -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.093*** -0.161*** -0.099*** -0.233*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.018) (0.038) (0.017) (0.02) 
Price Moratorium  -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
                                                     
42 
 The statin Lovastatin was approved by the FDA in August 1987. 
43 
 In 2006, the group consisted of 5 different active ingredients. 
44 
 Avoiding confusion and increasing the clarity of the results, the estimated coefficient 
for generic drugs are named RP instead of 1 . The same applies for the estimated 
coefficients of the additional effects for patent (RP*P) and original (RP*O) drugs.  
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NC   -0.01*** -0.005** -0.013*** 0.003 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
NC*RP    -0.002*  -0.005*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
NC*B     0.006* -0.001*** 
     (0.003) (0.002) 
NC*RP*B      0.007* 
      (0.004) 
Month Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.544*** -0.527*** -0.250*** -0.385*** -0.206*** -0.546*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.05) (0.069) (0.049) (0.038) 
Observations 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 
Number of    
products 
57 57 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.74 
Columns 1 - 3 show the results of the Models (1) - (3), Columns 4 - 5 the results of the Models (4) and 
(5). Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 % - Level; ** 
indicates significance at 5 % - Level; * indicates significance at the 10 % -Level. Cluster robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
The results of the regression models are in line with the hypotheses set out in Sec-
tion III.3.  
As predicted, the prices of generics decrease only to a small amount after the in-
troduction of the reference price system (RC) in 5 of the 6 model specifications. 
The generic prices decrease between -5.9 % (Model (2)) and -9.6 % (Model (6)).  
Confirming the first hypothesis, both patent and off-patent original drug producers 
lowered their prices significantly after the reference price introduction. Also, in 
line with hypothesis 2, patent producers lowered the prices of their products less 
(RP*P) than producers of off-patent originals (RP*O).  
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The price decrease of patent drugs is similar in all estimated models. The full ef-
fect
45
 is between -10.2 % (Model (1)) and -13.7 % (Model (6)). A stronger price 
reduction through reference pricing was estimated for off-patent original drugs. 
Depending on the model, the full effect ranges between -25.4 % (Model (4)) and  
-36.9 % (Model (6)). 
The effect of price moratorium is, as expected, negative and comparable in all 
estimated models. Therefore prices were about -2.3 % lower in months with an 
active price moratorium.  
The impact of competition was measured by the number of competitors (NC) 
within an active ingredient. The results show that the number of competitors per 
active ingredient has a negative impact on prices. For each additional competitor, 
the prices are decreasing about 1 % (Model (3)).  
The effect of additional competition after the introduction of reference prices, 
estimated by NC*RP in Model (4), is negative. Therefore the effect of competi-
tion on prices is stronger, compared to the situation before the reference price in-
troduction, estimated by NC in Model (4).  
The interaction term between branded drugs and the number of competitors 
(NC*B) states, as shown in Model (5), that patent and original drugs are less ef-
fected by additional competition than generic drug producer.  
This pattern prevails even after the introduction of reference prices. The prices of 
patent and original drugs are less effected by competition following the reference 
price introduction as the estimated coefficient in Model (6) (NC*RP*B) indicates. 
                                                     
45 
 Just to remind the reader, the total price effect of the introduction of reference pric-
ing for patent drugs is RP + RP*P, as shown in Section III.6.1. Likewise, the total 
price effect for original drugs is RP + RP*O.  
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III.7.2 Proton Pump Inhibitors  
The market of PPIs differs from that of statins in various ways. One important 
difference is the far lower the number of generic on the market of PPIs. Only the 
active ingredient omeprazole faced continuous generic competition in the com-
plete observation period.
46 
In addition, contrary to market environment of statins, 
the market of PPIs is characterized by a large number of re-importers. Both facts 
could lead to differences in the results between the two therapeutic groups, espe-
cially in concern to the impact of competition on prices.  
Table 8 shows the impact of the introduction of the reference price system for 
PPIs on the prices of patent, original and generic drugs in January 2005.  
Table 8: Effects of the introduction of reference prices on prices of PPIs, Fixed effect 
estimation with data from January 2004 - June 2006 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficient
47
       
RP -0.062*** -0.193*** -0.191*** -0.051 -0.125*** 0.912*** 
 (0.015) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.012) (0.078) 
RP*O 0.036 0.036 0.035 -0.027 -0.09*** -1.055*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.085) (0.042) (0.108) 
RP*P 0.056* 0.056* 0.051 -0.033 -0.058*** -1.052*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.095) (0.022) (0.088) 
Price Moratorium  -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.093*** -0.104*** -0.091*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
NC   -0.001 0.006 -0.038***  0.001 
                                                     
46
 It was only in 2006 generics of another active ingredient, Lansoprazol, entered the 
market of PPIs. 
47 
 Avoiding confusion and increasing the clarity of the results, the estimated coefficient 
for generic drugs are named RP instead of 1 . The same applies for the estimated 
coefficients of the additional effects for patent (RP*P) and original (RP*O) drugs.  
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   (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
NC*RP    -0.008  -0.057*** 
    (0.002)  (0.005) 
NC*B     0.039*** 0.006 
     (0.006) (0.003) 
NC*RP*B      0.051*** 
      (0.005) 
Month Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.594*** 0.667*** 0.683*** 0.592*** 0.952*** 0.610*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.097) (0.048) (0.053) 
Observations 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 
Number of    
products 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.73 
Columns 1 - 3 show the results of the Models (1) - (3), Columns 4 - 5 the results of the Models (4) and 
(5). Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 % - Level; ** 
indicates significance at 5 % - Level; * indicates significance at the 10 % -Level. Cluster robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
Analog to the case of statins, the introduction of the reference price system lead to 
a price decrease for generic drugs (RC) in the majority of the estimated models. 
The prices decreased, depending on the model, between -6.2 % (Model (1)) and    
-19.3 % (Model (2)).  
Both original and patent proton pump inhibitors producers lowered their prices 
after the reference price introduction, as the coefficients in Model (5) and (6) indi-
cate. Consequently also for the therapeutic group of PPIs, hypothesis 1 can be 
confirmed. Interestingly, the effects for both types of branded products, however 
not significant, are weaker than for generic PPIs, when not controlling for the de-
gree of competition (Model (1) and Model (2)).  
The use of the more extensive set of variables capturing the degree of competition 
changes this result. The estimated coefficients in Model (5) and Model (6) indi-
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cate the prices for both patent and original drugs decrease more than the prices of 
generics. 
The coefficients show that the price decrease pattern of original and patent drugs 
supports hypothesis 2. As expected, the effect on prices of patent protected proton 
pump inhibitors (RP*P) is weaker than the effect on the prices of original PPIs 
(RP*O). However, it has to be noted, that while hypothesis 2 can be supported, 
the differences in the price reduction between patent and original drugs are far 
smaller than in the case of statins. 
The results in Table 8 show, that the significant full
48
 price reductions of patent 
drugs after reference price introductions ranges from -14.0 % (Model (6)) to         
-18.3 % (Model (5)), depending on the model. In comparison, prices of original 
drugs decrease significantly between -14.3 % (Model (6)) and -21.5 % (Model 
(5)).  
The effect of price moratorium is, as expected, negative. The prices are lower, 
between -9.1 % (Model (6)) and -10.4 % (Model (4)), during months with a price 
moratorium.  
The significant results concerning the number of competitors indicate that the 
number of competitors (NC) has a negative influence on the prices of generic 
drugs as Model (4) shows. The effect diminishes for branded products as indi-
cated by the positive coefficient NC*B. Therefore brand name products seem to 
be much less effected by competition than generics. As the total effect for brand 
name products (NC+NC*B) is slightly positive. 
The negative effect of additional competition on generic drug prices increases 
after the reference price introduction for generic drugs as the coefficient NC*RP 
in Model (6) indicates. Similar to situation in Model (4), the effect of competition 
                                                     
48 
 Just to remind the reader, the total price effect of the introduction of reference pric-
ing for patent drugs is RP + RP*P, as shown in the Section III.6.1. Likewise, the to-
tal price effect for original drugs is RP + RP*O.  
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after the introduction of reference pricing is weaker for branded (patent or origi-
nal) products (NC*RP*B) than for generic drugs (NC*RP).  
III.8 Conclusion 
This paper estimates the effects of the introduction of a reference pricing in Ger-
many on the price setting behavior of producers of generic, original and patent 
drugs. To analyze the impact of reference pricing on these drug types, the imple-
mentation of joint reference price groups for the two therapeutic groups of statins 
and proton pump inhibitors in January 2005, was used. Both groups included pat-
ent, original, and generic drugs.  
The results show that for both of these two major therapeutic groups of drugs, the 
prices of patent, original, and generic drugs decreased after the reference price 
introduction. Moreover, the producers of original drugs that were facing generic 
competition lowered the prices for their products to a greater extent than the pro-
ducers of patent drugs, whose only direct (same active ingredient) competition are 
re-imports.  
The results also indicate that the competition situation plays an important role for 
the price setting behavior. In the analysis the number of competitors per active 
ingredient was used as a measurement for competition.  
The results show that an increase in the degree of competition leads to lower ge-
neric drug prices. The effect is stronger for generic PPIs in comparison to statins. 
In opposite, additional competition does not strongly affect the prices of patent 
and original drugs in both therapeutic groups. At last, the effect of increasing 
number of competitors is stronger after the introduction of reference prices. This 
effect is again weaker for original and patented drugs compared to generics. 
Overall, the results of the analysis are similar to the findings of Ellison et al. 
(1997), Pavcnik (2002), and Brekke et al. (2009). All studies ascertain that refer-
ence prices trigger different price reductions for off-patent original and generic 
drugs. Also, the important role of the degree of competition in the therapeutic 
market for the price reactions of producers is shown. In line with my results, 
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Pavcnik (2002) finds that the impact of competition is smaller for off-patent drugs 
than for generic drugs.  
However, unlike previous studies, the results of this paper indicate that differ-
ences exist in the price reaction of patent and off-patent original drug producers 
when facing reference prices. The results show that the price decrease is lower for 
patent protected drugs than for off-patent original drugs, given further evidence 
for the existence of an additional benefit for patent drugs. Due to this benefit, pat-
ent drugs have a competitive advantage that allows them to obtain higher prices 
even after being included in reference price group with cheaper competitors.  
Different potential reasons for this additional benefit can be given. One important 
argument for the acceptance of the higher prices for patent and, to a lesser extend, 
for original drugs could be their good reputation among patients and physicians. 
Studies by Hellerstein (1998), Lundlin (2000), and Coscelli (2000) that physicians 
and patients develop consistent choice habits. Their results imply that both parties 
exhibit strong state dependence and are far from being indifferent between 
branded (patent or original) and generic drugs. 
Another explanation is, that both physicians and patients expect better treatment 
results through the use of a patent drug and/or less side effects, leading to the ac-
ceptance of a higher price. Patent producers could build on this reputation and the 
quasi monopolistic market situation for the specific active ingredient to demand 
higher prices. Unlike patent drug producers, the manufacturers of original drugs 
do not have this unique market position. Due to the generic competition they have 
to decrease their prizes strongly after the reference price policy change to remain 
competitive. 
In addition, the smaller price decrease of patent drugs could be the result of the 
high research and development cost for the new drug. DiMasi et al. (2003) esti-
mate the costs of developing a new drug at 802 million USD, while other stud-
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ies49 assess the costs between 500 to 2.000 million USD. Even with the huge dif-
ference between the two numbers, it becomes obvious that the development of a 
new drug is very expensive. To refund these expenditures, producers of patent 
drugs have to demand higher prices than the manufacturers of off-patent originals, 
that were able to refinance their investments during the time period their products 
were under patent protection. 
Finally, the results strongly suggest that the introduction of reference pricing as 
well as important reference price policy changes affect generic, original and pat-
ent drugs differently. It has to be noted, that the role of the demand side, repre-
sented by the physicians and their patients, for the pricing of branded especially 
patent drugs, needs further research. Also, the possible negative effects of the re-
duced price level, due to reference pricing, on the market entry decision of future 
competitors should be investigated more closely.  
III.9 Appendix 1 
Table 9: Effects of the introduction of reference prices for statins, Fixed effect estima-
tion with data from January 2004 - June 2006 with year indicators 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficient       
RP -0.109*** -0.144*** -0.125*** -0.058 -0.120*** 0.014 
 (0.01) (0.013) (0.001) (0.039) (0.008) (0.012) 
RP*O -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.265*** -0.281*** -0.278*** -0.466*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) (0.052) (0.039) (0.078) 
RP*P -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.094*** -0.159*** -0.098*** -0.234*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.018) (0.039) (0.017) (0.019) 
Price Moratori-  -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
                                                     
49
  See Adams et al. (2006) 
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um 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
NC   -0.01*** -0.006* -0.013*** 0.003** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
NC*RP    -0.002*  -0.005*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
NC*B     0.005 -0.001*** 
     (0.003) (0.002) 
NC*RP*B      0.007* 
      (0.004) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.59*** -0.555*** -0.267*** -0.398*** -0.230*** -0.572*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.048) (0.08) (0.048) (0.031) 
Observations 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 
Number of  
products 
57 57 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.73 
Columns 1 - 3 show the results of the Models (1) - (3), Columns 4 - 5 the results of the Models (4) and 
(5). Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 % - Level; ** 
indicates significance at 5 % - Level; * indicates significance at the 10 % -Level. Cluster robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
Table 10: Effects of the introduction of reference prices on prices of PPIs, Fixed effect 
estimation with data from January 2004 - June 2006 with year indicators 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficient       
RP -0.155*** -0.258*** -0.248*** -0.163*** -0.132*** 0.888*** 
 (0.007) (0.01) (0.011) (0.035) (0.014) (0.086) 
  73 
RP*O 0.036 0.036 0.034 -0.006 -0.102** -1.071*** 
 (0.041) (0.01) (0.011) (0.021) (0.015) (0.087) 
RP*P 0.056 0.056 0.044 -0.011 -0.081** -1.069*** 
 (0.034) (0.009) (0.011) (0.024) (0.014) (0.088) 
Price Moratori-
um 
 -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.103*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
NC   -0.004** 0.001 -0.042*** -0.008*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
NC*RP    -0.005**  -0.057*** 
    (0.002)  (0.005) 
NC*B     0.043*** 0.013*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
NC*RP*B      0.051*** 
      (0.005) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.539*** 0.642*** 0.686*** 0.633*** 0.971*** 0.684*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.03) (0.029) (0.019) 
Observations 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 
Number of  
products 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.63 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.73 
Columns 1 - 3 show the results of the Models (1) - (3), Columns 4 - 5 the results of the Models (4) and 
(5). Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 % - Level; ** 
indicates significance at 5 % - Level; * indicates significance at the 10 % -Level. Cluster robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Table 11: Effects of the introduction of reference prices for statins, Fixed effect estima-
tion with data from January 2004 - June 2006 with quarter-year indicators 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficient       
RP -0.057*** -0.202*** -0.170*** -0.105*** -0.164*** -0.039*** 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.017) (0.044) (0.015) (0.014) 
RP*O -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.265*** -0.282*** -0.280*** -0.472*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.043) (0.051) (0.039) (0.077) 
RP*P -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.094*** -0.160*** -0.099*** -0.237*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.04) (0.017) (0.02) 
Price Moratori-
um 
 -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.142*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
NC   -0.01*** -0.005* -0.013*** 0.006** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
NC*RP    -0.002*  -0.005*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
NC*B     0.006*** -0.001*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
NC*RP*B      0.007* 
      (0.004) 
Quarter-Year 
Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.586*** -0.442*** -0.168*** -0.306*** -0.124*** -0.485*** 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.055) (0.086) (0.056) (0.044) 
Observations 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 
Number of  
products 
57 57 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 
Columns 1 - 3 show the results of the Models (1) - (3), Columns 4 - 5 the results of the Models (4) and 
(5). Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 % - Level; ** 
indicates significance at 5 % - Level; * indicates significance at the 10 % -Level. Cluster robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Table 12: Effects of the introduction of reference prices on prices of PPIs, Fixed effect 
estimation with data from January 2004 - June 2006 with quarter year indica-
tors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficient       
RP -0.105*** -0.254*** -0.246*** -0.169 -0.104*** 0.564** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.163) (0.027) (0.251) 
RP*O 0.036 0.036 0.035 -0.002 -0.095** -0.719*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.01) (0.042) (0.247) 
RP*P 0.056 0.056 0.05 -0.001 -0.074*** -0.715*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.111) (0.022) (0.255) 
Price Moratorium  -0.148*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.117*** -0.107*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
NC   -0.002 0.003 -0.04*** 0.014 
   (0.003) (0.01) (0.006) (0.011) 
NC*RP    -0.005  -0.038** 
    (0.01)  (0.014) 
NC*B     0.04*** 0.02 
     (0.006) (0.013) 
NC*RP*B      0.032** 
      (0.015) 
Quarter-Year 
Indicators 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.542*** 0.690*** 0.707*** 0.656*** 0.959*** 0.736*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.034) (0.108) (0.037) (0.089) 
Observations 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 
Number of    
products 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.74 
Columns 1 - 3 show the results of the Models (1) - (3), Columns 4 - 5 the results of the Models (4) and 
(5). Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 % - Level; ** 
indicates significance at 5 % - Level; * indicates significance at the 10 % -Level. Cluster robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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IV. The impact of regulative instruments on the 
market share of generic drugs  
IV.1 Introduction 
The expenditures for prescription drugs in the German Statutory Health Insurance 
(SHI) system increased from 19.4 billion euro in 2000 and 2010 to 30.2 billion 
euro.1 Therefore, drug expenditures are, after the expenditures for hospital treat-
ments (58.1 billion euro in 2010), the second largest cost factor of the SHI system. 
Yet, different to the expenditures for hospital treatment or physicians in ambulant 
care, the expenditures for prescription drugs rose on a larger annual rate than the 
overall costs in the SHI system. While the total expenditures for health care ser-
vices in the SHI system increased about 2.8 %, drug costs increased about 4.5 % 
annually.2 
In response, the Federal Ministry of Health, the regulatory body of the SHI, pur-
suits several strategies to control pharmaceutical expenditures. While some strate-
gies directly target the overall drug expenditures or the price of a prescription 
drugs, others influence the drug expenses indirectly.  
A indirect strategy to lower the expenditures for prescription drugs is the support 
of the substitution of original drugs
3
 by generic versions of the same active ingre-
dient. As the development of generic products causes only a minimum of R&D 
expenditures, prices of generic drugs are generally lower than prices of original 
products containing the same active ingredient. In a competitive market the in-
creasing utilization of generic drugs should trigger a decrease of the overall price 
                                                     
1
  See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011)  
2 
 See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011)  
3
  The term off-patent original drug can be used synonymously for the term original 
drug.  
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level. This should lead to a decrease of expenditures for prescription drugs. Dur-
ing the observation period of the dataset of the paper (2004 to 2007), large savings 
through the exchange of original drugs with generic versions could be achieved. 
In 2004, 202.0 million euro were saved through the substitution of original drugs 
with generic versions. The number increased to 321 million euro in 2006 and 
dropped again slightly to 269.1 million euro in 2007.4  
A major component of these savings was accomplished through the implementa-
tion of regulatory instruments. The three most important instruments are: 
 The reference price system that establishes a maximum reimbursement 
limit for drugs included in a reference price group. 
 The exemption of drugs in reference price groups from patient co-
payments,5 if the drug price is below a certain level. 
 The possibility of rebate contracts between pharmaceutical producers and 
sickness funds and the associated preferred dispense of rebated drugs by 
the pharmacies.  
The instruments and the way they affect market participants are explained in de-
tail in Section IV.4. 
This paper studies the effect on the demand of a generic drug subjected to one or 
more of these regulatory instruments. While there is a large body of literature 
studying the effects of the entry of generic drugs on the prices of original prod-
ucts,6 studies on the impact of regulative instrument on the demand of prescription 
drugs are mostly restricted on the effects of reference pricing.7 
                                                     
4
  See Häussler et al. (2006), p. 32-33, Häussler et al. (2007), p. 22-23, and Häussler et 
al. (2008), p. 21-22. 
5 
 Patients in the SHI system have normally to make a co-payment between 5 and 10 
euro per prescription drug. If the drug price is below 5 euro, the patient has to pay 
the full price by himself.  
6 
 See Cave et al. (1992), Grabowski and Vernon (1992), and Aronsson et al. (2001) 
7 
 See Section IV.2 for a literature overview.  
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This study uses an empirical approach that belongs to a class of models intro-
duced by Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995). Since the prescribing physician 
fulfills a central role in the choice of the dispensed drug, his decision behavior for 
prescribing drugs is modeled. Therefore a discrete choice approach with a random 
utility function is used as the starting point of the analysis. The approach is in-
spired by Dalen et al. (2006), but was substantially altered and extended to match 
the context of the paper.  
The paper has three objectives.  
First, the impact of the regulatory instruments on the demand of a generic drug 
will be estimated.  
Second, the role of the price difference between generic drugs and the correspond-
ing original drug on the demand of generic drugs will be examined.   
At last, the heterogeneity in the generic drug market will be acknowledged by 
separating generic products in branded generic drugs and non-branded generic 
drugs.
8
 Since different demand reactions are assumed for branded and non-
branded generic drugs, the effects of the observed regulatory instruments on both 
kinds of generics will be analyzed.  
The results of the paper indicate that a decrease of the price difference between 
generic drugs and the corresponding (more expensive) original drugs has a nega-
tive effect on the demand of a generic drug. Therefore, a price increase of the ge-
neric drug or a price decrease of the original drug decreases the demand for a ge-
neric drug. The effect is stronger for generic drugs that are part of reference price 
groups or are, in addition, exempted from patient co-payments. Interestingly, the 
effect of the price difference is reversed for drugs that are part of a rebate contract. 
This indicates the diminishing importance of the retail price for drugs participat-
ing in rebate contracts.  
                                                     
8
  The differences between these two types of generic drugs will be explained in detail 
in Section IV.3.1. 
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Among the regulatory instruments, the strongest effect on the demand for a ge-
neric drug was estimated for drugs that become part of rebate contracts. The effect 
is stronger for non-branded generic drugs than for branded generic products. The 
demand of generic drugs that are exempted from patient co-payments also in-
creased. The impact is weaker than in the case of rebate contracts and not signifi-
cantly different for branded and non-branded generic drugs. The smallest, still 
positive, effect on the demand of a generic drug was observed following the im-
plementation of reference price groups. This reaction was stronger for branded 
than for non-branded generics.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section IV.2 gives an overview on the existing 
literature of physician prescription behavior and the influence of regulatory in-
struments on the demand and pricing of prescription drugs. Section IV.3 describes 
the dataset and contains the descriptive results for the observed markets. Section 
IV.4 presents a short overview about the institutional background of the SHI sys-
tem and the role of the physicians. It also includes the description of the observed 
regulatory instruments as well as hypotheses about the impact of these instru-
ments on the demand of a generic drug. The demand model and the estimation 
approach are presented in Section IV.5 and Section IV.6. The estimation results 
are shown in Section IV.7. Finally, Section IV.8 concludes the paper. 
IV.2 Literature Review 
The nature of competition in the market of pharmaceuticals was examined by 
various authors. Among different topics, the effects of the market entry of generic 
drugs after patent expiration have been investigated by several authors.  
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) studied the effect of generic drug entry in the US 
market. They show that for 18 different active ingredients the original drug prices 
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increased in the years following the generic drug entry. In contrast, the prices of 
the generic drugs decreased substantially in the same time period.9  
Frank and Salkever (1997) confirmed some of these results, also using data from 
the US drug market. For 32 drugs that had lost their patent protection between 
1980 and 1985 they find that an increase in competition between generic produc-
ers reduced the prices of generic drugs. However, unlike the study of Grabowski 
and Vernon, the prices of original products are not affected by the competition 
between the generics.  
Lexchin (2004) also studied the changes of original drug prices following the 
market entry of generic drug competition. Using data from Ontario, Canada, Lex-
chin compared the prices of 81 different original drugs without generic competi-
tion in 1990 that faced one or more generic competitors in 1998. The results indi-
cate that the prices of original drugs did not change statistically significant when 
generic competition entered the market. The price development of original drugs 
was also not influenced by the origin of the generic drug (either produced by the 
same company that produces the original drug or not) or mandatory price freezes. 
A theoretical model supporting these empiric results was developed by Königs-
bauer (2005). She used a vertical differentiation approach to explain the observed 
pricing behavior of generic and original drug producers.  
Another group of authors studied the effects of regulative instruments on prices 
and demand of drugs.10  
Most of the studies investigating the effects of regulatory instruments discuss the 
influence of reference price (RP) systems on the pricing of drugs. Theoretical pa-
pers on the topic were published by Danzon and Lui (1996), Zweifel and Crivelli 
(1997), and Brekke et al. (2007). 
                                                     
9  Scherer (1993) called this finding the “generic competition paradox”. 
10
  Literature surveys of the topic were made by Danzon and Ketcham (2004), Lopes-
Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000) and Puig-Junoy (2005). 
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Danzon and Lui (1996) used a kinked demand model to show that the prices of all 
drugs in a reference price group converge towards the reference price. This im-
plies a decrease in the price of branded original products. In contrast, the prices of 
generics increases.  
Zweifel and Crivelli (1997) developed a Bertrand duopoly model also using a 
kinked demand approach. They found two possible Nash equilibria. In the low 
price equilibrium the producers of the innovator drug (original drug) accept the 
reference price as given while the generic is priced below the reference price. In 
the high price equilibrium the original product is priced above the reference price, 
while the price of the generic drugs equals the reference price.  
A recent theoretical approach by Brekke et al. (2007) compared the effects of ge-
neric reference pricing (GRP),11 therapeutic reference pricing (TRP),12 and the 
situation in the absence of reference pricing. The authors find that competition is 
strongest under therapeutic reference pricing, which thereby leads to the lowest 
drug prices. Moreover, as TRP implies the lowest profits for patent drug produc-
ers, it negatively affects the market entry of patent drugs in the theoretical model.  
Empirical studies of the influence of reference pricing were conducted by Arons-
son et al. (2001), Pavcnik (2002), Dalen et al. (2006), Brekke et al. (2009) and 
Augurzky et al. (2009).  
Using data from Sweden, Aronsson et al. (2001) showed that the introduction of a 
reference price system has a strong negative impact on the prices of both original 
and generic drugs.  
Pavcnik (2002) analyzed the impact of the introduction of therapeutic reference 
pricing in the German drug market on the prices of original and generic products. 
For two different therapeutic areas (antiulcerants and oral antidiabetics) Pavcnik 
                                                     
11
  In the case of generic reference pricing only drugs with the same active ingredient 
are included in a common reference price group.  
12
  In the case of therapeutic reference pricing, it is possible to assemble drugs of differ-
ent active ingredients that are therapeutically or pharmacologically similar in a joint 
reference price group. 
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(2002) identified strong price decreases for both types of drugs. The prices of 
original drugs decreased more than the prices of their generic versions. Moreover, 
an increase of the number of generic competitors also reduces prices significantly. 
The study of Dalen et al. (2006) investigated the effect of the implementation of 
an index price system13 in Norway on demand and market power of generic drug 
producers. The results indicate that the index price system had led to an increase 
of the generic demand.  
Brekke et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between pharmaceutical pricing 
strategies and the introduction of reference pricing. Their results indicate that ref-
erence prices reduced the prices of original drugs more than those of generic 
drugs. In addition, the results show a negative cross price elasticity for substitute 
drugs not included in the reference price system. The authors conclude that the 
reference price system is more effective in lowering prices than the already im-
plemented price cap system.  
Augurzky et al. (2009) examined the effects of the German reference price system 
on ex-factory prices. Their results indicate that market prices do not adjust fully 
after the implementation of reference prices, as a 1 % change in references prices 
only leads to a 0.3 % change in market prices. Moreover, the study shows a reduc-
tion of the market prices of about 7 % for drugs that are affected by the reference 
price system.  
While the impact of (I) reference price systems on drug prices and demand is re-
searched extensively, the literature concerning the effects of other regulative in-
struments in the German SHI system is less comprehensive. In particular, to the 
author’s knowledge, the effects of (II) the possibility to exempt drugs from patient 
co-payment and (III) rebate contracts between pharmaceutical producers and 
sickness funds are not analyzed in the present literature.  
                                                     
13
  This regulation approach is similar to a reference price system. For more information 
see Dalen et al. (2006) and Brekke et al. (2009). 
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In addition, the current research primary analyzes the different effects of regula-
tory mechanisms on original and generic drugs. This heterogeneity within the 
group of generic drugs has not been considered in the literature so far. 
The presented study tries to close these gaps. First, the effects of (I) reference 
pricing, (II) the possibility to exempt drugs from patient co-payments and (III) 
rebate contracts on the demand of a generic drug will be investigated. Second, the 
heterogeneity of generic drugs will be considered. Therefore generic drugs are 
separated in branded and non-branded generic ones. Following this, the effects of 
the three regulatory instruments on the demand of branded and non-branded ge-
neric drugs are investigated.  
IV.3 Dataset and descriptive results 
IV.3.1 Dataset 
The dataset provided by INSIGHT Health14 (called “Nationale Versorgungs In-
formation” (NVI)) covers the sales of all dispensed drugs for the six active ingre-
dients that are used in the analysis. These six active ingredients were chosen for 
various reasons.  
First, the included substances had to be affected by the three examined regulation 
instruments. Second, the chosen active ingredients should have a high significance 
in terms of sales and be used in the treatment of common diseases like heart prob-
lems or high blood pressure. Third, an original drug has to be on the market for 
the complete observation period. 
While all drugs with the same active ingredient are automatically part of a refer-
ence price group,15 the participation in the other two regulatory instruments is op-
                                                     
14 
 INSIGHT Health is a private provider of SHI related drug data. The dataset of 
INSIGHT Health included over 99 % of the prescribed drug products in the SHI sys-
tem. The data is collected from various data processing centers for pharmacies. 
15
  The included active ingredients are either part of Level 1 or Level 2 Reference Price 
Groups. 
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tional for pharmaceutical producers.16 Therefore, drugs that are part of a rebate 
contract or are exempted from patient co-payments are marked specifically in the 
dataset. 
For drugs that were available in different strengths or package sizes, the pharma-
ceutical form with the highest quantity of sales in the observation period was used 
in the empirical analysis.17 The dataset was also restricted to drugs that were 
available during the complete observation period.  
Table 13 shows the analyzed active ingredients, identified by their ATC Code,18 
the name of the original drug producer and the therapeutic group of the drug.  
Table 13: Sample of observed substances 
ATC7 Code Name Original drug producer Therapeutic group 
A02BC01 Omeprazole AstraZeneca® Proton pump inhibitor 
C09AA02 Enalapril MSD Sharp&Dohme® ACE inhibitor 
C09AA05 Ramipril AstraZeneca® ACE inhibitor 
C02AC05 Moxonidine Solvay® Central alpha agonist 
C08CA02 Felodipine Sanovi-Aventis® Calcium channel blocker 
C07BB07 
Bisoprolol and 
Thiazides Merck Pharma® Beta blocking agent 
Source: NVI  
                                                     
16
  Manufacturers can choose to exempt their products from patient co-payments or 
make rebate contracts with sickness funds.  
17
  The mechanism was chosen with regard to the instrument variable regression method 
used in the analysis. Through the narrowing of the dataset to the drugs with the high-
est overall sales per producers in an ATC7 group, it is possible to use the prices of 
drugs from the same producers with different package size or strength as instru-
ments. (See Section IV.6) 
18 
 The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification System is used to clas-
sify drugs. It is published by the WHO Collaborating centre for Drug Statistics 
Methodology. The system divides drugs into different groups according to the organ 
or system on which they act. Also it considers the therapeutic and chemical charac-
teristics of the classified drugs.  
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The balanced panel covers the monthly sales volume and the quantity of dis-
pensed drugs in the SHI Market from January 2004 to December 2007 for the 
observed active ingredients. It contains data for 93 drugs over a time span of 48 
periods, leading to 4,464 observations. The drugs can be separated in original 
drugs, branded generic drugs, non-branded generic drugs, and re-imported origi-
nal drugs.
19
  
Re-imports were only available for the active ingredients bisoprolol and thiazides 
as well as felodipine. Overall, only five out of 93 observed drugs were re-imports.  
While the distinction between original and generic drug is common in literature,20 
the differentiation between brand name generic drugs and non-branded generics is 
made by the author to meet the specific market environment in the German SHI 
prescription drug market. 
Following this categorization, generic drug producers can be differentiated by the 
level of activity in various therapeutic fields. In addition, manufacturers vary in 
their popularity by both patients and physicians, primarily triggered through in-
tensive marketing activities.21  
The first group, so-called “non-branded” generic producers concentrates their ac-
tivities on a specific therapeutic field, offering only a very limited range of differ-
ent drugs. They are also less known and popular by the user groups. An example 
for this kind of producers is Neurax Pharm®, concentrating on drugs in the thera-
peutic field of illnesses of the central nervous system. 
Generic drug producers of the second category, so-called “brand generic” produc-
ers, cover a wide area of different therapeutic fields. They also often produce 
Over-the-counter (OTC) drugs. Especially through the legal advertisement for 
                                                     
19
  The dataset included 6 original drugs, 5 re-imported drugs, 21 brand name generic 
drugs and 61 non-branded generic drugs. 
20
  See Section IV.2 for more information. 
21 
 For more information about how pharmaceutical marketing influence the physician 
prescription behavior, see de Laat et al. (2002). 
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OTC drugs22 they are well-known and popular to both patients and physicians. In 
Germany, Norvartis®, Stada® and Merckle® and some of their subsidiary com-
panies can be classified as branded generic drug producers.23  
The sales volumes of all drugs are denoted in retail prices. The quantity of dis-
pensed drugs is delivered as the number of sold packages. The number of sold 
packages per pharmaceutical form of each drug is transformed to the amount of 
dispensed Defined Daily Doses (DDD). The amount is calculated using the offi-
cially measured value of DDD per package from WiDO.24 Following this, the data 
is used to calculate the sales in euro per DDD, from now on referred to as price. 
The market share of each product was calculated as the quantity of dispensed 
DDD for each product divided by total quantity of dispensed DDD in the ATC7 
group. Note that a balanced panel cannot take account of new products introduced 
during the observation period. Therefore, the monthly market shares are calcu-
lated considering all available products with sales in the relevant market. This 
procedure leads to competition adjusted market shares for each product.
25
  
The dataset also includes the name of the producer, package size and strength of 
each drug. In addition, information about the status of a drug concerning the in-
clusion in a reference price group, the exemption from patient co-payment and the 
participation in a rebate contract were available.
 
 
                                                     
22 
 It has to be noted that advertisement for prescription drugs is forbidden in Germany.  
23
  See Appendix 3 in Section III.9 for the sales figures of branded generic producers, 
including their subsidiary companies in the observation period (2004 to 2007) Note 
that the subsidiary firms 1A Pharma, Ct-Arzneimittel and AbZ Pharma were not la-
belled as branded generic drugs in the data, as they are the non-branded subsidiaries 
of Novartis®, Stada® and Merckle®. 
24
  The "Wissenschaftliches Institut der Ortskrankenkassen" (WIdO) is the scientific 
institute of the Local Health Care Fund (AOK), Germany’s largest health insurance 
company. One of its tasks is the adjustment of the international DDD levels, issued 
by the WHO on yearly base, for the German health care market. 
25
  The analysis was also conducted using non adjusted market shares. The results did 
not vary, as the observed markets were widely saturated. Therefore only a small 
number of new competitors entered the market during the observation period.  
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IV.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Appendix 1 depicts the market share development of original,
26 
branded, and non-
branded generic drugs for the six active ingredients within the observation period.  
The descriptive results indicate that the combined market share of generic prod-
ucts was already considerably high even before the implementation of the exam-
ined regulatory instruments. Depending on the active ingredient the market share 
of generic drugs reached from 35 % to 90 % in January 2004 (See Figure 9 - Fig-
ure 14 in Appendix 1). 
This is most evident for the active ingredients omeprazole, felodopine, bisoprolol 
and thiazides, and enalapril. The combined market shares of generic drugs for 
each of these substances accounted for about 90 % in January 2004 and remained 
on this level until December 2007. This can be explained by the high level of ge-
neric competition in the markets even before the implementation of the considered 
regulation schemes. In contrast, original drugs did not play an important role 
throughout the observation period.  
The market picture was different for the active ingredients moxonidine and rami-
pril. The market shares of generic drugs were between 35 and 50 % at the begin-
ning of the observation period in January 2004. They increased steadily during the 
observation period. At the end of 2007, the generic market shares added up to 
about 90 %. In contrast, the market shares of original drugs decreased strongly 
during the observation period to market shares between 7 and 10 % in December 
2007.  
The descriptive results also indicate the strong market position of brand name 
generics. For each of the observed substances, brand name generics achieved a 
larger market share than non-branded generics during the observation period. 
                                                     
26
  For reasons of clarity, re-imported original drugs are not shown separately in the 
following descriptive figures. Re-imported drugs did not gain a mentionable market 
share during the observation period. Also, their prices did not differ substantially 
from the prices of original drugs.  
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However, the market position of brand name generic drugs was weakened follow-
ing the implementation of rebate contracts in April 2007.  
The development of the average prices
27
 of original, brand name generic and non-
branded generic drugs is depicted in Appendix 2. Figure 16 - Figure 20 indicate 
that the average price of original drugs was always higher than the average prices 
of any type of generic drug. This observation applies to all observed active ingre-
dients.  
In addition, the average price level of brand name generic and non-branded ge-
neric drugs was similar in all markets. However, for some of the active ingredi-
ents (e.g. omeprazole and ramipril), the average price of brand name generic 
drugs was slightly higher throughout the observation period.  
For each active ingredient the average prices of all drug types decreased in the 
observation period. The price decrease was stronger for original drugs than for 
both types of generic drugs. The average price decline was similar for branded 
and non-branded generic drugs.  
The descriptive results also indicate two strong price reductions in the observation 
period. The first considerable decline occurred after the implementation of refer-
ence price groups, affecting primarily the more expensive original drugs.28 The 
second sudden decrease of average prices followed the recalculation of reference 
prices in July 2006. Unlike the introduction of reference price groups, the recalcu-
lation also lowered the average prices of generic drugs. However, the average 
prices of original drug decreased more than the prices of generic drugs. The effect 
of the reference price recalculation was similar for brand name and non-branded 
generic drugs.  
                                                     
27
  As outliners could strongly bias the average prices, the prices were weighted with 
their monthly market share in the ATC7 group.   
28
  The reference dates of the implementation of the reference price system for each 
market can be found in Figure 8. 
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IV.4 Regulatory instruments affecting demand for generic drugs 
The regulatory body of the SHI, the Federal Ministry of Health, is responsible for 
the regulation of the market for prescription drugs. As a reaction to the increasing 
drug expenditures in the SHI system (the annually rate of expenditures for pre-
scription drugs was 4.5 % between 2000 and 2010)29 different cost control mecha-
nisms were implemented. These regulative instruments target the prescription 
choices of physicians, the dispense behavior of pharmacies, and the pricing strate-
gies of the pharmaceutical companies. 
Physicians occupy a central position within the SHI system. They are the only 
authority allowed to prescribe drugs to patients. Due to their "therapeutic free-
dom" they are also free in their choice of a particular drug. However, this “thera-
peutic freedom” is constrained by various regulative instruments.  
The most effective regulative instrument, the physician specific drug budget, was 
introduced in 2001. The drug budget restricts the drug expenditures per patient, 
depending, among other, on his age and gender. Physicians are encouraged to 
prescribe drugs with combined costs (in retail prices) that do not exceed this 
budget. If physicians are exceeding the budget they have to explain their prescrip-
tion behavior to the Regional Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physi-
cians.
30
 In the worst case, the physician can be made liable for the sum exceeding 
the budget.  
Thus, the drug budget encourages physicians to pay attention to the prices of the 
prescribed drugs. Consequently, the establishment of physician specific drug 
budgets increases the price sensitivity of physicians. It also promotes the prescrip-
tion of cheaper generic versions of an active ingredient instead of the more expen-
sive original drugs.  
                                                     
29
  See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011)  
30 
 The Regional Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (RASHIP) are 
responsible for the medical supply of compulsorily insured people. Each physician 
who wants to treat compulsorily insured persons has to be a member of the compe-
tent RAHSIP. 
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A regulatory instrument targeting both pharmacies and physicians was introduced 
in 1989. The so-called Aut-idem rule forces pharmacies to exchange the pre-
scribed drugs with cheaper products of the same active ingredient, if they are 
available in the same strength and package size.31
 
However, physicians are al-
lowed, due to their "therapeutic freedom", to suspend this procedure by adding a 
reservation to the prescription. This reservation prohibits pharmacies to substitute 
the prescribed drug. 
The only regulative instrument targeting patients that are member of statutory 
health insurance funds are prescription charges. Patients normally have to pay a 
prescription related co-payment between 5 and 10 euro depending on the price of 
the prescribed drug. Beside this co-payment, patients are fully reimbursed for the 
consummation of prescription drugs. Consequently, the price sensitivity of pa-
tients can be assumed to be weak. It has to be noted, that patients can be excluded 
from co-payments due to a high financial burden through prescription fees (f.e. 
patients that suffer from chronic diseases).  
The presented regulations so far are the basis for any regulatory schemes targeting 
the pharmaceutical industry, as they make patients and in particular physicians 
more price-sensitive in their drug choices. The instruments addressing the phar-
maceutical industry are at the focus of this study. They will therefore be explained 
in more detail. 
Figure 8 gives an overview of the regulative instruments that affected pharmaceu-
tical producers of included active ingredients during the observation period be-
tween January 2004 and December 2007. Our discussion of the instruments will 
be confined to this period. 
                                                     
31 
 By law the pharmacist has to choose between the three drugs with the lowest price. 
If the physician writes a specific drug name on the patient’s prescription instead of 
the name of the chemical substance, the pharmacist is allowed to choose between the 
three cheapest drugs and the named drug. 
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Figure 8: Regulatory instruments targeting pharmaceutical producers of the observed 
active ingredients between 2004 and 2007 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Book V of the Social Code  
A popular regulative instrument implemented in the observation period are price 
moratoria, that means freezing drug prices on a specific level for a certain time 
period. Pharmaceutical companies are still allowed to set their prices freely, how-
ever, they are obliged to give any price increase within the price moratorium as an 
additional discount to the sickness funds of the SHI system.32  
The effect of price moratoria on the demand of a generic drug is theoretically dif-
ficult to assess. It depends on the pricing strategies of both, the generic and corre-
sponding original drug producers during the price moratoria. In addition, the co-
existence of other regulative instruments could influence the effect of the price 
moratoria. 
In 2007, price ceilings for drugs not included in the reference price system were 
generally allowed. The price ceilings have to be either negotiated between the 
pharmaceutical companies and the National Association of Health Insurance 
                                                     
32 
 See Busse et al. (2005) 
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Funds33 on a voluntary base or have to be set after a cost-benefit analysis. How-
ever, the system has not been applied so far. Consequently, possible effects on 
pharmaceutical products cannot be measured. 
The reference price system was first implemented in 1989. Drugs that are part of a 
reference price group are only reimbursed to a specific limit by the sickness funds. 
This limit, called reference price, is determined in a complex process by the Na-
tional Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds. While the exact value of 
the reference price differs from group to group, it is always set lower than the 
price of original drugs. If the price of a product exceeds the reimbursement level, 
patients have to pay the difference between the reference price and the retail price 
by themselves.34 Originally only original drugs and their generic versions were 
included in the reference price system. Since 2004 also patent protected drugs can 
become part of a reference price group. Such groups can consist either of various 
patent protected drugs or a mixture of patent, off-patent original drugs and their 
generic versions.  
Reference prices are set by the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
Funds and revised annually. Currently, three different levels of reference price 
groups exist, differentiated by their formation directive as Level 1 Reference Price 
Groups, containing only drugs with the same active ingredient, Level 2 Reference 
Price Groups, containing drugs with therapeutically and pharmacologically simi-
lar active ingredients, and Level 3 Reference Price Groups, including drugs with 
comparable therapeutic effects, especially combinations.  
In June 2006 the reference prices of Level 2 and Level 3 Reference Price Groups 
were recalculated. This resulted in a reduction of the reference prices of the af-
fected groups below the previous level.  
                                                     
33
  The National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds is the central lobby of 
the statutory health insurance and long-term care insurance funds. It shapes the out-
line conditions for healthcare in Germany and represents the interests of the SHI 
sickness funds in the Federal Joint Committee. 
34 
 See Stargardt et al. (2005) 
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In December 2007, 440 different reference price groups existed. The main part of 
it were Level 1 RP Groups (316) containing original drugs and their generics, fol-
lowed by Level 2 RP Groups (66) which also include patent drugs, and Level 3 
RP Groups (58) consisting mainly of drug combinations.35  
The primary goal of reference pricing is the reduction of prices for expensive 
original products for which cheaper generic versions are available. In addition, as 
Merino-Castelló (2003) stated, the reference price system should also encourage 
price sensitive patients to replace expensive original drugs with cheaper generic 
versions. While this theory is acceptable for the Spanish reference price system, 
the situation is different for the German SHI market.  
Since patients in Germany only have to provide a small co-payment between 5 
and 10 euro, they can be assumed to be rather price-insensitive. Consequently, 
they should be less encouraged to urge their physician to prescribe cheaper drugs. 
The implementation of the reference price systems should increase the price sen-
sibility of patients only for drugs that are priced above the reference price level. 
Thus, it can be expected that the price level of originals decreases to the reference 
price level. Still, since reference prices are located between the price of the origi-
nal drug and the average price of generic drugs, generic drug prices remain the 
cheaper alternative. Yet, patients themselves have no real reason to choose them. 
It is the physician who, due to the constraints of their drug budget, should always 
try to prescribe the less expensive generic drugs.36  
From a theoretical point of view, reference pricing can be expected to have a con-
siderable impact on drug prices, especially on prices of expensive original drugs. 
However, it is less clear whether it also has an effect on the quantities sold.  
The situation is similar for the reference price recalculation in 2006. While it can 
be expected that both original drug producers and generic producers will lower 
                                                     
35
  See GKV-Spitzenverband (2008) 
36 
 The descriptive results shown in Appendix 2 in Section IV.9.2 confirm this thesis for 
the observed active ingredients.  
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their prices due to the new reference price, the market situation does not change. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether the recalculation has an effect on the quantity.  
Based on the reference price system, an additional instrument specifically promot-
ing the use of generic drugs was introduced in July 2006. Following the imple-
mentation of the "SHI Act of efficiency improvement in drug supply" it is possi-
ble for the Federal Association of Company Health Insurance Funds to exempt 
reference price groups from the requirement of the patient prescription charge. 
The producers of drugs that are part of such a reference price group can exempt 
their products from patient co-payments by lowering their prices to a certain level 
below the reference price.  
The possibility to exempt drugs from patient co-payments was well received by 
the pharmaceutical industry. In December 2007, 12,371 primary generic drugs 
had been excluded from the so-called prescription charges.37  
Although the exemption from co-payments can be obtained by every drug in the 
previous targeted reference price group,
38
 the foremost target of the instrument are 
generic drugs as their main selling argument is their price. Since generic drug 
competition is primary price-driven, the “co-payment exemption level” can be 
characterized as a generic drug specific reference price. As patients have to make 
co-payments for drugs exceeding the “co-payment exemption level”, the demand 
for these generic drugs should decrease. Moreover, physicians should also prefer 
co-payment freed drugs due to the lower price. Consequently, the demand for a 
generic drug that is freed from patient co-payments should increase.  
The newest regulative instrument are rebate contracts between statutory health 
insurance funds and pharmaceutical companies. The contracts contain arrange-
                                                     
37
  See GKV-Spitzenverband (2008) 
38
  This means that the target reference price group has to be chosen by Federal Asso-
ciation of Company Health Insurance Funds to give pharmaceutical producers the 
possibility for get exemption from patient related co-payments by lowering their 
prices below 30 % of the reference price. 
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ments about additional discounts for drugs of certain active ingredients or the 
whole product portfolios.  
Originally introduced in 2003, rebate contracts were not common until changes in 
legal agreements that were implemented through the "competition reinforcement 
law" in April 2007. These obliged pharmacists to dispense drugs covered by re-
bate contracts, if available. This directive even overwrites the previously de-
scribed Aut-idem rule.39
 
Following this legal change, the popularity of rebate con-
tracts increased strongly. 
The first round of rebate contracts in 2007 targeted only the generic market, leav-
ing out original products. The majority of statutory sickness funds had at least one 
rebate contract.40 In December 2007, 579 active ingredients with about 18,000 
products were included in rebate contracts.41  
The effects of rebate contracts on the utility of patients and physicians are as-
sumed to be positive. Physicians can benefit from prescribing drugs that are part 
of the rebate contract by joining the specific rebate contracts. If they do, prices of 
rebated drugs are not fully taken into account in the physician specific drug 
budget. Patients also benefit from rebate contracts, since the legal changes in 2007 
made it possible for health insurance funds to waive patient co-payments for re-
bated drugs. Therefore, the demand of drugs that are part of rebate contracts 
should increase.  
IV.5 A theoretical demand model  
In the following the utility function of a patient from, mediated by the physician’s 
advice is described. The physician partly acts as agent of the patient. However, as 
we have seen in Section IV.4, price sensitivity is mainly (but not solely) intro-
duced by the physician’s incentive system. In the following, the term doc-
                                                     
39 
 Physicians are still able to suspend the substitution of their prescribed drugs. 
40 
 See Häussler et al. (2008), p. 71-73  
41
  See Häussler et al. (2008), p. 70 
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tor/patient refers to a pair of physician and patient making a prescription decision. 
It is assumed that a doctor/patient chooses drugs that maximize the utility of the 
patient. All doctors/patients are subject to a budget constraint. Moreover, they are 
assumed to gain the same deterministic part of utility through the chosen drug.  
Following the model of Dalen et al. (2006), let 1,2,..,m M  be the observed 
market that contains all drugs of a specific active ingredient, described by the cor-
responding ATC Code. If mI  is the number of drugs in market m , the utility from 
drug 1,2,.., mi I  in market m  in time period 1,..,t T , for doctor/patient d  is 
random, and given by 
 imdt imt p imt imdtU g a P e    (1) 
where imtP  is the price of drug i  in market m  in period t . The coefficient pa  cap-
tures the direct effect of the price of a drug on the utility. It is assumed to be the 
same across drugs, markets and periods and is expected to be negative. 
The random variable imdte  represents heterogeneity in the preferences of doc-
tor/patient d  and therefore stands for the unobserved part of the utility. It is as-
sumed to be independently and identically (i.i.d) extreme value distributed across 
products, markets and periods.  
The variable imtg  describes product specific effects, due to unobservable drug 
specific attributes. It consists of two parts:  
 ;  1,2,..,imt im imt mg FE v i I    (2) 
where imFE  is the fixed effect of drug i  in market m  that is assumed to be con-
stant over time. Fixed effects are constants that capture unobserved drug specific 
effects. They are based on the assumption that even if drugs of the same market 
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consist of an identical active ingredient, differences concerning the packaging, the 
size, or the appreciation of specific drugs by physicians exist.42  
The random variable imtv  captures drug related effects that can affect the utility 
perception of the product in a specific time period t. Examples for such effects are 
press articles or short term marketing activities. The variable imtv  is assumed to 
have zero expectation and a constant and equal variance across products, markets 
and time periods. Also, imtv  is assumed to be uncorrelated across products, mar-
kets and periods. 
A physician d  will choose drug i  in market m  in time period t , if and only if 
 for all imdt jmdtU U j i   
As imdte  is assumed to be independently and identically extreme value distributed, 
the probability (Pr) of the physician choosing drug i  in market m  in period t  has 
the form of the logit:
 43 
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where imt  is the probability for the choice of drug i in market m in time period t.  
Assuming that product 1,2,.., mb I  in all markets 1,2,..,m M  is the original 
drug; the ratio of the relative probabilities of drug i  to drug b  can be described 
as:  
 
(( ) ( ))imt p imt bmt p bmtg a P g a Pimt
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e


  
  (4) 
                                                     
42
  See Coscelli (2000) and Pavcnik (2002). Both authors have shown the relevance of 
unobserved drug related fixed effects. 
43 
 See MacFadden (1974) on the discrete choice approach, especially the class of Gen-
eralized Extreme Value models. 
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Equation (4) indicates that original drugs are used as the base category or outside 
good option, measuring the substitution relation between generic and original 
drugs.44  
As mentioned before, the deterministic part of the utility is assumed to be identi-
cal for all individuals. Thus, the logarithm of the relative probabilities given in (4) 
equals the logarithm of the respective market shares. Therefore equation (4) im-
plies:  
 ln ( )imt im p imt bmt imt
bmt
MS
FE a P P v
MS
      (5) 
where im im bmFE FE FE    and imt imt bmtv v v   .  
The variable imtMS  represents the market share of drug i in market m in time pe-
riod t. bmtMS  stands for the market share of the corresponding original drug b in 
market m in time period t.  
Note that the empirical observation of average prices of generic and original drugs 
in Section IV.3.2 leads to the proposition that generally imt bmtP P  for all i b .  
IV.5.1 Implementation of regulative instruments 
Section IV.4 described the most important regulative instruments that affect pre-
scription drugs during the observation period.  
The focus of this analysis is on reference pricing, on the possibility to exempt 
drugs from patient co-payments, and on rebate contracts. However, to avoid mis-
interpretations or miscalculation of the estimated effects, the impact of additional 
regulative schemes, that were present during the observation period, has to be 
controlled in the model.  
As Figure 8 shows, two price moratoria were effective in the observation period. 
The first price moratorium was effective until December 2004.45 A new price 
                                                     
44
  See Berry (1994) for the importance of an outside good option. 
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freeze was introduced in April 2006, which lasted until the end of the observation 
period. To capture the possible effect of these price moratoria on the demand of a 
generic drug, the dummy variable imtPF  is introduced. It takes the value of 1 if the 
drug i in market m in time period t is part of a price moratorium, and 0 otherwise. 
The reference price system will be considered first. Figure 8 in Section IV.4 
shows that the time period of inception of the reference price system was different 
for the observed active ingredients. Thus, the dummy variable imt  is introduced. 
It takes the value of 1 if a drug i in market m is part of a reference price group in 
time period t and 0 otherwise. 
In April 2006 a legal change modified the calculation of reference prices in Level 
2 and Level 3 reference prices groups. This affected some of the observed active 
ingredients. Hence, the effect of the recalculation is captured by the dummy vari-
able imtRPRC . It takes the value of 1 if the drug i in market m was part of a refer-
ence price group whose reference prices were recalculated, and t ≥ April 2006. 
The variable is 0 in all other cases.  
The second regulative scheme included in the estimation is the possibility for 
drugs to be exempted from patient co-payments. Similar to reference pricing, the 
implementation date of the instrument differ for the observed active ingredients.46 
Since pharmaceutical companies can choose to participate in this regulative 
scheme, the time period of co-payment exemption depends on the pricing decision 
of the manufacturer. The dummy variable imt  covers this. It takes the value of 1 
if a drug i in market m is exempted from patient co-payments in time period t, and 
0 otherwise.  
The newest regulatory instrument implemented in the SHI system are rebate con-
tracts between pharmaceutical manufactures and sickness funds. Rebate contracts 
are optional for pharmaceutical producers. Thus the month a drug becomes part of 
a rebate contract depends on the negotiations with sickness funds. So, it is possi-
                                                                                                                                     
45
  See Busse et al. (2005) 
46 
 See Figure 8  
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ble that drugs did not become part of rebate contracts instantly after the imple-
mentation of the instrument in April 2007.47
 
Consequently, the dummy variable 
imt  takes the value of 1 if a drug i in market m is part of a rebate contract in time 
period t, and 0 otherwise.  
At last, a time trend parameter q  is implemented in the model. The time trend is 
modulated as quarterly dummies, taking the form of  where 1,..,16q q  . It cap-
tures time specific effects. For example it can be expected that the market share 
ratio of generic drugs to original drugs is generally increasing during the observa-
tion period. This can be justified by the cheaper price of generic drugs and the 
increasing acceptance of generic drugs by physicians and patients.  
The inclusion of q  should separate the effects of the regulatory instruments from 
the expected general increase of the market share ratio within the observation pe-
riod.  
Including those elements into the basic expression (5), the “Basic Model” takes 
the following form:  
 
ln ( )
                  
imt
im p imt bmt RP im imt ECP im imt
bmt
RC im imt PF imt RPRC imt q imt
MA
FE a P P a GD a GD
MA
a GD a PF a RPRC v
 
 
      
   
 (6) 
imGD  is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if drug i  in market m is a generic 
drug, and 0 otherwise.  
The parameters PFa  and RPRCa  capture the effects of price moratoria and reference 
price recalculations of the affected drugs on the market share ratio. The coeffi-
cient RPa  measures the total effect of the implementation of the reference price 
system on the market share ratio of a generic drug. The impact of the exemption 
from patient co-payments on the market share ratio of a generic drug, participat-
                                                     
47  
See Figure 8  
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ing in the regulative scheme, is estimated by the coefficient ECPa . The demand 
effect on a generic drug that is part of a rebate contract is measured by the vari-
able RCa .  
IV.5.2 The Expanded Model for branded and non-branded generic drugs 
Equation (6) explains the impact of drug prices and selected regulatory instru-
ments on the demand of a generic drug. However, generic drugs appear as a ho-
mogenous group. But, as shown in Section IV.3.1, generics can be separated in 
branded and non-branded generic drugs.  
Thus, the effects of the regulatory instruments on both types of generic drugs will 
be estimated in an extended model. 
Consequently, the coefficients capturing the demand effect of reference pricing (
RPa ), exemption from patient co-payments ( ECPa ) and rebate contracts ( RCa ) are 
expanded to: 
 RP RPNBG RPBG BGa a a    (7) 
 ECP ECPNBG ECPBG BGa a a    (8) 
 RC RCNBG RCBG BGa a a    (9) 
with BG  =1 if the generic drug is a branded generic and 0 otherwise.  
The demand effect of the three regulations for non-branded generics is captured 
by the coefficients RPNBGa , ECPNBGa  and RCNBGa .  
The total demand effect of the implementation of reference pricing on branded 
generics is estimated by RPNBG RPBGa a . Alike, ECPNBG ECPBGa a  describes the ef-
fect of the exemption from co-payments for participating branded generic drugs. 
At last, DCNBG RCBGa a  captures the demand impact of rebated branded generics. 
Incorporating the modifications of (7) – (9), the “Expanded Model” takes the fol-
lowing form: 
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ln ( ) ( ) ( )
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im p imt bmt RPNBG RPBG BG im imt ECPNBG ECPBG BG im imt
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(10) 
IV.6 Estimation of the demand equation 
The theoretical models of this study belong to the class of the so-called demand-
price models.48 The estimation of demand-price models is characterized by possi-
ble endogeneity problems. These are caused by the possible causality between the 
prices occurring on the right hand side of (10) and the market share ratio on the 
left hand side of (10), also known as the simultaneous causality problem. There-
fore using ordinary least square methods (OLS) could lead to inconsistent esti-
mates as the error terms could be correlated with the prices.  
A standard solution for this problem is the use of instrument variables for the pos-
sible endogenous variable. Instruments are defined as variables that are correlated 
with the endogenous variable (in this case prices)49 but not with the error term. 
The application of instruments variables concludes in the estimation of the coeffi-
cients of the demand equation using a two-stage least-square approach (TSLS).  
Since the use of instruments is often criticized in the econometric literature, a 
Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity50 is used to determine the necessity of 
instrument variables for prices. However, the corresponding test statistic requires 
a TSLS regression and a standard OLS estimation to be carried out first. 
Following Berry et al. (1995) and Hausmann-Taylor (1981), instrument variables 
for the TSLS approach should affect the supply side (the market share ratio) but 
have to be uncorrelated with the error terms in the demand equation. Thus, in-
                                                     
48
  See Berry (1994) 
49
  See Berry (1994) for more information on the use of instrument variables in demand 
supply models. 
50 
 See Davidson and MacKinnon (2003), p. 339-348 
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spired by Dalen et al. (2006) the following instrument variables for prices were 
chosen:  
1. Prices per DDD of drugs from the same producers with the next 
smaller package size and equal strength.  
2. Prices per DDD of drugs from the same producers with the next bigger 
strength and equal package size.  
A Hausmann-test showed that a fixed effect model in favor of a random effect 
model should be used in the estimation process. The residuals were also tested on 
heteroskedacity51 and serial correlation.52 Since both effects occur, product level 
cluster robust standard errors are estimated, which are robust to group vice het-
eroskedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation.  
Next, the quality of the instrument variables was tested. The results indicate that 
the instrument variables fulfill the requirements of identity and exogeneity i.e., 
instrument variables should be correlated with the endogenous variables, but not 
with the residual terms. In addition, the strength of the instruments was tested, as 
weak instruments (instruments that are only weakly correlated with the endoge-
nous variables) could lead to poor estimators. The instrument variables also sat-
isfy this demand.53 
Following this, the Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity in panel regression 
was conducted. The null hypothesis states that the error terms are uncorrelated 
with all regressors. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates the need of instru-
                                                     
51 
 A modified Wald-test for group vice heteroskedacity (most common form of het-
eroskedacity in panel data) has been conducted.  
52 
  A test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model 
was conducted, as discussed by Wooldridge (2003), p. 274-276. See Drukker (2003) 
for further details of the test statistic. 
53 
 The results of Anderson canonical correlation test show that the equation is identi-
fied for both the Basic and the Expanded Model. Tests based on the Cragg-Donald F 
statistic indicate that the instruments are not weak. The results of Sargan-Hansen test 
show that the instruments are exogenous, therefore not correlated with the residuals.  
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ment variables.54 The test statistic for the present dataset computes a                    
p-value < 0.05 (< 0.1 for the Expanded Model). Therefore, the application of in-
strument variables for prices is advised. Following these remarks, a TSLS model 
with robust standard errors was used to estimate the coefficients of the demand 
equations. The next section shows the results of the estimation process.  
IV.7 Estimation results  
IV.7.1 Basic Model 
Table 14 shows the results of the TSLS estimations for the various variants of the 
Basic Model, following equation (6).55 They include the estimated effects of the 
price difference between generic and original drugs imt bmt(P -P )  and the regulative 
instruments on the demand of a generic drug. The demand is measured by the 
market share ratio of the generic drug to the corresponding original drug.  
Following Figure 8, various regulative instruments were simultaneously active 
within the observation period. To avoid misinterpretations, Basic models (2) and 
(3) estimate the coefficients of the demand equation considering different sets of 
interaction variables.  
                                                     
54
  For more information on both tests see Davidson and MacKinnon (2003), p. 339-348 
and Wooldridge (2003), p. 483-484 
55 
 The missing value of the constant in the IV regression can be explained by the ap-
plied estimation procedure. The Two Stage Least Square estimation was performed 
using a user written stata command, called xtivreg2, see Schaeffer (2008). The 
command was used instead of the standard command (ivreg) because of the avail-
ably of additional test statistics concerning the validity of the used instruments. It 
also includes options for group vice heteroskedacity and serial correlation robust 
standard errors. However, it misses the option to report the value of the estimated 
constant. 
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Table 14: Estimated coefficients of the Basic Models 
Coefficient
56
 Basic Model (1) Basic Model (2) Basic Model (3) 
Price Difference 
imt bmt
(P -P )  -0.217 -0.519*** -0.505*** 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) 
Reference Price (RP) 0.095* 0.114** 0.106** 
 (0.05) (0.049) (0.05) 
Co-payment Exemption (CPE) 0.457*** 0.234** 0.044 
 (0.06) (0.1) (0.14) 
Rebate Contract (RC) 0.854*** 1.073*** 1.001*** 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.18) 
Price Moratorium -0.127*** -0.115*** -0.270*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) 
Reference Price Recalculation (RPRC) 0.330*** 0.176 -0.0286 
 (0.094) (0.12) (0.14) 
Price-Difference*RP - -0.501** -0.507** 
  (0.23) (0.23) 
Price-Difference* CPE - -1.438*** -1.658*** 
  (0.41) (0.37) 
Price-Difference* RC - 1.851*** 10.53*** 
  (0.51) (3.28) 
Price-Difference* CPE*RC - - -8.211*** 
   (2.88) 
RP*Price Moratorium - - 0.067 
   (0.059) 
                                                     
56
  Instead of the regression coefficient descriptions, the names of the variables, whose 
effects are estimated, are shown in Table 14 and Table 15. This was done to simplify 
the interpretation of the results. 
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CPE*RPRC - - 0.112 
   (0.17) 
RC*RPRC - - 0.217 
   (0.21) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,464 4,464 4,464 
Number of Drugs 93 93 93 
R-Square 0.50 0.51 0.51 
Standard errors robust to any form of heteroskedacity and serial correlation are in parentheses. *** indi-
cates significance at the 1 % - Level; ** indicates significance at 5 % - Level; * indicates significance at 
the 10 % - Level. 
Results of Basic Model (1) 
This model contains only the direct effects of the price difference and the regula-
tive instruments on the demand of a generic drug. It should be noted that the 
measured coefficients indicate the change of the price difference about one euro. 
The average price differences between original and generic drugs were located 
between 0.10 and 0.20 euro, as the descriptive results indicate. Therefore the nu-
merical value of the coefficients should be interpreted with care.   
The effect of the price difference imt bmt(P -P )  on the demand of generic drugs is 
negative but not significant in Basic Model (1). Although the effect becomes sig-
nificant in Basic models (2) and (3), for reasons of clarity, the explanation of the 
effect is already given here. Given the estimated negative coefficient, in the com-
mon case of imt bmtP P  for all i b
57, an increase of the price difference (through 
the price increase of the original drug or the price decrease of the generic drug) 
leads to a rise of the demand for generic drugs. This supports the assumption that 
physicians try to prescribe generic drugs, if possible, due to the price advantage of 
the latter. 
                                                     
57 
 Appendix 2 in Section IV.9.2 shows that generally generic drugs are cheaper than 
original drugs. This result is found for every observed market. 
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The introduction of reference pricing had a significant positive influence on the 
demand of generic drugs, as the positive coefficient of (RP) indicates. The esti-
mated effect is rather small. Therefore the demand for cheaper generic drugs did 
not increase much following the implementation of reference prices. A possible 
explanation is that some physicians that previously preferred the more expensive 
original drug could be urged by patients to prescribe cheaper generic drugs, if the 
corresponding original drug is priced above the reference price. However, follow-
ing the strong drug budget pressure, it can be assumed that the number of physi-
cians prescribing larger amounts of original drugs is rather small. Consequently, 
the implementation of reference pricing leads to only a small effect on the demand 
of a generic drug.  
The exemption from patient co-payments increased the demand for generic drugs 
that were part of the regulative scheme as the positive coefficient of (CPE) shows. 
This seems reasonable as physicians and patients benefit from co-payment freed 
drugs, as proposed in Section IV.5. Physicians prefer the cheaper co-payments 
exempted drugs, due to their incentive system. Patients, on the other hand, save 
the prescription fee between 5 and 10 euro when using co-payment exempted 
drugs.  
The strongest positive demand effect, measured by the coefficient (RC), was es-
timated for drugs that were part of a rebate contract. The extent of the demand 
reaction can be explained by the quasi monopolistic position of rebate drugs, due 
to the fact that pharmacies are obliged to dispense rebated drugs, if available. 
Therefore, the market share of a rebate drug increases strongly, as assumed in 
Section IV.5.  
The effect of price moratoria (Price Moratorium) on the market share ratio of a 
generic drug and the corresponding original drug is negative. A possible explana-
tion is the absence of regulative instruments during the first price moratoria (see 
Figure 8). As the descriptive results indicate, market shares of original drugs are 
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higher during the first price moratorium compared with the later time periods.58
 
This development is captured by the estimated coefficient for price moratoria, 
leading to a negative impact on the market share ratio.  
The recalculation of reference prices in April 2006 (RPRC) increased the demand 
for a generic drug. This result is not self-evident, as the recalculation affected the 
prices of both original drugs and generic drugs, forcing both of them to reduce 
their prices to stay competitive. Consequently, the relative market situation might 
have remained stable. Still, similar to the case of reference pricing, it is possible 
that original drug producers do not decrease their prices to the new reference price 
level. This would explain the increase of the demand for the cheaper generic 
drugs. However, the coefficient is only significant in Basic Model (1).  
For clarity reasons, the estimated coefficients of the quarter year indicators are not 
included in Table 14. They indicate an increasing demand for generics during the 
observation period.  
Results of Basic Models (2) and (3) 
Basic Model (2) and Basic Model (3) consider different sets of interaction vari-
ables. Basic Model (2) includes possible interactions between the regulative in-
struments and the price difference between generic and original drugs imt bmt(P -P ) . 
Basic Model (3) additionally includes all possible interaction variables between 
the included regulative instruments.59  
Most results of Basic Model (1) are confirmed in the more elaborate models. Still, 
the significance and the strength of some effects changes in Basic Model (2) and 
(3). The direct effect of the price difference imt bmt(P -P )  is stronger and also sig-
nificant in these models. The coefficients measuring the effects of reference price 
                                                     
58 
 See Appendix 2 in Section IV.9.2 
59 
 As the results in Table 14 show, not every conceivable interaction variable is in-
cluded in the estimation. In some cases, a specific reform was enacted for the com-
plete observed time span of another regulative regime. Therefore the dummy captur-
ing the interaction would always take the value of one (perfect multi-collinearity).  
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recalculations (RPRC) and the exemption from patient co-payments (CPE) have 
the same sign, but are insignificant in Basic Model (3).  
In addition, the following results of Basic Models (2) and (3) are worth mention-
ing. 
The interaction variables, capturing the effect of imt bmt(P -P )  and the various regu-
lative instruments, indicate that the magnitude of the direct price effect on the 
demand of a generic drug varies under the regulative regimes. 
The estimated interaction coefficient Price-Difference*RP shows that the negative 
effect of imt bmt(P -P )  is significantly stronger for generic drugs that are part of a 
reference price group. Moreover, the interaction coefficient Price-Difference* 
R*CPE indicates that the impact of imt bmt(P -P )  increases even more for generic 
drugs that are additionally exempted from patient co-payment.60
 
These results 
seem reasonable, as both reference pricing and exemption from patient co-
payments are directed at decreasing drug prices.  
At last, it should be noted that the estimated effect of imt bmt(P -P )  is positive for 
generic drugs that are part of a rebate contract (Price-Difference*RC). This results 
appears counterintuitive, but can be explained by the nature of rebate contracts. 
Since pharmacies are obliged to dispend rebated drugs, if available, the impor-
tance of the retail price is reduced. Therefore, it is possible that the demand for a 
rebated generic drug rises, although the corresponding retail price increases. The 
estimated interaction coefficient (Price-Difference*CPE*RC) in Basic model (3) 
indicates that this effect is weaker for drugs participating in rebate contracts but 
are, in addition, exempted from patient co-payments.  
Other interaction variables that were included in the model specification (3) to 
capture possible interaction effects between the regulative instruments are not 
significant or had to be dropped due to multi-collinerarity.  
                                                     
60 
 As explained before, only drugs that are part of a reference price groups can be ex-
empted from patient related co-payments. 
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IV.7.2 Expanded Model 
The Expanded Model, following equation (10), separates the drug class of generic 
drugs to branded and non-branded generic drugs.  
Table 15 shows the results of the estimation process using a similar set of models 
as for the basic model approach. Therefore, Expanded Model (1) estimates the 
effects of the price difference imt bmt(P -P )  and the regulative instruments on the 
demand of branded and non-branded generic drugs. Expanded Models (2) and (3) 
include different sets of interaction variables.  
Table 15: Estimated coefficients of the Expanded Models 
Coefficient Expanded Model (1) Expanded Model (2) Expanded Model (3) 
Price Difference 
imt bmt
(P -P )  -0.195 -0.468*** -0.473*** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) 
Reference Price*Non-Branded generic 
drug (RP) 
0.01 0.021 0.025 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.061) 
RP*Branded generic drug (BGD) 0.195*** 0.240*** 0.220** 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.092) 
Co-payment Exemption*Non-Branded 
generic drug (CPE) 
0.407*** 0.151 -0.0827 
 (0.072) (0.11) (0.15) 
CPE*BGD 0.041 0.106 0.232 
 (0.081) (0.12) (0.18) 
Rebate Contract*Non-Branded generic 
drug (RC) 
1.162*** 1.548*** 1.494*** 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.22) 
RC*BGD -0.691*** -1.028*** -1.025*** 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.27) 
Price Moratorium -0.126*** -0.120*** -0.268*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.04) 
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Reference Price Recalculation (RPRC) 0.307*** 0.152 -0.0195 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) 
Price-Difference*RP - -0.531** -0.512* 
  (0.27) (0.28) 
Price-Difference*RP*BGD - 0.383 0.29 
  (0.31) (0.34) 
Price-Difference* CPE - -1.786*** -1.326** 
  (0.48) (0.52) 
Price-Difference* CPE*BGD - 0.681 -0.892 
  (0.59) (0.67) 
Price-Difference* RC - 3.098*** 15.07*** 
  (0.71) (4.53) 
Price-Difference* RC*BGD - -2.651*** -1.727 
  (0.95) (1.09) 
Price-Difference* CPE*RC - - -12.06*** 
   (3.9) 
Price-Difference* CPE*RC*BGD - - - 
61
 
    
RP*Price Moratorium - - 0.098 
   (0.06) 
RP*Price Moratorium*BGD - - 0.0467 
   (0.073) 
CPE*RPRC - - 0.365* 
   (0.19) 
CPE*RPRC*BGD - - -0.625*** 
                                                     
61 
 The dataset does not include brand name generics that were exempted from patient 
co-payments and are part of a rebate contract at the same time. 
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   (0.19) 
RC*RPRC - - 0.0484 
   (0.31) 
RC*RPRC*BGD - - 0.234 
   (0.38) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,464 4,464 4,464 
Number of Drugs 93 93 93 
R-Square 0.52 0.53 0.54 
Standard errors robust to any form of heteroskedacity and serial correlation are in parentheses. *** indi-
cates significance at the 1 % - Level; ** indicates significance at 5 % - Level; * indicates significance at 
the 10 % - Level. 
Results of Expanded Model (1)  
The results of Expanded Model (1) show the direct effects of the price difference 
and the observed regulative instruments on the market share ratio. In contrast to 
the basic models, the demand effect of regulative instruments is estimated sepa-
rately for branded and non-branded generic drugs. Possible explanations for the 
overall effects of the regulative instruments on the demand of a generic drug were 
already given in the results for Basic Model (1). Thus, the following explanations 
focus on the possible differences in the demand reactions for branded and non-
branded generic drugs. 
The direct effect of the price difference imt bmt(P -P )  on the demand for generic 
drugs is negative and not significant. The result is similar to the case of Basic 
Model (1). Again, the result shows that physicians prefer cheaper drugs.  
The impact of reference pricing on the demand of branded and non-branded ge-
nerics is positive, but, similar to Basic Model (1), rather small. However, the re-
sults indicate that the demand effect is stronger for branded generic drugs 
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(RP*BGD)62
 
than for non-branded generic drugs (RP). The stronger demand effect 
for branded generics can be explained by the higher popularity of branded gener-
ics among physicians and patients.63  
The exemption from patient co-payments has a positive effect on the demand of 
both branded (RP*CPE*BGD)64 and non-branded (RP*CPE) generic drugs that 
participate in the reform. The impact on the market share ratio is, like in Basic 
Model (1), stronger than in the case of reference pricing. However, the demand 
reaction is only significant in Expanded Model (1). It is also not significantly dif-
ferent for branded and non-branded generics. Therefore the stronger market posi-
tion does not seem to increase the demand of a co-payment exempted branded 
generic drug.  
In contrast, the demand effect differs strongly between branded and non-branded 
generic drugs that are part of a rebate contract. Rebate contracts have a positive 
and significant impact on the demand of non-branded generics (RC). The effect is 
weaker for branded generics (RC*BGD).65 Therefore, non-branded generic pro-
ducers gained more from rebate contracts than branded generic producers. This 
result can be explained by the different strategies of statutory health insurances 
concerning rebate contracts. In 2007, the group of sickness funds with the largest 
number of members, the local social health insurances (AOKs),66 contracted only 
non-branded generic producers. Consequently, the demand of a non-branded ge-
neric drug that was part of rebate contracts increased strongly. The situation is 
different for branded generic producers that were not able to conclude contracts 
                                                     
62 
 The total demand effect of reference pricing for a branded generic drug is RP+ 
(RP*BGD). 
63 
 Appendix 1 in Section IV.9.1 shows that during the observation period for each ac-
tive ingredient branded generic drugs had a higher market share than non-branded 
generics.  
64 
 The total demand effect for a branded generic drug that is exempted from patient co-
payments is RP*CPE+ (RP*CPE*BGD). 
65 
 The total demand effect for a rebated branded generic drug is RC+ (RC*BGD). 
66 
 The Local Health Care Funds (AOK) covered 35.5 % of all insured persons in the 
SHI system in 2007. 
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with the AOKs. Some of them made rebate contracts with other health insurance 
funds (BARMER, Techniker Krankenkasse or Deutsche Angestellten 
Krankenkasse). Based on these contracts, the demand of a rebated branded ge-
neric increased, although the effect was smaller than for non-branded generics. A 
possible reason for this could be the lower number of members of the contracted 
health insurance funds. 
The demand impact of price moratoria (Price Moratorium) and the recalculation 
of references prices (RPRC) are comparable with the estimated effects of the basic 
models. Price moratoria have a negative effect on the demand of a generic drug 
while the effect of the reference price recalculation is positive. The explanations 
for both effects are the same as in the case of the basic models.  
Results of Expanded Models (2) and (3)  
The Expanded Models (2) and (3) include different sets of interaction variables. 
Expanded Model (2) incorporates interactions between the regulative instruments 
and the price difference between original and generic drugs. Expanded Model (3) 
additionally considers all meaningful interactions between the observed regulative 
instruments. 
The majority of the findings of Expanded Model (1) are supported by the results 
of the Expanded Models (2) and (3). However, some differences have to be 
pointed out. The effect of the price difference imt bmt(P -P )  on the demand of ge-
neric producers becomes stronger and also significant in the more elaborated ex-
panded models. However, the influence of the recalculation of reference prices 
(RPRC) becomes insignificant. This is also the case for the demand effect of the 
exemption from patient co-payments (CPE).  
In addition, the estimated effects of the interaction variables between the regula-
tive instruments and the price difference imt bmt(P -P )  should be noted. Similar to 
the results of the basic models, the price difference has a stronger negative impact 
on the demand of a generic drug if it is part of a reference price group (Price-
Difference*RP). The effect is even stronger for drugs that are also exempted from 
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patient co-payments (Price-Difference*RP*CPE). Both interaction effects are not 
significantly different for branded and non-branded generic drugs.  
Comparable to the estimated effect in the basic models, the interaction variable 
between imt bmt(P -P )  and rebate contracts is positive (Price-Difference*RC). The 
positive interaction effect is significantly smaller for branded generic drugs 
(Price-Difference*RC*BGD). A possible reason for this is the attempt of branded 
generic producers to hold their market position in other submarkets.67 Therefore, 
they cannot raise their prices in the same manner as smaller non-branded generic 
producers that never had a large market share in any submarket.  
The demand effect of the price difference is weaker for rebated non-branded drugs 
that are, in addition, exempted from patient co-payments (Price-
Difference*CPE*RC). This result can be explained by the legal framework for the 
exemption from patient co-payments. Based on these regulative settings, produc-
ers of drugs cannot increase their prices strongly without losing the co-payment 
exemption.  
The quarterly time indicators capturing time specific effects are, similar to the 
estimates in the basic models, supporting the assumption that the market share of 
a generic drug increases over time. Other interaction variables included in the 
model specification (3) are not significant or had to be dropped due to multi-
collinerarity. 
IV.8 Discussion 
The promotion of generic drug use is one of the major strategies for the share-
holders of the SHI to control the expenditures for prescription drugs. Different 
regulative schemes were implemented to support the use of generic drugs instead 
of original products. The most important instruments are the reference price sys-
                                                     
67 
 Submarkets are defined as the demand of patients that are insured by a health insur-
ance fund that does not have made a rebate contract with the pharmaceutical com-
pany.  
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tem, the possible exemption from patient co-payments, and rebate contracts be-
tween drug producers and statutory health insurance funds.  
This study analyzes the impact of these reforms and the role of the price differ-
ence between generic and original drugs on the demand of a generic drug. The 
demand of the generic drug is expressed by the ratio of the market share of the 
generic drug to that of the corresponding original drug.  
As expected, the direct effect of the price on the generic demand is negative. 
Thus, an increase of the generic drug price leads to a reduction of the market share 
ratio. Interestingly, the strength of the price effect is affected by the regulatory 
instruments. The impact is stronger for drugs that are included in reference price 
groups or are, in addition, exempted from patient co-payments. However, the 
price effect is reversed for drugs that are part of a rebate contract. In this case, the 
demand is actually increasing with rising prices. This indicates the diminishing 
importance of the retail price for drugs under a rebate contract.  
All three analyzed regulative instruments have a positive impact on the demand of 
generic drugs. The effect is strongest for generic products participating in rebate 
contracts. The possibility to exempt drugs from patient co-payments also signifi-
cantly increases the market share ratio of affected generic drugs. Reference pric-
ing had the smallest impact on the demand of a generic drug (though a strong im-
pact on the overall price level).  
In an Extended model, the effects of the price difference and the regulative in-
struments on different types of generic drugs are analyzed. To this end generic 
drugs are separated in branded and non-branded generic drugs.  
In the Extended Model, similar to the Basic Model, rebate contracts have the larg-
est impact on the demand of generic drugs. Interestingly, the demand effect is 
much stronger for non-branded generic drugs than for branded generics. There-
fore, rebate contracts primarily helped smaller generic companies to increase their 
market share substantially. The demand reaction for drugs that are exempted from 
co-payments is, like in the Basic Model, positive but weaker than for rebate con-
tracts. The effect is similar for branded and non-branded generics. Again, the 
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smallest demand effect is found for the regulative instrument of reference pricing. 
The results show that the branded generic drugs benefited more from the reference 
price implementation than non-branded ones.  
The paper has several limitations that have to be considered when interpreting the 
results.  
An important restriction for the analysis is the dataset that consists of only 93 dif-
ferent drugs distributed across six markets. The reason for this limitation is the 
requirement that the effects of the implementation of the considered regulatory 
instruments have to be examined for each of the three regulative instruments. 
Therefore the sample of active ingredients for which each instrument was imple-
mented during the observation period was rather limited. Especially the criterion 
of the introduction of reference pricing narrowed the field of potential active in-
gredients considerably, since many active ingredients in the market were already 
part of a reference price group before the observation period started.  
In addition, the instrument of rebate contracts was implemented towards the end 
of the observation period of the dataset. This also restricted the number of avail-
able active ingredients for the analysis. It can be expected that the number of re-
bate contracts will increase in the future, due to their great success. In principle, 
this would make it possible to include a larger variety of active ingredients in fu-
ture analysis. However, it has to be noted that since 2007 it has become increas-
ingly difficult to get full information on all rebate contracts as they are private 
agreements between the parties involved with an increasing level of complexity. 
This will make it more difficult to repeat a similar study in the future. 
The results indicate that the observed regulatory instruments were successful in 
increasing the demand for generic drugs. However, at the end of 2007, the overall 
market share of generics has reached a high level in almost every observed active 
ingredient.68 Therefore the implementation of new regulatory mechanisms target-
ing the demand of generic drugs cannot be expected to increase the market share 
                                                     
68
  See Appendix 1 Section IV.9.1 
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of generics much further. Consequently, only small expenditure savings can be 
expected through such regulative instruments. 
Due to this fact, policy makers should establish new ways to restrict drug expendi-
tures. Especially potential savings on the market of patent protect drugs might be 
evaluated as the importance of this market segment increases steadily. This is il-
lustrated by the fast rising share of expenditures for patent protect original drugs 
(between 1993 and 2008 from 10.2 to 36.8 % of the total expenditures for pre-
scription drugs in the SHI system).69   
Savings on the market segment of patent drugs could be achieved in different 
ways. Policy maker can choose between mandatory regulations like the reference 
price system and competition-based regulations like rebate contracts.  
The so-called “Early Benefit Evaluation” that will be implemented in 2011, be-
longs to the first category. It primary targets the prices of new patent drugs as it is 
used to evaluate the utility of new active ingredients.70
 
The valuation will be per-
formed by the Federal Joint Committee.
71
 If an additional utility, in comparison 
with the existing alternative treatments is found, the price of the patent drugs72 is 
negotiated between the National Association of Health Insurance Funds and the 
pharmaceutical producer. If an additional benefit cannot be proven, the patent 
drug is automatically included in a reference price group. In both cases, the prices 
for new patent protected drugs should decrease, leading to lower expenditures for 
new drugs.  
                                                     
69 
 See Schwabe et al. (2009) 
70 
 According to the schedule, early benefit analyzes will also be used for older active 
ingredients in the future. 
71 
 The Federal Joint Committee is the highest decision -making body of the joint self-
government of physicians, dentists, hospitals, and health insurance funds in Ger-
many. It issues directives for the benefit catalogue of the SHI system and specifics 
which services in medical care are reimbursed by the SHI. 
72 
 More precisely, an additional discount for all statutory health insurance funds is ne-
gotiated.  
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A possible approach, using more competition-orientated regulative instruments, is 
the extended use of rebate contracts for patent protected drugs. Beside the pure 
cost savings, the contracts could also include options of risk or cost agreements. 
These options would help to lower the financial risks of expensive drug treatments 
in therapeutic fields where the effectiveness of the drugs strongly depends on the 
singular patient. Also, additionally services by the pharmaceutical companies 
could be part of rebate contracts for patent protected drugs. This could also in-
crease the quality of the treatment. 
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IV.9 Appendix  
IV.9.1 Appendix 1 
Figure 9: A02BC01 - Omeprazole market share 
 
Figure 10: C02AC05 - Moxonidine market share 
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Figure 11: C07BB07 - Bisoprolol and Thiazides market shares 
 
Figure 12: C08CA02 - Felodipine market share 
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Figure 13: C09AA02 - Enalapril market share 
 
Figure 14: C09AA05 - Ramipril market share 
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IV.9.2 Appendix 2 
Figure 15: A02BC01 - Omeprazol average prices 
 
Figure 16: C02AC05 - Moxonidin average prices 
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Figure 17: C02AC05 - Bisoprolol and Thiazide average prices 
 
Figure 18: C08CA02 - Felodipine average prices 
 
 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
Ja
n
_
2
0
0
4
F
e
b
_
2
0
0
4
M
a
r_
2
0
0
4
A
p
r_
2
0
0
4
M
a
y
_
2
0
0
4
Ju
n
e
_
2
0
0
4
Ju
ly
_
2
0
0
4
A
u
g
_
2
0
0
4
S
e
p
t_
2
0
0
4
O
c
t_
2
0
0
4
N
o
v
_
2
0
0
4
D
e
c
_
2
0
0
4
Ja
n
_
2
0
0
5
F
e
b
_
2
0
0
5
M
a
r_
2
0
0
5
A
p
r_
2
0
0
5
M
a
y
_
2
0
0
5
Ju
n
e
_
2
0
0
5
Ju
ly
_
2
0
0
5
A
u
g
_
2
0
0
5
S
e
p
t_
2
0
0
5
O
c
t_
2
0
0
5
N
o
v
_
2
0
0
5
D
e
c
_
2
0
0
5
Ja
n
_
2
0
0
6
F
e
b
_
2
0
0
6
M
a
r_
2
0
0
6
A
p
r_
2
0
0
6
M
a
y
_
2
0
0
6
Ju
n
e
_
2
0
0
6
Ju
ly
_
2
0
0
6
A
u
g
_
2
0
0
6
S
e
p
t_
2
0
0
6
O
c
t_
2
0
0
6
N
o
v
_
2
0
0
6
D
e
c
_
2
0
0
6
Ja
n
_
2
0
0
7
F
e
b
_
2
0
0
7
M
a
r_
2
0
0
7
A
p
r_
2
0
0
7
M
a
y
_
2
0
0
7
Ju
n
e
_
2
0
0
7
Ju
ly
_
2
0
0
7
A
u
g
_
2
0
0
7
S
e
p
t_
2
0
0
7
O
c
t_
2
0
0
7
N
o
v
_
2
0
0
7
D
e
c
_
2
0
0
7
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 w
e
ig
h
te
d
 s
a
le
s 
p
e
r
 D
D
D
 (
in
 e
u
r
o
)
Months
Brand name generic drugs Non-branded generic drugs Original drugs
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
Ja
n
_
2
0
0
4
F
e
b
_
2
0
0
4
M
a
r_
2
0
0
4
A
p
r_
2
0
0
4
M
a
y
_
2
0
0
4
Ju
n
e
_
2
0
0
4
Ju
ly
_
2
0
0
4
A
u
g
_
2
0
0
4
S
e
p
t_
2
0
0
4
O
c
t_
2
0
0
4
N
o
v
_
2
0
0
4
D
e
c
_
2
0
0
4
Ja
n
_
2
0
0
5
F
e
b
_
2
0
0
5
M
a
r_
2
0
0
5
A
p
r_
2
0
0
5
M
a
y
_
2
0
0
5
Ju
n
e
_
2
0
0
5
Ju
ly
_
2
0
0
5
A
u
g
_
2
0
0
5
S
e
p
t_
2
0
0
5
O
c
t_
2
0
0
5
N
o
v
_
2
0
0
5
D
e
c
_
2
0
0
5
Ja
n
_
2
0
0
6
F
e
b
_
2
0
0
6
M
a
r_
2
0
0
6
A
p
r_
2
0
0
6
M
a
y
_
2
0
0
6
Ju
n
e
_
2
0
0
6
Ju
ly
_
2
0
0
6
A
u
g
_
2
0
0
6
S
e
p
t_
2
0
0
6
O
c
t_
2
0
0
6
N
o
v
_
2
0
0
6
D
e
c
_
2
0
0
6
Ja
n
_
2
0
0
7
F
e
b
_
2
0
0
7
M
a
r_
2
0
0
7
A
p
r_
2
0
0
7
M
a
y
_
2
0
0
7
Ju
n
e
_
2
0
0
7
Ju
ly
_
2
0
0
7
A
u
g
_
2
0
0
7
S
e
p
t_
2
0
0
7
O
c
t_
2
0
0
7
N
o
v
_
2
0
0
7
D
e
c
_
2
0
0
7
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 w
e
ig
h
te
d
 s
a
le
s 
p
e
r
 D
D
D
 (
in
 e
u
r
o
)
Months
Brand name generic drugs Non-branded generic drugs Original drugs
  128 
Figure 19: C09AA02 - Enalapril average prices 
 
Figure 20: C09AA05 - Ramipril average prices 
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IV.9.3 Appendix 3 
Table 16: Sales of the three biggest generic producers in the SHI market (in million 
euro) based on NVI data 
  Sales 2004 Sales 2005 Sales 2006 Sales 2007 
Novartis®
73
 1,479 1,792 1,988 1,975 
Stada®
74
 683 746 832 921 
Merckle®
75
 1,594 1,766 1,814 1,499 
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V. Changes in drug dispense. Which factors de-
termine what drug a patient receives?
76
 
V.1 Introduction 
In the German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) System, patients often face 
switches of the drug dispensed to them. In the past, most these changes occurred 
between more expensive original drugs and bio-equivalent cheaper generic 
versions of the same active ingredient. The existing literature has found various 
determinants that affect these changes. Both, patient and physician characteristics, 
do play a role for the exchange of an original drug by a generic version, as shown 
by Hellerstein (1998), Coscelli (2000), and Decollogny et al. (2011). Furthermore 
the importance of the price differential between original and generic drugs has 
been shown.77 Also, the impact of marketing activities on prescription behavior 
has been analyzed.78 
However, the current literature is less extensive concerning switches between 
drugs of similar active ingredients and changes between generic drugs of the same 
active ingredients. In addition, the impact of regulatory instruments in the SHI 
system on the probability of a change in the dispensed drug has been analyzed to a 
lesser extent.79  
                                                     
76
  This paper is a joint work with Christoph de Millas 
77
  See Lundin (2000) and Furu et al. (2008) 
78
  See Janakiraman et al. (2008) 
79
  Furu et al. (2008) and Lundin (2000) incorporated aspects of regulative regimes in 
their analysis. In both cases, the considered regulatory instruments were similar to 
the German Reference Price system. 
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Unlike in other OECD countries with a smaller market share of generic drugs,80 
generic drugs are common in the German SHI prescription drug market. In 2009, 
81 % of the dispensed active ingredients for which generic drugs were available, 
were generic drugs.81 Only 19 % were original drugs without patent protection.82 
Thus, the relevance of drug switches from original to generic drugs is smaller in 
the German SHI market than in other OECD countries. In opposite, drug changes 
between generic drugs consisting of the same active ingredient are more present in 
the German SHI system than in countries with a lower generic drug share. Also 
the German drug market has a relatively high number of regulative instruments to 
encourage switches to cheaper active ingredients, whereas other European health 
systems prefer direct control by statutory pricing and positive lists.83 Examples for 
such instruments are therapeutic reference pricing and the lead compound rule. 
Both instruments will be explained in detail in Section V.2.  
Including these aspects in our analysis, we consider changes between drugs of the 
same active ingredient as well as changes between drugs of different, however 
pharmacologically similar, active ingredients. Avoiding possible misleading re-
sults due to changes based on different side effects of drugs, the therapeutic 
groups used in the analysis include only active ingredients that have a very similar 
range of side effects. Therefore, switches of drugs with different active ingredi-
ents resulting from side effects should only happen exceptionally.  
The aim of this study is to estimate the effects of patient, physician, and drug spe-
cific characteristics on the prescription behavior of physicians. The paper contrib-
utes to the existing literature in various ways. First, while other authors narrow the 
focus on switches from original to generic drugs of the same active ingredient, we 
                                                     
80
  See Mrazek and Frank (2004) and Decollogny et al. (2011) 
81
  The overall market share of generics in 2009 was 63 %. See Pro Generika e.V. 
(2010) 
82
  See Pro Generika e.V. (2010) 
83
  See Vogler et al.(2008), p. 59 and p. 85 
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extend the analysis to include drug switches between generic drugs and switches 
between similar active ingredients. 
Second, the large dataset includes at least 200,000 observations of prescriptions 
by physicians for each of the different therapeutic groups of drugs. Moreover, the 
analysis is conducted for three therapeutic groups separately with very similar 
results. Therefore a high degree of validity and robustness of our results can be 
assumed.  
Third, the impact of the implementation of several important regulative instru-
ments in the German SHI system on the probability for a drug switch will be es-
timated in this paper. Similar studies have been concluded for a singular instru-
ment in the Swedish drug market by Lundin (2000) and in the Norwegian drug 
market by Furu et al. (2008), however only in the context of prescription changes 
of original to generic drugs. Yet, we are not aware of any study examining the 
effects of the implementation of regulative instruments in the German SHI market 
on changes of the prescription behavior of physicians. Thus, this study tries to 
close this gap.  
The results of the paper show that patient and physician specific characteristics 
and habits have a strong impact on the likelihood for a change of the dispensed 
drug. Patient specific characteristics like the time span between prescriptions or 
the number of previous changes between drugs of the same or different active 
ingredients increase the probability of a drug change. In contrast, the number of 
visited physicians, the age of the patient and the previous number of drug pre-
scriptions within an active ingredient have an negative effect on the likelihood of 
a drug change. Also, the preferences of physicians for a specific producer or ac-
tive ingredient influence the probability of a drug switch. The preference for an 
specific active ingredient increases the probability of drug switch while the pref-
erence for a specific producer reduces it. Moreover, the price difference between 
two consecutively dispensed drugs has an impact on the likelihood of a prescrip-
tion change. In addition, the nature of the active ingredient of the dispensed drug 
influences the drug choice. Several regulative instruments (reference pricing, co-
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payment exemption for patients, and rebate contracts) also positively affect the 
probability for a change of the dispensed drug significantly.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section V.2 describes the German SHI market, 
the main regulative instruments, and the role of the physician. Section V.3 pro-
vides an overview of the existing literature on the prescription behavior of physi-
cians. This is followed by the dataset prescription and the descriptive results in 
Section V.4. Section V.5 introduces a theoretical approach for the physician pre-
scription behavior. Section V.6 discusses an empirical estimation framework 
based on the theoretical approach. Section V.7 shows the estimation results as 
well as their interpretations. Section V.8 concludes. 
V.2 The German Health Care System 
In 2009, over 90 % of the German citizens were insured in the German Statutory 
Health Insurance (SHI) system.84 These insurants received both outpatient (ambu-
lant care) and inpatient (hospital care) services in various forms.
  
The most important fields of services, in terms of expenditures for the SHI sys-
tem, are prescription drug expenses in the outpatient sector (30.2 billion euro in 
2010), medical services provided by physicians in ambulant care (27.1 billion 
euro in 2010), and hospital treatments for the insurants (58.1 billion euro in 
2010).85  
While prescription drugs are the second strongest driver of expenditures in the 
SHI system, they are the sector with the largest growth rate between 2000 and 
2010. While the expenditures for medical services in ambulant care and hospital 
treatments increased on average about 2.1 % and 2.8 % per annum, the annually 
growth rate of expenditures for prescription drugs was higher (4.5 %). Thus, be-
                                                     
84
 See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2010) 
85
  See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011) 
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tween 2000 and 2010, the expenditures for prescription drugs rose stronger than 
the total health care expenditures (2.8 %).86 
In response to the rising drug expenditures, the German Federal Ministry of 
Health, responsible for the regulation of the drug market, implemented various 
cost control instruments.
87
 Interestingly, unlike in other OECD countries with 
fixed prices or price caps,
88
 pharmaceutical companies in Germany are still al-
lowed to set their manufacturer price freely. 
One of the most important roles in the SHI system is full field by the physician in 
ambulant care. He inhabits a central role for both patient but also for the various 
regulation schemes. Since a core objective of our analysis is the measurement of 
the effects of the implementation of various regulative instruments on the pre-
scription behavior of physicians, the most important schemes will be described in 
detail in the following.  
The first restriction for a physician is the drug budget, implemented in 1989. 
However, the calculation process was changed over the years by various reforms. 
The current calculation procedure came into effect in 2001. Following this, a phy-
sician is only allowed to prescribe a restricted value of prescription drugs per pa-
tient and quarter. This value is measured in retail prices and depends on the age, 
the employment status (pensioner or employee), and the gender of the patient. The 
sum of the patient related prescription volumes form the drug budget of the physi-
cian.
89
 In case of overstepping the drug budget a physician has to face conse-
quences by the Regional Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians.
90
 
                                                     
86
  See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2011) 
87
  See Denda (2010) for an overview of the regulative instruments in the SHI system. 
88 
 See Mossialos et al (2004)  
89
  Physicians can shift drug budgets between patients. So they can use the idle budget 
of certain patients to subsidize other patients' drug demands.  
90 
 The Regional Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (RASHIP) are 
responsible for the medical supply of compulsorily insured people. Each physician 
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These consequences range, depending on the amount of overstepping, from a 
formal discussion of the prescription behavior with the responsible RASHIP and 
the sickness funds to penalty payments equal to the difference between the drug 
budget and the values of the prescribed drugs in the quarter.  
The second regulation instrument affecting the physician prescription decision is 
the "Aut-Idem" rule, implemented in 1989. This regulation scheme obliged phar-
macists to substitute drugs by cheaper alternatives of the same active ingredient, if 
these are available in the same strength, package size and comparable form. Thus, 
it is possible that the drug a physician prescribes differs from the drug the patient 
receives from the pharmacist. However, physicians can prohibit the substitution 
by adding a reservation on the prescription. 
The regulative instrument of reference pricing, first implemented in 1989, primar-
ily targets the producers of drugs. It implements a maximum reimbursement limit 
for drugs that are part of a reference price group. As patients have to pay the posi-
tive difference between the reference price and the retail price, it seems reasonable 
that physicians try to prescribe drugs that do not require additional co-payments 
for patients. This is especially common for drugs where bioequivalent cheaper 
generic versions are available. At the same time, the prescription of cheaper drugs 
helps the physician to remain within the drug budget.  
Since 2006 producers of drugs in specific reference price groups have the possi-
bility to exempt their drugs from patient co-payments. To achieve this, pharma-
ceutical manufacturers have to lower their prices to a certain level below the ref-
erence price. The availability of these, cheaper, co-payment exempted drugs 
should affect both the prescription behavior of physicians due to the drug budget 
and the demand of patients for drugs without co-payments. 
Another regulation, implemented in 2007, is the "lead compound" rule. Included 
in the regional drug agreements between sickness funds and the Regional Asso-
ciation of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians, the lead compound rule pro-
                                                                                                                                     
who wants to treat compulsorily insured persons has to be a member of the compe-
tent RASHIP. 
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motes the prescription of specific active ingredients in selected therapeutic 
groups. This results in quotes for specific active ingredients that physicians are 
obliged to achieve in certain therapeutic groups.91  
The latest major regulation scheme, also implemented in 2007, are rebate con-
tracts between pharmaceutical producers and sickness funds. Following this regu-
lation the Aut-Idem rule was modified. The pharmacies are now obliged to dis-
pense primarily the rebated drug and not the cheapest drug. Consequently, physi-
cians that persist on a specific drug for a patient, have to prohibit the substitution 
of the drug explicitly.  
V.3 Literature review 
The prescription decision of physicians was examined by various authors. How-
ever, the majority of the studies focused on prescription switches between brand 
name original drugs and corresponding generic versions.  
Hellerstein (1998) used prescription data for multisource drugs from the US Food 
and Drug Administration92 to examine determinants for the physicians’ choices 
between generic drugs and branded originals. Her findings suggest that the prefer-
ence of physicians for original brand name or generic drugs is fairly independent 
of observable patient specific characteristics. Thus, Hellerstein concludes that the 
heterogeneity in the prescription decision is due to unobserved physician charac-
teristics. However, her analysis has several limitations. First, the dataset, which 
                                                     
91
  The rates are negotiated first at federal level and are modulated and/or expanded on 
the regional level in negotiations between the Regional Association of Statutory 
Health Insurance Physicians and the SHI sickness funds. 
92  
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is an agency of the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services. It is one of the United States federal execu-
tive departments, responsible for the protection and promotion of public health 
through the regulation and supervision of, among other areas, prescription and over-
the-counter pharmaceutical drugs (medications), and medical devices. The FDA is 
also responsible for the market access of new drugs and the withdraw of drugs from 
the US market in cases of serious side-effects that were unknown at the time of the 
product launch.  
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were extracted from a physician survey, included data of only two weeks. Thus 
only two observations for each patient existed. Due to the short observation period 
and the small number of observations it was difficult to measure possible patient 
or physician habits. Especially the analysis of patient specific habits is not possi-
ble as patients appear only twice in the dataset. Second, the data did not contain 
information on prices. Therefore the impact of possible price differences on pre-
scription decisions could not be measured. At last, the dataset did not include in-
formation about which drug was finally dispensed to a patient but only about the 
drug the physician prescribed.  
The paper of Coscelli (2000) addressed two of the limitations of Hellerstein's 
study. Coscelli's dataset included all prescriptions for anti-ulcer drugs for a 10 % 
sample of the population of Rome on a monthly base for the years 1990 - 1992. In 
addition, Coscelli had exact information about the drug that was finally dispensed 
to the patient. This avoids possible misleading results because of unobserved sub-
stitutions by the pharmacist. His results support Hellerstein's hypothesis of consis-
tent physician related prescription habits, using a number of variables to describe 
the physician. However, in addition to Hellerstein's results, he also finds evidence 
for patient related characteristics, that affect the prescription choice of the physi-
cian. Yet, like Hellerstein, the paper of Coscelli does not include price data to de-
scribe the influence of the price differences on prescriptions.  
Lundin (2000) fixed this issue by using data from two pharmacies in a small 
Swedish municipality of Tierp for the years 1992 and 1993. The dataset contained 
information about the prices of the dispensed drugs as well as the amount that had 
to be paid for a drug by both, the patient and a third-party payer. The dataset also 
included exact information about which drug was dispensed. The results of 
Lundin (2000) confirm the existence of habit persistence among both patients and 
physicians. In addition, it shows that the price difference between the original and 
the generic version of a drug has an effect on the prescription decision. Inherently, 
an increase in the price difference results in an increasing frequency of physicians 
choosing the generic instead of the original drug. 
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Janakiraman et al. (2008) investigated the impact of promotion activities of phar-
maceutical companies on the prescription decision of physicians. Their dataset 
included unique information on promotion related variables like the number of 
out-of-office meetings between physicians and representatives of pharmaceutical 
companies, symposium visits, and detailing visits by pharmaceutical representa-
tives. The results indicate that a certain group of physicians, classified as "non-
persistent" in their prescription behavior, are affected by detailing visits and by 
the number of symposium visits they are invited to. In opposite, physicians that 
are classified as "persistent" prescribers are only responsive to symposium visits. 
The results also imply that older doctors as well as physicians working in smaller 
practices are less likely to switch drug prescriptions. Physicians receiving more 
visits by pharmaceutical representatives, feature a higher willingness to change 
their drug prescriptions than physicians receiving fewer visits. 
Furu et al. (2008) used a dataset from Norway, containing all prescriptions for 23 
different active ingredients to determine explanatory factors for the prescription 
choice between original and generic drugs. Beside various patient and physician 
related variables, also price data was included in the estimation. The findings of 
the paper give further evidence on the importance of both physician and patient 
characteristics for the physician’s prescription decisions. The results indicate that 
the probability for generic substitution is affected by the price difference as well 
as by the type of insurance coverage of the patient. In addition, the study points 
out the role of pharmacies for the patient's decision to substitute the more expen-
sive original drug by a cheaper generic product.  
Stargardt (2010) analysed the impact of the inclusion of statins in the German 
reference price system on drug switches of long term users between the more ex-
pensive active ingredient atorvastatin and other statins. Using patient data of a 
large German sickness fund his results concerning patient related socio-economic 
variables indicate that the probability of a patient to switch drugs decreases with 
older age and a larger number of hospital visits due to cardiovascular diseases in 
the baseline periods. Also patients with a high yearly income (> 41,800 euro) have 
a lower predicted probability to switch drugs compared to patients with a low in-
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come (< 15,000 euro). In contrast, the predicted probability for a drug switch in-
creases for patients that are exempted from co-payments due to low income or 
unemployment. In addition, the membership in a disease management program for 
diabetes also increases the predicted probability for a drug switch. 
Decollogny et al. (2011) examined the influence of patients, physicians, and cer-
tain generic drug market characteristics on the generic substitution in Switzerland. 
They used reimbursement data of a large health insurer for three regions in Swit-
zerland during 2003. Their results indicate that poor health status (described by 
older patients and complex treatments) is associated with lower generic drug use. 
Increasing generic drug use is associated with higher out-of-pocket payments, 
greater price differences between generic and original drugs and with the number 
of generic drugs in the market.  
Our own results and their relation to the presented literature will be discussed in 
the final Section V.8. 
V.4 Dataset and descriptive results 
The dataset is provided by a large German sickness fund with more than 1.0 mil-
lion members during the observation period included in the dataset (2004 - 2007). 
It was one of the largest sickness funds in the SHI system (among the top 15 out 
of 241 considering the number of members in 2007).93 The insured are from dif-
ferent social backgrounds and income groups. Compared to total SHI population, 
the age structure of the insurants is younger and the share of unemployed persons 
is below the average.94 The catalogue of benefits and the reimbursement of physi-
cians in the German SHI system is more or less identical over all sickness funds.95
 
Consequently it seems unlikely that patients in our dataset are treated differently 
                                                     
93
  See Beiträge zur Gesellschaftspolitik (2008) 
94 
 See Holle et al. (2005) for more information about the historically rooted risk pro-
files of different types of sickness funds.  
95 
 See Schulze Ehring and Köster (2010) 
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than patient in other sickness funds with a different age, mortality or gender struc-
ture.
96
  
The data contains information about the complete prescription history of patients 
and their treading physicians between 2004 and 2007 on a monthly basis for three 
different therapeutic groups (HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors, ACE inhibitors, and 
proton pump inhibitors). The three therapeutic drug markets were chosen due to 
the high prevalence of the associated diseases and the significance of the associ-
ated expenditures for the SHI system. Also, each of the associated diseases is of 
chronic nature and requires constant treatment with drugs. Finally, all three thera-
peutic groups consist of active ingredients with and without patent protection. 
The identity of patients and physician is made anonymous. Each patient is as-
signed a specific patient_id, while physicians are identified by a prescriber_id 
that is bestowed by the Regional Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Phy-
sicians. The dataset includes socio-economic variables like age, gender, and the 
status of the patient as an employed or an unemployed person. In addition, the 
data include information about the nature of the dispensed drug97 (brand name, 
producer, strength, price per defined daily doses
98
 and package size).  
The initial overall dataset contains 2,617,017 observations for 73,032 physicians 
and 372,196 patients. We excluded patients in the dataset that received only one 
drug prescription in the observation period. Also, as the data contains some data 
errors, especially regarding invalid prescriber_ids, several observations had to be 
deleted. The two limitations reduced the number of observations included in the 
dataset only marginal (< 1%).  
                                                     
96
  See Grobe et al. (2005) 
97
  It has to be noted, that the prescribed drug and the dispensed drug can differ due to 
the "Aut-Idem" rule. We try to control this problem in our estimation using a specific 
variable that captures the effect of "Aut-Idem". See Section V.6.2.3. 
98
  The Defined Daily Doses (DDD) is a measurement for drug consumption. According 
to the definition by the WHO, it is “the assumed average maintenance dose per day 
for a drug used in its main indication in adults". See WHO Collaborating Centre for 
Drug Statistics Methodology (2011) for more information about the DDD system. 
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Also, similar to other panel datasets of dynamic nature, the dataset suffers from 
the so-called initial conditions problem. The problem arises as we do not have any 
information on the behavior of patients and physicians before the observation pe-
riod. Therefore we cannot observe possible important information that forms the 
prescription decision in the later, observable, time periods. Following the advices 
found in the literature (Heckman (1981) and Coscelli (2000)) to solve this prob-
lem, it is assumed that the prescription is either a first time treatment or that the 
treatment is restarted if a patient has not received a prescription in the therapeutic 
group for six months. This assumption seems suitable for our dataset, since it only 
includes chronic diseases that require constant drug treatments and a physician 
visit every three to six months.  
Consequently, only those patients were included in the estimation who received 
their first prescription after June 2004. Resulting from the above mentioned re-
strictions the number of observations is reduced to 998,841, containing 62,024 
physicians and 248,203 patients. 
Table 17 shows the number of observations, patients and physicians for all three 
therapeutic drug markets. It also includes the number of drug switches during the 
observation period for each market. 
Table 17: Number of observations, patients, physicians and drug dispense changes 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Number % Number % Number % 
Observations 212,742 - 322,251 - 463,848 - 
Patients 53,202 - 72,769 - 168,585 - 
Physicians 29,783 - 35,841 - 53,315 - 
Drug changes 45,393 21.3 58,803 18.2 80,973 17.5 
 
Table 17 shows that at least 50,000 patients and at least nearly 30,000 physicians 
were observed in each therapeutic drug market. The total sum over all patients and 
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physicians is not identical to the numbers given before, as some patients and phy-
sicians are part of more than one therapeutic group. The total number of observa-
tions ranged from slightly above 200,000 drug prescriptions for HMG-CoA reduc-
tase inhibitors to about 460,000 prescriptions for proton pump inhibitors. The per-
centage of drug switches ranged between 17.5 % and 21.3 % in the three thera-
peutic groups in the observation period of four years. 
The three indications, representing different therapeutic drug markets, are de-
scribed by the 4-digit ATC Code (also called ATC5 Code).
99
 An individual active 
ingredient is identified by a unique 5-digit ATC Code (also called ATC7 Code)
100
. 
They are shown in Table 18.  
The first therapeutic drug market are HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (ATC5 Code 
C10AA, containing active ingredients C10AA**) that are used to control hyper-
cholesterolemia and prevent cardiovascular diseases.  
The second therapeutic group are ACE inhibitors for the treatment of hyperten-
sion and congestive heart failure. The market is defined by the ATC5 Code 
C09AA. It includes active ingredients with the ATC7 Codes C09AA**). 
The third therapeutic group are proton pump inhibitors (ATC5 Code A02BC) that 
are used to reduce the gastric acid production to decrease the pain from heartburn. 
The included active ingredients are identified by the ATC7 Codes A02BC**). 
Table 18 also shows drug expenditures for the active ingredients between 2004 
and 2007. The market data (called Nationale Verordnungsinformation (NVI)) are 
provided by the German market research company INSIGHT Health.  
                                                     
99
  The ATC code is an internationally used drug classification system. It is differenti-
ated into five levels. The first level contains 14 main groups that are assigned to an 
anatomic main group (for example cardiovascular system) that is primarily affected 
by the drug. The next two levels describe the therapeutic group and its possible sub 
groups. The fourth and fifth level are classified by the chemical structure of the drug.  
100
  See WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology (2010) for more 
information. 
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Table 18: Market data of the observed therapeutic drug markets 
Therapeutic 
group 
Active 
ingredient 
7-digit ATC 
code 
Sales in 
million € 
2004 
Sales in 
million € 
2005 
Sales in 
million € 
2006 
Sales in 
million € 
2007 
HMG-CoA reductase  
inhibitors  817.7 617.8 582.5 479.9 
 Simvastatin C10AA01 286.6 375.3 374.8 352.9 
 Lovastatin C10AA02 18.0 14.3 11.9 8.5 
 Pravastatin C10AA03 83.6 78.6 74.5 44.3 
 Fluvastatin C10AA04 73.1 95.0 77.9 46.6 
 Atorvastatin C10AA05 356.4 54.6 43.4 27.6 
ACE inhibitors  557.2 575.1 480.5 356.6 
 Captopril C09AA01 78.0 62.4 46.3 31.5 
 Enalapril C09AA02 201.5 198.9 163.5 115.1 
 Lisinopril C09AA03 107.1 104.5 90.8 59.1 
 Perindopril C09AA04 8.8 5.0 3.5 2.1 
 Ramipril C09AA05 118.0 167.6 150.5 131.1 
 Quinapril C09AA06 6.6 5.7 5.1 3.7 
 Benazepril C09AA07 11.4 9.6 6.7 4.7 
 Cilazapril C09AA08 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.1 
 Fosinopril C09AA09 11.7 9.5 6.7 4.9 
 Trandolapril C09AA10 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.5 
 Spiralpril C09AA11 7.8 6.8 3.7 2.1 
 Moexipril C09AA13 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 
 Imidapril C09AA16 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.4 
Proton pump inhibitors  993.7 1,090.1 993.0 985.1 
 Omeprazole A02BC01 421.2 419.9 448.3 593.6 
 Pantoprazole A02BC02 297.4 354.1 286.9 204.1 
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 Lansoprazole A02BC03 41.9 35.9 35.6 28.1 
 Rabeprazole A02BC04 13.4 15.0 12.5 10.5 
 Esomeprazole A02BC05 219.8 265.2 209.7 148.8 
Source: NVI  
It has to be noted that the econometric analysis was conducted separately for each 
therapeutic group to improve the validity of the results.  
In the next step, we will develop a theoretical approach that formalizes the deci-
sion making process of physicians for a drug prescription in a therapeutic group.  
V.5 A theoretical approach for the prescription behavior of physicians 
In this section, a model for the decision making behavior of physicians will be 
developed. A basic assumption is that physicians act partly as agents of their pa-
tients. Thus, they care about the latter's health status. In case of indications where 
various related active ingredients are available, the physician has a scope of op-
tions that lead to similar medical results. Therefore, the physician has to choose 
which drug he wants to prescribe.  
As mentioned before, the three therapeutic groups (HMG-CoA reductase inhibi-
tors, ACE inhibitors, and Proton pump inhibitors) will be analyzed separately; 
therefore we omit an additional index for the therapeutic group in our notion. 
Considering one therapeutic group, let 1,..,k K  denote the drugs in this thera-
peutic group. 
Let  0,1ijktDC   denote whether a drug change to a drug k from any other drug 
in the therapeutic group has occurred ( 1ijktDC  ) or not ( 0ijktDC  ) by physician 
1,..,j J  for patient 1,..,i I  in observation point 1,..,t T .  
In terms of panel data terminology, the physician is considered as the observed 
object with 1,..,j J . He prescribes to his patient 1,..,i I . The number of ob-
served prescriptions to a specific patient is counted by 1,..,t T . Therefore, the 
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counting of observation points 1,..,t T  is individual for each physician/patient 
tuple.  
Note that drug changes between products of a singular producer, for example the 
exchange of a smaller package by a bigger one, are not considered as drug 
switches in our analysis. Consequently, the binary depending variable only takes 
the value of 1, if a drug change is connected to a change of the producer.  
Let                   denote the physician's utility from the drug switch such 
that he will change the medication if, and only if                    . 
In particular, we will assume that the physician's utility of a drug switch is addi-
tively decomposed into several components as follows: 
                                                        (1) 
Where the following variables are used: ijktu  is a vector capturing patient specific 
variables; 1( )kt ltp p   describes the effect of retail prices on the physician’s util-
ity of a drug switch; the vector jktPC  contains physician related variables; drug 
related attributes that could affect the prescription decision are included in the 
vector ktD ; the monthly time dummy             captures possible observed 
month specific effects. Note the difference between the observation point t and the 
month m. The index t counts the number of prescriptions of a physician j for a 
specific patient i. In contrast, m is the month, in which the prescription occurs. 
The distinction between these two subscripts becomes important for some of the 
variables used in the analysis. 
The elements of equation (1) will be discussed and refined in turn in the following 
paragraphs.  
In the case of multiple options for the medication of a medical condition with 
comparable effects, physicians take into account observable characteristics and 
attributes of the patient i for their prescription decisions. These are captured by the 
vector ijktu . It includes patient specific characteristics like age or gender. Also, 
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patient specific habits like the preference for a specific active ingredient are con-
sidered by the physician. The vector is parameterized as 
 ijkt ijkt ijktu X e   (2) 
where ijktX  is the vector of observable patient related variables.  
The corresponding parameter vector is denoted as  , while the unobservable por-
tion of the patient’s term is represented by ijkte . This residual is assumed to be 
independently and normally distributed over the observation points, patients, and 
physicians with        (0,1). 
Based on informational constrains and private motives, it cannot be assumed that 
physicians act as perfect agents for their patients. Thus, physicians will consider 
their own preferences and their information about available drugs.  
An important aspect for the physician is the retail price of the prescribed drug. 
While patients are nearly fully reimbursed for drug expenditures, physicians have 
to consider the retail price of the prescribed drug due to their limited drug budget. 
The effect of the drug prices is estimated by the price difference between the dis-
pensed drug             in observation point t and the dispensed drug          
           , in observation point t-1 as 1( )kt ltp p  , with    . The coeffi-
cient   captures the effect of the price difference.101  
However, the retail price of a drug is only one of several factors affecting the pre-
scription decision. It can be assumed that physicians also have a set of non-price 
related characteristics and habits concerning the prescription of drugs. For exam-
ple, physicians might prescribe some drugs more frequently due to their specific 
patient clientele or their own preferences for a particular producer. Also, special-
                                                     
101
  The price per DDD is used instead of the retail price to avoid possible miscalcula-
tions and misinterpretations. When using retail prices, the change of a drug that is re-
lated with a change in package size from a smaller package to a bigger one can result 
in a positive price difference, although the price per “pill” remains constant or even 
decreases. This problem is solved by the use of prices per DDD that make prices of 
drugs comparable and independent of package size or strength. 
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ized physicians could have different drug preferences compared to general practi-
tioners. The variable vector jktPC  captures such physician specific characteristics 
and habits. It is parameterized as  
 jkt jkt jPC S    (3) 
The vector of observable physician characteristics and habits is denoted jktS  with 
the corresponding parameter vector  . The unobserved part of the physician pref-
erences, assumed to be persistent over t and k, is denoted as j .  
In addition to physician specific factors, we assume that physicians also consider 
drug specific properties in their prescription decision. Therefore the vector ktD  
contains information about the active ingredient and the popularity of the drug. 
Also the possible effects of the implementation of regulation schemes targeting 
specific drugs are considered as a part of the drug specific variable vector. It is 
modeled as: 
      kt kt ktD DV RI               (4) 
where ktDV  is a vector of drug related variables. The implementation of regula-
tion instruments that target drug k in observation point t is captured in vector ktRI . 
The corresponding parameter vectors are   and  . 
Therefore, the empirical model to be estimated has the following form: 
                                               
                                                                                                       (5) 
where          if physician j changes the prescription to drug k from any other 
drug in observation point t for patient i.  
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V.6 Empirical analysis 
V.6.1 Estimation strategy 
First, it has to be decided, whether a logit or probit approach should be used to 
estimate equation (5). For both models, the unobserved heterogeneity can be as-
sumed as a fixed or a random effect. 
 In fixed effects models, j  is considered as a parameter, which can be es-
timated like other parameter vectors. In this case, no assumption about the 
relationship between j  and the other independent variables is specified. 
 In random effect models, j  is treated as a random variable, which is de-
scribed by a density function. 
The use of the fixed effect approach can lead to the incidental parameters prob-
lem.
102
 This can result in non-consistent estimators for the unobserved heteroge-
neity when estimating a fixed effect probit model.103 However, the estimated coef-
ficients of a fixed effect logit model104 are not biased as the conditional distribu-
tion of the model does not depend on the unobserved heterogeneity j .
105  
In opposite to the fixed effect model approaches, random effect models106 assume 
that the correlation between the independent observed variables and the unob-
served heterogeneity j  is zero. Similar to fixed effect models, both probit and 
logit models can be estimated. As simple estimators for the random effect logit 
model are not available,107 the random effect probit model should be the preferred 
estimation approach. 
                                                     
102 
 See Neyman and Scott (1948), Arellano (2003), and Wooldridge (2003), p. 490-492 
103
  See Honoré (2002) 
104
  See Chamberlain (1980) 
105 
 See Wooldridge (2003), p. 491 
106 
 See Heckman (1981) 
107 
 See Wooldridge (2003), p. 490 
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Thus, the fixed effect logit model and the random effect probit model have been 
identified as suitable models for our estimation. Although the random effect probit 
model underlies stricter restrictions about the correlation between j  and the in-
dependent, observable variables, it will be used to estimate equation (5). The rea-
son is that the computation of a fixed effect logit model becomes excessive with a 
large number of observations. In addition, certain statistical problems arise in the 
calculation of partial effects in fixed effect logit models.108 
The use of the random effect probit estimator leads to the correlation assumption 
of the following form ( , ) 0ijkt jCorr W   , where ijktW  describes the variable vec-
tor containing all regressors of the model. This assumption is very stringent. Thus, 
a second empirical approach will be estimated that relaxes the correlation assump-
tion.  
In this second model, that follows Chamberlain (1980) and especially Mundlak 
(1978), the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity j  is allowed to correlate in 
linear form with the mean values of the time-varying regressors ijkW .
109 The un-
observed effect j  is assumed to have the linear form:
110 
                (6) 
The variable j  is independent and normally distributed          
 . Also it is 
assumed that                               . The modification of the random 
effect j  leads to following model specification: 
                                                     
108 
 See Greene (1990), p. 656  
109 
 See also Wooldrigde (2003), p. 487 
110
 The original approach, as it can be found in Wooldridge (2003), p. 487-490 and 
Mundlak (1978), contains a constant. Since we already included a constant in the 
random effect probit model, and both constants cannot be separated, we chose not to 
include the constant in equation (7). 
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                                      +     +  +     >0                                              (7) 
Again, it should be remembered that the three therapeutic groups (HMG-CoA 
reductase inhibitors, ACE inhibitors, and proton pump inhibitors) will be analyzed 
separately. 
V.6.2 Variable description 
The dependent variable (SWITCH) is a binary variable, taking the value of 1, if 
patient i receives a drug k from physician j in observation point t that is different 
from the drug received in 1t  , and 0 otherwise.111 The different groups of inde-
pendent variables are described in detail below. The selection of the included 
variables is based on various studies, especially Hellerstein (1998), Coscelli 
(2000), Lundin (2000), and Furu et al. (2008). In addition, if necessary, new vari-
ables were defined, f.e. to capture the effects of the implementation of regulatory 
instruments. 
V.6.2.1 Patient related variables 
The first category of independent variables are the patient related variables, shown 
in Table 19: 
Table 19: Description of patient related independent variables 
Variable name Variable description 
AGE Age of the patient i 
GENDER Female = 1, male = 0  
EAST GERMANY  Patient i receives treatment in East Germany = 1, 
Patient i receives treatment in West Germany = 0 
WELFARE RECIPIENT  Patient i receives benefit payments in observation 
                                                     
111 
 The exact definition of a drug switch in terms of our analysis is formulated in Sec-
tion V.5. 
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point t = 1, Patient i receives no benefit payments 
in observation point t = 0  
NATIONALITY Patient i is not a German citizen = 1, Patient i is a 
German citizen = 0  
CITY AREA Patient i lives in a city area = 1, Patient i lives in a 
rural area = 0  
TIME LAPSE Number of months between prescriptions in obser-
vation point t and t-1 for patient i 
N PRESCRIPTIONS Total number of prescriptions of the patient i 
N ATC7 GROUPS Total number of different ATC7 groups received 
by patient i  
N PHYSICIANS Number of different physicians that prescribed at 
least one drug to patient i 
PAST SWITCHES BETWEEN ATC7 GROUPS Number of switches between ATC7 group until 
observation point t for patient i 
PAST SWITCHES WITHIN ATC7 GROUP Number of drug switches within ATC7 group until 
observation point t for patient i 
N PRESCRIPTIONS WITHIN ATC7 GROUP Number of prescriptions within the same ATC7 
group until observation point t for patient i 
The first variables considered in the estimation process are the AGE and the 
GENDER of the observed patient. The location dummy EAST GERMANY cap-
tures possible differences in the prescription pattern between East and West Ger-
many. The variable WELFARE RECIPIENT indicates whether a patient receives 
benefit payments by the government. NATIONALITY shows, whether the patient 
is a German citizen or not. CITY AREA describes whether the patient lives in a 
rural or in an urban area. 
N PRESCRIPTIONS differentiates patients into heavy users (chronic users) and 
occasional users. The distinction of patients in heavy and light users is further 
described by the variable TIME LAPSE that counts the months between two fol-
lowing prescriptions of a drug in the therapeutic group, independent of the visited 
physician. N ATC7 GROUPS counts the number of different active ingredients a 
patient has received over all observation points. The number can be influenced by 
both physician and patient. As the physician tries to find a suitable treatment for 
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the patient, the number of different active ingredients in the sample can capture 
the difficulties to find one. In addition, the variable indicates the patient’s willing-
ness to change the treatment. N PHYSICIANS describes how many different phy-
sicians a patient has consulted during the observation period.  
The next set of variables, also shown in Table 19, captures the persistence of pa-
tients to a specific drug or active ingredient. However, it has to be noted, that 
switches can also be affected by the choice of pharmacists or physicians, espe-
cially concerning the actually dispensed drug. 
PAST SWITCHES BETWEEN ATC7 describes how many switches between 
different active ingredients a patient has experienced until observation point t. The 
variable N PRESCRIPTIONS WITHIN ATC7 GROUP, describes the continuous 
prescription of the same active ingredient until observation point t. The number of 
previous changes of the dispensed drug with an active ingredient is captured by 
the variable PAST SWITCHES WITHIN ATC7 GROUP. 
V.6.2.2 Physician related variables  
The next group of independent variables are the physician related covariates, de-
scribed in Table 20. 
Table 20: Description of physician related variables 
Variable name Variable description 
N PATIENTS Number of different patients that received at 
least one drug prescription from physician j  
AGE PATIENTS 
Average age of all patients that received at least 
one drug prescription from physician j  
SPECIALIST Physician j is a specialist = 1, physician j is a 
general practitioner = 0  
QUANTITY PRESCRIPTIONS Average quantity of prescriptions over the last 3 
months of physician j 
PERCENTAGE ATC7 GROUP 
Average share of dispensed DDD of the pre-
scribed active ingredient over the last 3 months 
(in percent) of physician j 
HERFINDAHL-INDEX ATC7 GROUP Herfindahl-Index across different active ingredi-
ents over the last 3 months (market shares meas-
ured in DDD) of physician j 
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HERFINDAHL-INDEX PRODUCERS Herfindahl-Index across different producers over 
the last 3 months (market share measured in 
DDD) of physician j 
The variables N PATIENTS and AGE PATIENTS are independent of the obser-
vation point t. They describe the total number of patients as well as the average 
age of patients that are treated by the physician, giving information about his pa-
tient clientele. They also capture possible experience effects resulting from the 
number of patients treated and age specific aspects for the prescription behavior of 
the physician. Possible differences between general practitioner and specialists are 
measured by the variable SPECIALIST. 
QUANTITY PRESCRIPTIONS counts, for each observation point t, the average 
amount of defined daily doses (DDD) prescribed by the physician in the last three 
months. The variable separates doctors in heavy and light prescribers considering 
the specific therapeutic group. The importance of the dispensed active ingredient 
for the physician is indicated by the variable PERCENTAGE ATC7. 
The variable HERFINDAHL-INDEX ATC7 GROUP describes the physician re-
lated diversity in prescribing different active ingredients for a specific indica-
tion.112 The last physician related variable, HERFINDAHL-INDEX 
PRODUCERS captures possible preferences of physicians for specific drug pro-
ducers.  
V.6.2.3 Drug related variables 
Table 21 shows drug specific variables that describe the properties of the dis-
pensed drugs and the price difference between the dispensed drugs in observation 
point t and observation point t-1. 
 
                                                     
112
  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the sum of squared market shares. For conven-
ience the percentage values are multiplied with 100. The index ranges from 0 to 
10,000.  
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Table 21: Description of drug related variables 
Variable name Variable description 
PRICEDIFF 
Price difference ((measured in price per DDD) 
between the dispensed drug in observation point t 
and the dispensed drug in observation point t-1 of 
patient i 
MARKET SHARE PZN
113
 Market share of dispensed drug i (measured in 
DDD) related to the corresponding ATC7 group  
in observation point t of patient i (in percent) 
ATC7 GROUP Set of dummy variables, identifying the ATC7 
group of the dispensed drug in observation point t 
of patient i 
AUT-IDEM DRUG 
Dummy variable with the value of 1, if dispensed 
drug is one of the 3 cheapest drugs of the active 
ingredient in observation point t of patient i, 0 if 
not  
The variable PRICEDIFF captures the price difference (in price per DDD) be-
tween the dispensed drug in observation point t and its predecessor in t-1. 
MARKET SHARE PZN is an indicator for the popularity of a specific drug that is 
identified by its central pharmaceutical number (PZN). ATC7 GROUP is a set of 
dummy variables that captures drug specific effects based on characteristics of the 
corresponding active ingredient. The variable AUT-IDEM DRUG indicates, 
whether the dispensed drug was one of the three cheapest drugs within the corre-
sponding active ingredient in observation point t. While the physician could have 
prescribed this drug explicitly, it is more likely that the pharmacist has exchanged 
the originally prescribed drug with the dispensed cheaper drug due to the Aut-
Idem rule. 
V.6.2.4 Implementation of regulative instruments 
The last group of variables contains indicators for the effect of the implementation 
of regulatory instruments on the probability of a change of the dispensed drug.  
                                                     
113
  The abbreviation PZN stands for the term "Pharma Zentral Nummer". The PZN is a 
7-digit number, which identifies a drug clearly according to its name, pharmaceutical 
form, strength, and package size. Therefore, each drug in the Germany SHI market 
can be identified by its unique PZN. 
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Table 22: Description of regulatory instruments 
Variable name Variable description 
Definition of the variables concerning the    
implementation of regulatory instruments 
Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if, for the 
first time the dispensed drug in observation point 
t of patient i is part of the implemented regula-
tory instrument, while it was not in observation 
point t-1 of patient i, 0 otherwise. 
LEAD COMPOUND Describes the implementation of the lead com-
pound rule. 
REFERENCE PRICE Describes the implementation of the reference 
price system. 
EXEMPTION FROM CO-PAYMENT Describes the implementation of the possibility 
to exempt drugs from patient related co-
payments 
REBATE CONTRACT Describes the implementation of rebate contracts 
between health insurances and pharmaceutical 
producers 
 
The variable LEAD COMPOUND displays the influence of the lead compound 
rule that encourages physicians to prescribe a specific active ingredient instead of 
other therapeutic options. Note that since the therapeutic market of ACE inhibitors 
was not covered by the lead compound rule, no coefficient was estimated for this 
therapeutic group. The dummy variable REFERENCE PRICE captures changes in 
prescription as a result of the introduction of the reference price system. The vari-
ables EXEMPTION FROM CO-PAYMENT and REBATE CONTRACT114 
measure the effects of introduction of the two latest regulatory reforms on the 
drug dispense situation of the patient. The former variable captures the effect of 
the implementation of the possibility of drugs to become exempted from patient 
related co-payments. The latter dummy variable captures the impact of the intro-
                                                     
114
  Since the dataset is restricted to a specific health insurance fund, only drugs which 
are part of rebate contracts of this health insurance fund are marked as rebated prod-
ucts. 
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duction of a rebate contract between the pharmaceutical company and the health 
insurance fund.  
The definition, whether a regulation instrument existed in the month the observa-
tion point falls into, is based on the status in the pharmacy software. This is due to 
the fact, that only with the implementation in the official pharmacy software; the 
regulations become relevant for the prescription decisions of the physicians and 
the dispensing decision of the pharmacists. An exception is the variable LEAD 
COMPOUND. Here the agreed inception of the treaty between the Association of 
Statutory Health Insurance Physicians and the sickness funds is considered. 
The considered regulations were implemented with a time lap of at least a year. 
Consequently, the effects of the implementation of each regulatory instrument 
should not overlap. Still there is a minority of cases where two or three of the de-
scribed regulation dummies change values simultaneously. Although the number 
of these cases is very small,115 we deleted the concerned observations and recalcu-
lated the models. The estimations results did not differ; therefore the original 
dataset was used.  
The descriptive statistics of the variables for each therapeutic market are shown in 
Appendix 1.  
V.7  Estimation results 
V.7.1 Random effect probit model 
In this section, the results of the standard random effect probit model and of the 
random-effect probit model, inspired by Chamberlain (1980) and Mundlak 
(1978), are presented. Both models were estimated by using 50 evaluation 
                                                     
115
  The maximum of cases was found for the combination of co-payment exemption and 
rebate contacts. For this combination, in 1.8 % of the observed cases both dummy 
variables took the value of one in the same observation period. 
  159 
points.116 The stability of the models was checked by running the models with 34 
and 66 evaluation points. Comparing the results, the relative differences between 
the coefficients are always <1 %. Thus, the models can be assumed to be stable.117  
A likelihood-ratio test, conducted between the standard and the Chamber-
lain/Mundlak random effect probit models indicates that the latter econometric 
approach should be the preferred option.118 This result is confirmed by the calcu-
lated AIC and BIC scores.119  
The economic interpretation of the results of the Chamberlain/Mundlak probit 
model is limited to the magnitude and the sign of the coefficients. The results of 
the estimation are shown in Table 32 in Appendix 2.120 It turns out that the estima-
tion results of the three therapeutic groups are qualitatively very similar. There-
fore, we describe the results for all three groups simultaneously.  
It should be noted that in the following sections the term “probability of drug 
change” or similar expressions will be used. This is not entirely accurate. Follow-
ing the model specification in Section V.5, the estimated coefficients for both the 
random effect probit models and the corresponding marginal effects have to be 
interpreted as effects on the “probability of a change to the drug in question”. 
However, for reasons of readability, we will simply refer to “drug changes”.  
                                                     
116
  See Butler and Moffitt (1982) and Hellerstein (1998) for more information about the 
derivation of the full likelihood for the random-effects probit model. 
117
  The stability was checked by using the quadchk command in Stata®. Results are 
available on request. 
118 
 The results of the standard random effect probit model are shown in Table 31 in 
Appendix 2 in Section V.9.2. 
119 
 AIC stands for the "Akaike Information Criterion", while BIC stands for the “Bayes-
ian Information Criterion”. Both criteria help to select a specific model within a class 
of parametric models that have a different number of parameters. Since the ap-
proaches are related, for both of them the rule can be stated, that the estimated model 
with the lower value of AIC or BIC should be chosen. For more information, see 
Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978).  
120
  To simplify the interpretation of the results, the estimated coefficients of the average 
values of the time variant variables as well as the estimates of the monthly dummy 
variables are not included. The results are available on request. 
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Patient related variables 
The results of variables capturing the socio-economic status of patients indicate 
that the dispensed drug is less frequently switched for older patients than for 
younger patients (negative coefficient of AGE). The drug prescriptions of patients 
living in East Germany are more often switched than for patients living in West 
Germany (positive coefficient of EAST GERMANY). Both results can be found 
in all therapeutic areas. The gender of the patients has a negative impact on the 
switching probability. Therefore, women are less likely to get their drug prescrip-
tion changed than man. However the effect is only significant for the therapeutic 
area of proton pump inhibitors. The variable CITY AREA is also only significant 
for ACE inhibitors, suggesting that drug prescriptions of patients living in larger 
cities are switched more often than for patients in rural areas of Germany.  
The second set of patient related variables describe the habits and preferences of 
patients. The coefficient of TIMELAPSE is positive and significant for all thera-
peutic markets. It indicates that the longer the time gap between drug prescrip-
tions, the more the dispensed drug of a patient is likely to get switched.  
The total number of prescriptions a patient receives in the observation period (N 
PRESCRIPTIONS) has a significant positive effect on the drug change probabil-
ity. Thus, patients receiving more prescriptions have a higher possibility to re-
ceive a different drug than patients with fewer prescriptions. Also the total num-
ber of different active ingredients (N ATC7 GROUPS) increases the likelihood of 
a drug change. This result is comprehensible, as patient that changes active ingre-
dients more often automatically get their drug prescription changed more fre-
quently.  
The total number of different physicians a patient visits (N PHYSICIANS) has a 
negative effect on the switching probability. The positive coefficient of PAST 
SWITCHES BETWEEN ATC7 GROUPS indicates that patients who already had 
different active ingredients prescribed in the past have an increased likelihood for 
prescription changes in the future. This effect is relatively small for patients 
treated with proton pump inhibitors compared to the two other therapeutic groups.  
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A similar explanation can be given for PAST SWITCHES WITHIN ATC7 
GROUPS. Patients with a bigger variety of different drugs within an ATC7 group 
have an increased probability to get switched again in the future. This effect is 
stronger for patients with HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors.  
The number of past prescriptions within an active ingredient (N 
PRESCRIPTIONS WITHIN ATC7 GROUP) has a negative effect on the drug 
change probability for all three therapeutic markets. Therefore patients that are 
adapted to a specific active ingredient, through a larger number of prescriptions in 
this group, are less likely to get switched to another drug than patients with a 
shorter prescription history concerning the specific ATC7 group. The smallest 
effect was estimated for patients treated with ACE inhibitors.  
Summarizing the results for patient related variables, we find that for the group of 
socio-economic factors only age and whether the patient lives in East or West 
Germany have a significant impact on the switch probability for all three thera-
peutic areas. However, all variables describing the previous history of drug dis-
penses have significant effects on the probability of a drug switch. 
Physician related variables 
The results for variables describing the characteristics of physicians show that the 
total number of treated patients (N PATIENTS), their average age (AGE 
PATIENTS), and training of a physician as a specialist (SPECIALIST) have a 
negative impact on the probability of a drug switch. Thus, physicians that are spe-
cialists, have a high number of patients or an older patient clientele change drug 
prescriptions less often than physicians that are general practitioners, treating a 
lower number of patients or have a younger patient clientele.  
The second set of variables captured the prescription habits of physicians. The 
results show that the probability of a drug switch is lower for patients treated by 
physicians with a higher number of average prescriptions (QUANTITY 
PRESCRIPTIONS). A similar effect was found for patients receiving a drug with 
an active ingredient that is prescribed strongly by the corresponding physician 
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(PERCENTAGE ATC7 GROUP). Both effects are not significant for the thera-
peutic group of ACE inhibitors. 
The estimates of the Herfindahl coefficients indicate the effects of physician re-
lated preferences for specific active ingredients (HERFINDAHL-INDEX ATC7 
GROUP) or producers (HERFINDAHL-INDEX PRODUCER) in a therapeutic 
group. The results show that physicians concentrating their prescriptions on a 
fewer number of active ingredients, expressed through a high HERFINDAHL-
INDEX ATC7 GROUP, are more likely to change their prescription behavior than 
physicians prescribing across active ingredients.  
It has to be noted that the negative sign of PERCENTAGE ATC7 GROUP and the 
positive sign of HERFINDAHL-INDEX ATC7 GROUP seems to be a contradic-
tion. However, although the variables appear to be similar in their meaning, they 
capture different attributes of the physician. The variable PERCENTAGE ATC7 
GROUP measures the physician related average market share (in DDD) of the 
actual dispensed active ingredient over the last three months. The results indicate 
that a physician who prescribes a large amount of this active ingredient changes 
his prescriptions less often. Thus, the variable captures the possible preference for 
the actual dispensed active ingredient.  
In contrast, HERFINDAHL-INDEX ATC7 GROUP shows the overall preference 
of a physician towards the different active ingredients in the therapeutic market. It 
is, in contrast to PERCENTAGE ATC7 GROUP, independent of the actual dis-
pensed active ingredient in observation point t. A physician that prefers to concen-
trate his prescriptions on a fewer number of active ingredients, measured by a 
high HERFINDAHL-INDEX ATC7 GROUP, has a higher probability to switch 
his prescriptions than a doctor prescribing a larger variety of active ingredients, 
expressed by a lower Herfindahl index.  
At last, independent of the therapeutic markets, physicians preferring specific 
drug producers, indicated through a high HERFINDAHL-INDEX PRODUCER, 
are less likely to switch the prescriptions of their patients.  
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The analysis of the physician related variables indicates that characteristics of the 
physician and his patient clientele both have an impact on the probability of a 
drug switch. The effects are similar in all observed therapeutic markets. Also, pre-
scription preferences for specific active ingredients or producers affect the pre-
scription behavior of physicians significantly.  
While it seems that both patient and physician specific characteristics and habits 
play a role for the drug dispense, the influence of the properties of the dispensed 
drugs itself are captured by the set of drug related variables.  
Drug related variables 
The estimated coefficient of the PRICE DIFFERENCE between the dispensed 
drugs in observation points t and t-1 is negative in all therapeutic groups. There-
fore, in the case a cheaper drug in observation point t compared to the drug in ob-
servation point t-1 is dispended, the negative price difference has a positive effect 
on the switch probability. In the case of a positive price difference, which corre-
sponds to dispending a more expensive drug in t compared to t-1, the effect is 
negative.  
The market share of the prescribed drug has a significant negative impact on the 
probability of a drug change. This result has to be interpreted cautiously as it 
could be a statistical artifact. It is less likely that patients are switched to drugs 
with a high market share since a large number of patients already receive this 
drug. Therefore, the probability of a change towards such a drug is affected nega-
tively. The positive coefficient of the AUT IDEM variable is not surprising, as 
most drugs dispensed with the attribute Aut-Idem are the result of a substitution 
process by the pharmacists.  
The dummies for the active ingredients121 in the therapeutic markets indicate that 
there are significant differences across the active ingredients in the frequency of 
                                                     
121 
 Note that the estimates for the active ingredient dummies have to be interpreted in 
comparison to the reference category.  
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drug changes. This shows that specific attributes (e.g. patent status) of the pre-
scribed active ingredients have an effect on the choice of the dispensed drug.  
The results of the estimation of the drug related variables showed that especially 
the price difference of drugs plays an important role. A negative price difference 
leads to a significant increase in the probability of a drug change, indicating the 
change from a more expensive drug to a cheaper one. Also the probability of a 
drug switch depends on the active ingredient of the dispensed drug.  
Implementation of regulative instruments 
The implementation of any regulative instrument considered had a positive impact 
on the probability of a drug change. The strongest impact was found for the im-
plementation of rebate contracts (REBATE CONTRACTS) followed by reference 
pricing (REFERENCE PRICE) and the possibility to exempt drugs from patient 
co-payments (EXEMPTION CO-PAYMENT).  
The statistic significant coefficients for the regulation variables indicate that be-
side patient, physician or drug related attributes, an additional impact on switches 
of the dispensed drug is the implementation of regulatory instruments. 
V.7.2 Magnitude analysis  
Since the coefficient estimates of the random effect probit models are very diffi-
cult to interpret in an economic sense, the marginal effects of the coefficients are 
estimated. Most papers122 calculate the marginal effects at the means (MEM). 
Therefore, the sample means of the independent variables would be used as fixed 
values. Instead of using MEM, we computed the average of discrete or partial 
changes over all observations, therefore estimating average marginal effects 
(AME).123  
                                                     
122 
 Examples for the use of MEM can be found in Hellerstein (1998), Coscelli (2000) 
and Lundin (2000). For the calculation of MEM in STATA®, see Bartus (2005). 
123 
 The average marginal effects were calculated using the user written command mar-
geff in STATA®. See Bartus (2005) 
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The main argument for the use of average marginal effects is the possibility of a 
more realistic interpretation of the results, especially for dummy variables.
124
 Un-
der the consideration of dummy variables, the calculation of MEM is delicate, as 
the used sample means refer to non-existing observations. Since the larger part of 
our independent variables are dummies, the use of AMEs is the preferred option.  
The calculated AMEs have to be interpreted differently for continuous and 
dummy variables. For continuous variables, the AMEs indicate how a partial 
change (about 1 unit) of a variable changes the probability for the switch of the 
dispensed drug. The interpretation of marginal effects for dummy variables is dif-
ferent. They show the marginal impact on the probability for a drug dispense 
switch if the dummy variable changes its value from 0 to 1. 
Table 23 shows the average marginal effects of patient related variables:  
Table 23: Average marginal effects for patient related variables of the Chamber-
lain/Mundlak random probit model
125
 
Dependent variable – SWITCH 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
AGE -0.0257 *** 0.0030 -0.0230 *** 0.0023 -0.0113 *** 0.0014 
GENDER -0.0014 *** 0.0014 -0.0023 ** 0.0011 -0.0003  0.0008 
EAST GERMANY 0.0076  0.0021 0.0042 ** 0.0017 0.0092 *** 0.0015 
WELFARE 
RECIPIENT  0.0128  0.0433 0.0165  0.0309 0.0018  0.0255 
                                                     
124 
 See Bartus (2005) 
125 
 Due to the complexity of the estimation and limitations in the calculating capacity, 
the marginal effects estimated for ACE inhibitors and proton pump inhibitors are 
based on an 80 % respectively 60 % sample. To confirm the results, we repeated the 
probit model estimation and drew several random samples (80 % or 60 % respec-
tively) and calculated the marginal effects again. The results for the marginal effects 
do not differ much and are available on request. 
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NATIONALITY 
0.0061  0.0043 0.0004  0.0034 0.0016  0.0021 
CITY AREA 0.0001  0.0016 0.0003  0.0014 0.0039 *** 0.0011 
TIME LAPSE 0.0178 *** 0.0003 0.0168 *** 0.0003 0.0123 *** 0.0002 
N PRESCRIPTIONS 0.0092 *** 0.0005 0.0070 *** 0.0003 0.0024 *** 0.0001 
N ATC7 GROUPS 0.0553 *** 0.0037 0.0552 *** 0.0035 0.0764 *** 0.0012 
N PHYSICIANS -0.0424 *** 0.0011 -0.0361 *** 0.0009 -0.0312 *** 0.0006 
PAST SWITCHES 
BETWEEN ATC7 
GROUPS 0.1580 *** 0.0044 0.1733 *** 0.0049 0.0847 *** 0.0012 
PAST SWITCHES 
WITHIN ATC7 
GROUP 0.1471 *** 0.0012 0.1025 *** 0.0009 0.0544 *** 0.0006 
N PRESCRIPTIONS 
WITHIN ATC7 
GROUP -0.0360 *** 0.0009 -0.0230 *** 0.0005 -0.0236 *** 0.0003 
*** indicates significance on the 1 % level, ** significance on the 5 % level and * shows significance on 
the 10 % level  
The results indicate that for a one unit increase in the age of the patient (AGE) the 
likelihood for a switch of the dispensed drug decreases between 1.1 and 2.6 %. 
This shows that older patients are less likely to face a drug change than younger 
patients. Concerning the number of months between prescriptions (TIME 
LAPSE), we find that an increase of about one month increases the probability of 
a drug change for the patient between 1.2 and 1.8 %. Visiting one additional phy-
sician in the observation period (N PHYSICIANS) decreases the change probabil-
ity on average about 3.1 to 4.2 %.  
The increase of the previous number of switches between active ingredients 
(PAST SWITCHES BETWEEN ATC7 GROUPS) about one unit raises the 
switch probability between 8.5 and 17.3 %. An additional past drug switch within 
an active ingredient (PAST SWITCHES WITHIN ATC7 GROUPS) increases the 
likelihood of a drug switch between 5.4 and 14.7 %.  
If patients receive drugs more constantly within a specific active ingredient (N 
PRESCRIPTIONS WITHIN ATC7 GROUP), the probability of a switch de-
creases between 2.3 and 3.6 % for each additional previous prescription within 
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this active ingredient. Table 24 shows the average marginal effects for the physi-
cian related variables. 
Table 24: Average marginal effects for physician related variables of the Chamber-
lain/Mundlak random probit model 
Dependent variable – SWITCH 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
N_PATIENTS -0.0008 *** 0.0002 -0.0007 *** 0.0001 -0.0007 *** 0.0000 
AGE PATIENTS -0.0004 *** 0.0001 -0.0003 *** 0.0001 -0.0004 *** 0.0001 
SPECIALIST -0.0046 *** 0.0016 -0.0060 *** 0.0014 -0.0071 *** 0.001 
QUANTITY 
PRESCRIPTIONS -0.0055 *** 0.0015 -0.0012  0.001 -0.0037 *** 0.0007 
PERCENTAGE 
ATC7 GROUP -0.0005 *** 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 -0.0006 *** 0.0001 
HERFINDAHL-
INDEX ATC7 
GROUP 0.00001 *** 0.0001 0.00001 *** 0.0001 0.00002 *** 0.0001 
HERFINDAHL-
INDEX 
PRODUCERS -0.00002 *** 0.0001 -0.00003 *** 0.0001 -0.00004 *** 0.0001 
*** indicates significance on the 1 % level, ** significance on the 5 % level and * shows significance on 
the 10 % level  
For the group of physician related variables, the dimension of the variables has to 
be considered, before interpreting the impact of a one unit change. While some 
marginal changes are highly significant in a statistical sense, the actual importance 
of such a change is rather low. An example is the average age of the patients 
treated by the physician in the observation period (AGE PATIENTS). Even if the 
average age would increase about ten years, the effect would still be lower than 
1 %.  
Since the issue of the dominance of statistical significance in contrast to substan-
tive significance has already been discussed by various authors (e.g. Hoover and 
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Siegler (2008); Ziliak and McCloskey (2008); and Miller (2008)), it will be not 
addressed here in detail. Considering the underlying dimensions and the relation 
to the mean values of the variables that can be found in Table 28 in Appendix 1, 
only a number of physician related marginal effects are regarded as substantively 
significant.  
Therefore only the Herfindahl indices seem to have a considerable impact on the 
dependent variable. At first glance, the actual effect of the Herfindahl indices on 
the change probability seems relatively small. Still, the effects should not be un-
derestimated, as the coefficient only indicates the probability increase of a drug 
change if the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) increases about one unit. As the 
Herfindahl indices can take values up to 10,000, the small impact on the change 
probability of an increase about one unit are misleading.126  
Following the results in Table 24, an increase of the HHI measuring the prefer-
ence of physicians for a specific active ingredient (HERFINDAHL INDEX ATC7 
GROUPS) raises the probability for a drug switch. The probability decreases for 
patients whose physicians show a high preference for specific drug producers 
(HERFINDAHL INDEX PRODUCERS). Both effects are strongest for the group 
of proton pump inhibitors. 
The average marginal effects of drug related variables on the SWITCH variable 
are shown in Table 25.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
126
  See Miller (2008) for more information about misleading interpretation of marginal 
effects because of different scales. 
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Table 25: Average marginal effects for drug related variables of the Chamber-
lain/Mundlak random probit model 
Dependent variable – SWITCH 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
PRICEDIFF -0.1568 *** 0.0068 -0.2150 *** 0.0069 -0.0339 *** 0.0020 
MARKET SHARE 
PZN -0.0038 *** 0.0002 -0.0003 *** 0.0001 -0.0019 *** 0.0001 
AUT-IDEM DRUG 0.0561 *** 0.0042 0.0447 *** 0.0048 0.0404 *** 0.0031 
ATC_C10AA01 0.0088  0.0065 -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA02 Reference category -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA03 0.0229 *** 0.0070 -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA04 -0.0500 *** 0.0061 -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA05 -0.0660 *** 0.0068 -  - -  - 
ATC_C09AA01 -  - 0.0424  0.0293 -  - 
ATC_C09AA02 -  - 0.0459  0.0285 -  - 
ATC_C09AA03 -  - 0.0598 ** 0.0302 -  - 
ATC_C09AA04 -  - -0.0669 *** 0.0231 -  - 
ATC_C09AA05 -  - 0.0332  0.0266 -  - 
ATC_C09AA06 -  - 0.0442  0.0304 -  - 
ATC_C09AA07 -  - -0.1746  1.2351 -  - 
ATC_C09AA08 -  - 0.0158  0.0275 -  - 
ATC_C09AA09 -  - -0.0519  0.0435 -  - 
ATC_C09AA10 -  - -0.0089  0.0259 -  - 
ATC_C09AA11 -  - -0.1746  0.3350 -  - 
ATC_C09AA13 -  - -0.1746  1.2351 -  - 
ATC_C09AA16 -  - Reference category -  - 
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ATC_A02BC01 -  - -  - -0.0318 *** 0.0032 
ATC_A02BC02 -  - -  - -0.0522 *** 0.0027 
ATC_A02BC03 -  - -  - -0.0096 ** 0.0038 
ATC_A02BC04 -  - -  - Reference category 
ATC_A02BC05 -  - -  - -0.0570 *** 0.0027 
*** indicates significance on the 1 % level, ** significance on the 5 % level and * shows significance on 
the 10 % level  
The results of the marginal effects of the drug related variables show that the price 
difference seems to have a large impact on the probability of a drug change. The 
effect has to be interpreted differently for positive and negative price differences. 
The prescription of a cheaper (more expensive) drug in t compared to the drug in 
t-1 would lead to an average rise (decrease) of the switch probability between 3.4 
and 21.5 % for an increase of the price per DDD about one euro. While this effect 
seems very large, it has to be noted, that the average price difference lies between 
0.02 euro and 0.04 euro. Following this, the actual effect has to be considered 
much weaker.127 A dispended drug that falls under the Aut-Idem rule increased the 
probability of a drug change between 4.0 and 5.6 %.  
If the patient receive the HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor atorvastatin (ATC7 Code 
C10AA05), the likelihood of a drug switch decreases about 6.6 % in comparison 
to the reference active ingredient lovastatin (ATC7 Code C10AA02). In case of 
fluvastin (ATC7 Code C10AA04), the decrease is 5.0 %.  
It has to be noted that during the observation period the active ingredients atorvas-
tatin and fluvastin have been under patent protection whereas for lovastatin 
(ATC7 Code C10AA02), simvastatin (ATC7 Code C10AA01) and pravastatin 
(ATC7 Code C10AA03) generic versions were available. Thus, the results show 
that the probability for drug switches increases whether a physician changes the 
                                                     
127 
 This is a further example for the importance of substantive significance as mentioned 
by Hoover and Siegler (2008), Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) and Miller (2008) 
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prescription to or within an active ingredient for which generic drugs are avail-
able. 
The same holds for the therapeutic group of the ACE inhibitors. We find that pa-
tients treated with perindopril (ATC7 Code C09AA04) have a decreased probabil-
ity (-6.7 %) for a change in their drug dispense. In opposite, for patients using 
lisinopril (ATC7 code C09AA03) the likelihood of a drug switch increases about 
6 % compared to the reference active ingredient imidapril (ATC7 Code 
C09AA16).  
In case of proton pump inhibitors, the results indicate that a drug change to or 
within one of the active ingredients with existing generics (omeprazole (ATC7 
Code A02BC01), pantoprozole (ATC7 Code A02BC02), and lansoprazole (ATC7 
Code A02BC03) is less likely than a change to or within the patent protected ref-
erence active ingredient rabeprazole (ATC7 Code A02BC04). The relative high 
probability for a switch to or within rabeprazole compared to the active ingredi-
ents with available generic drugs is unusual for a patent drug. The reason seems to 
be the relative high market share of parallel imports for rabeprazole during the 
observation period. In contrast, there are no parallel importers in the market for 
the patent protected active ingredient esomeprazole (ATC7 Code A02BC05). The 
results indicate that patients receiving esomeprazole have a reduced likelihood to 
experience a change in drug prescription (-5.7 %) compared to the reference drug 
rabeprazole. 
Table 26 describes the average marginal effects of the introduction of major regu-
latory instruments between 2004 and 2007 on the probability of a drug switch.  
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Table 26: Results of the Chamberlain/Mundlak random effect probit estimation for the 
effects of the introduction of regulatory instruments 
Dependent variable – SWITCH 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
LEAD 
COMPOUND 0.7962  50.3801 
Not included in regulatory 
regime 0.8361  429.2979 
REFERENCE 
PRICE 0.1124 *** 0.0062 0.0542 ** 0.0312 0.0577 *** 0.0039 
EXEMPTION 
FROM CO-
PAYMENT 0.0088 ** 0.0033 0.0638 *** 0.0028 0.0791 *** 0.0030 
REBATE 
CONTRACT 0.2492 *** 0.0048 0.4209 *** 0.0048 0.3461 *** 0.0045 
*** indicates significance on the 1 % level, ** significance on the 5 % level and * shows significance on 
the 10 % level  
The last category of covariates captures the effects of the implementation of regu-
latory instruments on the changes of the dispensed drug for patients. The results 
show, that the introduction of reference prices (REFERENCE PRICE) increased 
the probability for a change in the dispensed drug between 5.4 and 11.2 %. The 
introduction of the possibility for pharmaceutical companies to exempt their drugs 
from patient co-payments (EXEMPTION FROM CO-PAYMENT) also increased 
the probability for a drug switch between 0.9 % and 7.9 %. The implementation of 
rebate contracts had the largest impact on the likelihood of a drug switch. The 
probability increased between 24.9 and 42.1 % following the implementation of 
rebate contracts. 
V.8 Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to estimate the effects of patient, physician and drug 
related characteristics and habits on the probability of a switch of the dispensed 
drugs for chronic diseases in the German SHI system. Moreover, for the first time, 
  173 
the impact of the implementation of regulative instruments in the German SHI 
system on the probability of drug switches was analyzed.  
We evaluated the effects of the patient, physician, and drug related variables for 
three different therapeutic groups, namely, HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors, ACE 
inhibitors and proton pump inhibitors. These therapeutic groups range quite 
prominently among the treatments of chronic diseases. We used a dataset consist-
ing of the prescription history of over 50,000 patients and an overall number of 
nearly one million drug prescription observations between January 2004 and De-
cember 2007.  
Interestingly, the estimated effects are similar for all three therapeutic groups. 
Thus, our results seem to be quite robust, even more so in view of the fairly large 
datasets. 
The results indicate that patient and physician specific characteristics and habits 
have a significant impact on the probability of a drug switch. In line with Heller-
stein (1998) and Stargardt (2010), our results suggest that older patients are less 
often switched than younger patients. Similar to Coscelli (2000), we find that an 
increase in time between treatment episodes increases the probability of a drug 
switch. Also, patients with a higher total number of different active ingredients, a 
larger account of previous switches between active ingredients, and especially 
more previous drug changes within and between active ingredients are more likely 
to get switched in their prescription.  
Contrary to the results of Coscelli (2000), patients visiting a greater number of 
different doctors have a reduced probability of a drug switch. A possible explana-
tion is that a new physician has to assemble medical knowledge about the patient 
first. Therefore the physician will initially prescribe the drug previously pre-
scribed by his predecessor to avoid possible side effects.  
Considering physician related habits and characteristics, the results indicate that 
patients face an increased probability for a drug switch if their physician prefers 
specific active ingredients. A reason for this could be an increased knowledge of 
the physician concerning the active ingredient, leading to a better knowledge 
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about the range of drugs on the market to choose from. In contrast, patients treated 
by physicians that have a strong preference for a specific manufacturer are 
changed less likely.  
The analysis also shows that a cheaper price of the dispensed drug and the fact 
that it is an Aut-Idem drug (i.e. among the three cheapest drugs of an active ingre-
dient) increase the probability to switch to this drug significantly. Both results 
show that physicians include economic aspects in their decision making, obvi-
ously to evade possible punishment due to regulations like budgeting.  
In the existing literature, the impact of regulatory instruments on the prescription 
decision of physicians has only been investigated by few authors (e.g. Furu et al. 
(2008) and Lundin (2000)). Since the German SHI prescription drug market is 
strongly regulated, we included variables to capture the effects of the implementa-
tion of regulative regimes. The results show that the introduction of reference 
pricing, the possible exemption from patient co-payments, and especially the im-
plementation of rebate contracts had a strong positive impact on the likelihood for 
a switch to a drug included in these instruments.  
Overall, we find strong evidence that patient and physician related characteristics 
and habits influence the probability for a drug switch for patients in the German 
SHI market. In addition, the results indicate a strong impact of economic factors 
on the prescription behavior of physicians. Especially the implementation of sev-
eral regulative instruments increased the likelihood of a drug switch significantly. 
In contrast to similar theoretical approaches, we do not incorporate parameters 
that represent the level of reimbursement by the sickness funds.128 The reason is 
that prescription drugs in the German SHI system are nearly fully reimbursed. 
Patients only have to pay a small co-payment between five and ten euro. There-
fore the question of cost sharing between the two parties is less important. How-
ever, the importance of drug prices for the physician due to the drug budget is 
acknowledged in the estimation process.  
                                                     
128
  See Hellerstein (1998) and Lundin (2000) 
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The dataset includes only data of one specific (although large) health insurance 
fund. This could influence the representativity of the results. Especially the low 
number of unemployed persons in the data set should be noted. However, due the 
structure of the SHI system, the supply of health care services is irrespective of 
the income of the insurant. Therefore, the possible bias should be small. Unfortu-
nately, an extension of the data sample is difficult, as most health insurance funds 
do not share patient related data, even for scientific research.  
For further research it would be interesting to include information about market-
ing activities of pharmaceutical companies (e.g. number of visits by pharmaceuti-
cal representatives) in the German SHI system. Following Venkataraman and 
Stremersch (2007) and Janakiraman et al. (2008) such factors could have an im-
pact on the prescription decision. Also further variables regarding doctors’ charac-
teristics, such as age or practice type (e.g. singular or group practice) are desir-
able. Finally, it would be interesting to analyze whether the income situation of 
patients affect the prescription behavior of physicians.  
V.9 Appendix 
V.9.1 Appendix 1 
Table 27: Descriptive statistics of patient related variables 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
AGE 60.62 11.02 0 99 58.97 13.21 0 102 52.00 16.01 0 101 
GENDER 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.38 0.48 0 1 0.51 0.50 0 1 
EAST GERMANY 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1 
WELFARE 
RECIPIENT  0.01 0.02 0 1 0.01 0.02 0 1 0.01 0.02 0 1 
NATIONALITY 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1 
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CITY AREA 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1 
TIME LAPSE 3.06 3.49 0 41 2.55 2.88 0 41 1.95 3.79 0 41 
N PRESCRIPTIONS 6.64 3.90 2 38 7.98 5.19 2 38 6.86 6.52 2 62 
N ATC7 GROUPS 1.19 0.43 1 4 1.07 0.27 1 3 1.42 0.62 1 5 
N PHYSICIANS 1.42 0.70 1 7 1.48 0.75 1 8 1.60 0.88 1 11 
PAST SWITCHES 
BETWEEN ATC7 
GROUPS 0.13 0.40 0 9 0.05 0.25 0 9 0.33 0.77 0 14 
PAST SWITCHES 
WITHIN ATC7 
GROUP 
0.88 1.33 0 35 1.05 1.52 0 17 0.97 1.67 0 27 
N PRESCRIPTIONS 
WITHIN ATC7 
GROUP 3.57 2.81 1 38 4.39 3.73 1 38 3.36 4.74 1 62 
Table 28: Descriptive statistics of physician related variables 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
N_PATIENTS 9.42 13.54 1 191 11.42 15.04 1 206 17.66 30.72 1 468 
AGE PATIENTS 61.66 7.21 1 94 60.33 8.43 0 98 52.71 9.30 0 96 
SPECIALIST 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1 
QUANTITY 
PRESCRIPTIONS 3.48 2.14 0.33 49.33 3.99 2.48 0.33 38.67 3.83 2.37 0.33 42.67 
PERCENTAGE 
ATC7 GROUP 84.18 25.83 0.28 100.00 68.49 31.02 0.32 100.00 75.34 30.29 0.17 100.00 
HERFINDAHL-
INDEX ATC7 
GROUP 8,360 2,226 2,000 10,000 6,629 2,685 1,528 10,000 7,686 2,498 2,000 10,000 
HERFINDAHL-
INDEX 
PRODUCERS 6,227 3,046 761 10,000 5,737 2,970 830 10,000 6,220 2,938 933 10,000 
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Table 29: Descriptive statistics of drug related variables 
 HMG-CoA reductase  
inhibitors 
ACE Inhibitors Proton pump 
inhibitors 
Variable name Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
PRICEDIFF -0.03 0.10 -2.83 2.01 -0.02 0.07 -3.42 2.00 -0.04 0.20 -7.99 8.03 
MARKET SHARE 
PZN 4.71 8.23 0.00 51.12 4.70 7.92 0.00 98.55 4.77 6.67 0.00 36.3 
AUT-IDEM-DRUG 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.14 0.34 0 1 
ATC_C10AA01 0.78 0.41 0 1 
- - - - - - - - 
ATC_C10AA02 0.01 0.12 0 1 
- - - - - - - - 
ATC_C10AA03 0.09 0.29 0 1 
- - - - - - - - 
ATC_C10AA04 0.07 0.26 0 1 
- - - - - - - - 
ATC_C10AA05 0.04 0.19 0 1 
- - - - - - - - 
ATC_C09AA01 
- - - - 0.05 0.22 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA02 
- - - - 0.27 0.44 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA03 
- - - - 0.15 0.36 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA04 
- - - - 0.00 0.04 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA05 
- - - - 0.51 0.50 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA06 
- - - - 0.01 0.08 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA07 
- - - - 0.01 0.08 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA08 
- - - - 0.00 0.03 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA09 
- - - - 0.01 0.07 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA10 
- - - - 0.00 0.02 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA11 
- - - - 0.00 0.05 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA13 
- - - - 0.00 0.02 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_C09AA16 
- - - - 0.00 0.02 0 1 - - - - 
ATC_A02BC01 
- - - - - - - - 0.57 0.49 0 1 
ATC_A02BC02 
- - - - - - - - 0.22 0.41 0 1 
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ATC_A02BC03 
- - - - - - - - 0.03 0.16 0 1 
ATC_A02BC04 
- - - - - - - - 0.01 0.11 0 1 
ATC_A02BC05 
- - - - - - - - 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Table 30: Descriptive statistics of regulatory instruments 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
LEAD COMPOUND 0.01 0.08 0 1 -
129
 - - - 0.02 0.12 0 1 
REFERENCE PRICE 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.00 0.02 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1 
EXEMPTION FROM 
CO-PAYMENT 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.06 0.23 0 1 
REBATE 
CONTRACT 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1 
V.9.2 Appendix 2 
Table 31: Results of the standard random effect probit model  
Dependent variable -SWITCH 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump 
inhibitors 
Variable name Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Patient related variables 
AGE -0.0006  0.0005 -0.0002  0.0003 -0.024 *** 0.0002 
GENDER -0.0802  0.0085 -0.0099  0.0072 -0.0043  0.006 
EAST 0.0462 *** 0.0125 0.0352 *** 0.011 0.0771 *** 0.0106 
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  The proton pump inhibitors were not part of the lead compound regime.  
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WELFARE 
RECIPIENT 0.0615  0.246 0.1170  0.1798 0.0112  0.179 
NATIONALITY 0.0357  0.025 0.0038  0.0212 0.0048  0.0148 
CITY AREA -0.0026  0.0096 -0.0024  0.0087 0.0264 *** 0.0077 
TIME LAPSE 0.0918 *** 0.0014 0.0938 *** 0.0012 0.0849 *** 0.0009 
N PRESCRIPTIONS 0.0303 *** 0.0019 0.0268 *** 0.0012 0.0249 *** 0.0008 
N ATC7 GROUPS 0.1376 *** 0.0172 0.1301 *** 0.0182 0.3309 *** 0.0069 
N PHYSICIANS -0.2800 *** 0.0068 -0.235 *** 0.0054 -0.2373 *** 0.0041 
PAST SWITCHES 
BETWEEN ATC7 
GROUPS 0.4387 *** 0.0161 0.4818 *** 0.0178 0.2709 *** 0.0048 
PAST SWITCHES 
WITHIN ATC7 
GROUP 0.6887 *** 0.0046 0.5564 *** 0.0032 0.3886 *** 0.003 
N PRESCRIPTIONS 
WITHIN ATC7 
GROUP -0.2158 *** 0.0031 -0.1584 *** 0.002 -0.1655 *** 0.0018 
Physician related variables 
N_PATIENTS -0.001 *** 0.001 -0.0085 *** 0.0007 -0.0068 *** 0.0003 
AGE PATIENTS -0.0096 *** 0.0009 -0.003 *** 0.0006 -0.005 *** 0.0004 
SPECIALIST -0.02 *** 0.01 -0.0384 *** 0.0091 -0.0447 *** 0.0078 
QUANTITY 
PRESCRIPTIONS -0.013 ** 0.0061 0.0039  0.0042 -0.0229 *** 0.0031 
PERCENTAGE 
ATC7 GROUP -0.0025 *** 0.0004 -0.0001  0.0002 -0.0012 *** 0.0002 
HERFINDAHL-
INDEX ATC7 
GROUP 0.00005 *** 0.0001 0.0001 *** 0.0001 0.0001 *** 0.0001 
HERFINDAHL-
INDEX 
PRODUCERS -0.0001 *** 0.0001 -0.0001 *** 0.0001 -0.0002 *** 0.0001 
Drug related variables 
PRICEDIFF -0.6938 *** 0.0342 -1.0271 *** 0.0356 -0.2198 *** 0.012 
MARKET SHARE -0.0133 *** 0.0009 -0.0008  0.0006 -0.0163 *** 0.0007 
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PZN 
AUT-IDEM DRUG 0.14 *** 0.0169 0.1763 *** 0.0193 0.0656 *** 0.0147 
ATC_C10AA01 0.1031 *** 0.038 -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA02 Reference category  -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA03 0.1295 *** 0.0383 -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA04 -0.3004 *** 0.0435 -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA05 0.6129 *** 0.0532 -  - -  - 
ATC_C09AA01 -  - 0.4661 *** 0.1434 -  - 
ATC_C09AA02 -  - 0.481 *** 0.1424 -  - 
ATC_C09AA03 -  - 0.5541 *** 0.1426 -  - 
ATC_C09AA04 -  - -0.4221 ** 0.204 -  - 
ATC_C09AA05 -  - 0.4163 *** 0.1426 -  - 
ATC_C09AA06 -  - 0.4425 *** 0.1485 -  - 
ATC_C09AA07 -  - 0.2535 * 0.1497 -  - 
ATC_C09AA08 
-  - -6.6225  8448.97
5 
-  - 
ATC_C09AA09 -  - 0.2678 ** 0.1495 -  - 
ATC_C09AA10 -  - -0.1773  0.3453 -  - 
ATC_C09AA11 -  - -0.073  0.1655 -  - 
ATC_C09AA13 
-  - -7.5212  14014.4
2 
-  - 
ATC_C09AA16 -  - Reference category -  - 
ATC_A02BC01 -  - - - -0.1805 *** 0.0244 
ATC_A02BC02 -  - - - -0.3727 *** 0.0244 
ATC_A02BC03 -  - - - -0.0347  0.0287 
ATC_A02BC04 -  - - - Reference category 
ATC_A02BC05 -  - - - -0.4788  0.0265 
Regulatory instruments 
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LEAD COMPOUND 
8.3961  16280.15 
Not included in regula-
tory regime 13.645  75122.87 
REFERENCE PRICE 0.5152 *** 0.024 0.2821 ** 0.1403 0.3533 *** 0.0179 
EXEMPTION FROM 
CO-PAYMENT 0.0961 *** 0.0173 0.3883 *** 0.0125 0.6223 *** 0.0133 
REBATE 
CONTRACT 1.2066 *** 0.0153 1.6827 *** 0.0142 1.668 *** 0.014 
Controls 
Monthly Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant ( 0 ) -1.3511 *** 0.0903 -1.4963 *** 0.163 -1.6894  0.0826 
Log Likelihood   -67938.25   -104034.13  -126519.41  
Rho  0.061  0.0033 0.088  0.0029 0.081  0.0024 
Number Observations 212,742   322,048   463,848   
*** indicates significance on the 1 % level, ** significance on the 5 % level and * shows significance on 
the 10 % level  
Table 32: Results of the Chamberlain/Mundlak random effect probit estimation for 
patient related variables 
Dependent variable -SWITCH 
 HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors 
ACE inhibitors Proton pump inhibitors 
Variable name Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Patient related variables 
AGE -0.1521 *** 0.0179 -0.1413 *** 0.0138 -0.0806 *** 0.0102 
GENDER -0.0084  0.0085 -0.0141 ** 0.0071 -0.0018  0.0060 
EAST 0.0447 *** 0.0122 0.0257 ** 0.0106 0.0642 *** 0.0104 
WELFARE 
RECIPIENT 0.0738  0.2451 0.0980  0.1771 0.0129  0.1800 
NATIONALITY 0.0360  0.0247 0.0025  0.0206 0.0115  0.0148 
CITY AREA 0.0008  0.0094 0.0019  0.0083 0.0279 *** 0.0075 
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TIME LAPSE  0.1052 *** 0.0019 0.1034 *** 0.0016 0.0877 *** 0.0012 
N 
PRESCRIPTIONS  0.0546 *** 0.0028 0.0427 *** 0.0019 0.0173 *** 0.0010 
N ATC7 GROUPS  0.3269 *** 0.0220 0.3374 *** 0.0210 0.5372 *** 0.0081 
N PHYSICIANS -0.2509 *** 0.0068 -0.2213 *** 0.0052 -0.2220 *** 0.0042 
PAST SWITCHES 
BETWEEN ATC7 
GROUPS 0.9260 *** 0.0256 1.0353 *** 0.0284 0.5937 *** 0.0081 
PAST SWITCHES 
WITHIN ATC7 
GROUP 0.8628 *** 0.0077 0.6218 *** 0.0054 0.3852 *** 0.0042 
N 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
WITHIN ATC7 
GROUP -0.2127 *** 0.0051 -0.1412 *** 0.0032 -0.1679 *** 0.0022 
Physician related variables 
N_PATIENTS -0.0049 *** 0.0011 -0.0044 *** 0.0008 -0.0046 *** 0.0003 
AGE PATIENTS -0.0026 *** 0.0008 -0.0021 *** 0.0006 -0.0032 *** 0.0004 
SPECIALIST -0.0271 *** 0.0097 -0.0370 *** 0.0088 -0.0513 *** 0.0076 
QUANTITY 
PRESCRIPTIONS -0.0323 *** 0.0092 -0.0073  0.0063 -0.0262 *** 0.0052 
PERCENTAGE 
ATC7 GROUP -0.0031 *** 0.0005 0.0005  0.0003 -0.0043 *** 0.0003 
HERFINDAHL-
INDEX ATC7 
GROUP 0.0001 *** 0.0001 0.0001 *** 0.0001 0.0001 *** 0.0001 
HERFINDAHL-
INDEX 
PRODUCERS -0.0001 *** 0.0001 -0.0002 *** 0.0001 -0.0003 *** 0.0003 
Drug related variables 
PRICEDIFF -0.9287 *** 0.0405 -1.3205 *** 0.0427 -0.2415 *** 0.0141 
MARKET SHARE 
PZN -0.0226 *** 0.0012 -0.0020 ** 0.0008 -0.0139 *** 0.0010 
AUT-IDEM DRUG 0.3073 *** 0.0209 0.2523 *** 0.0247 0.2665 *** 0.0184 
ATC_C10AA01 0.0525  0.0382 -  - -  - 
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ATC_C10AA02 Reference category -  - -   
ATC_C10AA03 0.1313 *** 0.0383 -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA04 -0.3247 *** 0.0442 -  - -  - 
ATC_C10AA05 -0.4498 *** 0.0547    -  - 
ATC_C09AA01 -  - 0.2406  0.1531 -  - 
ATC_C09AA02 -  - 0.2682 * 0.1522 -  - 
ATC_C09AA03 -  - 0.3368 ** 0.1523 -  - 
ATC_C09AA04 -  - -0.4958 ** 0.2120 -  - 
ATC_C09AA05 -  - 0.2041  0.1524 -  - 
ATC_C09AA06 -  - 0.2483  0.1572 -  - 
ATC_C09AA07 -  - 0.0559  0.1585 -  - 
ATC_C09AA08 -  - -7.4554  19601.71 -  - 
ATC_C09AA09 -  - 0.1581  0.59 -  - 
ATC_C09AA10 -  - 0.3577  -1.02 -  - 
ATC_C09AA11 -  - 0.1659  -0.34 -  - 
ATC_C09AA13 -  - -7.553  22793.93 -  - 
ATC_C09AA16 -  - Reference category -  - 
ATC_A02BC01 -  - -  - -0.2223 *** 0.0246 
ATC_A02BC02 -  - -  - -0.4037 *** 0.0246 
ATC_A02BC03 -  - -  - -0.0701 ** 0.0288 
ATC_A02BC04 -  - -  - Reference category 
ATC_A02BC05 -  - -  - -0.4577 *** 0.0269 
Regulatory instruments 
LEAD COMPOUND 
8.9284  32,639 
Not included in regulatory 
regime 13.9348  134,174 
REFERENCE 
PRICE 0.5672 *** 0.0271 0.2992 ** 0.1563 0.3612 *** 0.0216 
EXEMPTION 
FROM CO-
0.0512 *** 0.0189 0.3501 *** 0.0135 0.4741 *** 0.0154 
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PAYMENT 
REBATE 
CONTRACT 1.0815 *** 0.0174 1.6367 *** 0.0161 1.5157 *** 0.0156 
Controls 
Monthly Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant ( 0 ) -1.4636 *** 0.0920 -2.0371 *** 0.1701 -1.4683 *** 0.0580 
Log Likelihood -66404.947    -99182.028  -123373.96  
Rho  0.045  0.003 0.067  0.0027 0.064  0.0022 
Number Observations 212,742   322,048   463,848   
*** indicates significance on the 1 % level, ** significance on the 5 % level and * shows significance on 
the 10 % level  
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VI. A microeconomic approach of rebate contracts 
in the German health care system
1
 
VI.1 Introduction 
Prescription drugs are one major source of expenditures in the German Statutory 
Health Insurance (SHI) system. About 19 % of the SHI budget is spent for pre-
scription pharmaceuticals. The expenditures for prescription drugs have grown 
stronger since 2005 (5.3 % per year) than the expenditures for hospitals (3.6 %) 
and physicians (5.0 %).
2
 To reduce the expenditures for prescription drugs, vari-
ous instruments were implemented in the SHI system.
3
  
Among others, rebate contracts are considered as a way to reduce health care ex-
penditures. A rebate contract between a sickness fund (or a group of sickness 
funds) and a producer of pharmaceuticals contains agreements about rebates on 
every drug consisting of an active ingredient that is dispensed in a pharmacy at the 
expense of the sickness fund. The German health care system allows rebate con-
tracts between pharmaceutical firms and sickness funds since 2003. Thereby, the 
extent of the contract is not specified. It can include only a singular product or the 
whole portfolio of a pharmaceutical firm. However, rebate contracts were not 
used frequently until 2007 as the incentives for pharmaceutical producers were 
rather low. Due to a legal change in 2007, pharmacists are legally obliged to dis-
pense rebated products instead of other drugs with the same molecule. Since then, 
pharmaceutical producers receive a legal priority for the supply of insured of the 
sickness fund with their products. In return, they have to grant rebates on their 
products. Consequently, the popularity of rebate contracts increased. While physi-
                                                     
1
  This paper is a joint work with Christoph de Millas. 
2
  See Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2004-2009) 
3
  See Denda (2010) 
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cians have the right to demand that a specific drug is dispensed, the denial of re-
bated drugs would affect their personal budget and they could be financially 
prosecuted for economic inefficiency.
4
  
The economic effects of rebate contracts are still under discussion. Some parties 
argue that rebate contracts will increase competition and thereby reduce prices, 
since the current prices in the market include price mark-ups, resulting from price 
leadership and market domination of a few big generic producers. For supporters 
of these arguments the rebate contracts are an option to break this oligopoly struc-
ture.
5
  
Other parties suggest that the rebate contracts will even increase the oligopolistic 
power in drug markets, as large firms will be able to offer a higher volume of re-
bates. Following this, they will be able to win the tenders. In the end, smaller pro-
ducers will be driven out of the market and prices will rise again due to the in-
creased concentration of the market.
6
  
The goal of this paper is to analyze, with the help of a theoretical model, which of 
the two contrary opinions is more applicable.  
Even though the concept of tendering is not uncommon in the pharmaceutical 
market,
7
 the theoretical literature about rebate contracts in pharmaceutical markets 
is limited. So far, we are not aware of any paper that analyzed the German market 
for rebate contracts in a theoretical economic model.  
Therefore a theoretical model for rebate contracts in the German SHI system will 
be developed in this paper. The model will include different types of generic pro-
ducers and patient groups. Resulting from the inclusion of various types of pa-
tients, consumer preferences will play an important role in the model.  
                                                     
4
  See KV Sachsen (2011) 
5
  See Hermann (2007) 
6
  See Pro Generika e.V. (2010) 
7
  See Carradinha (2009) and Grabowski and Mullins (1997)  
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The results indicate an imbalance between larger and smaller pharmaceutical pro-
ducers concerning their competitive position. The strong market position of larger 
generic drug producers remains following the introduction of rebate contracts. 
However, rebate contracts are successful in intensifying competition between pro-
ducers and lowering the drug expenditures of sickness funds. Crucial factors for 
the success of rebate contracts are mismatch costs and market access. If the mis-
match costs are too high or the market access is too expensive, the contestability 
of the market can be reduced. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section VI.2 gives an overview about the exist-
ing literature and the theoretical background influencing the development of the 
model approach. Section VI.3 introduces the basic model and outlines the situa-
tion before the introduction of rebate contracts. In Section VI.4 we investigate the 
implementation of rebate contracts under different market conditions. In Section 
VI.5 the results and limitations of the models are discussed with respect to the 
German market. Section VI.6 concludes.  
VI.2 Literature review 
The literature on theoretical aspects of the German SHI rebate market is very lim-
ited. Most discussions about rebate contracts are focused on aspects like medicine, 
entrepreneurship, law, lobbying, and politics. As they are considered in the design 
of the theoretical model, a short outline concerning these aspects will be given in 
the following.  
The paper of Pruszydlo et al. (2008) discusses the medical aspects of rebate con-
tracts. Their paper analyzes the problems of interchangeability that can occur be-
tween different generics of the same active ingredient (AIP). The German law 
only allows substitution between drugs that are identical in terms of AIP, strength, 
package size, dosage form and indication. However, drugs can still differ in shape, 
color, divisibility or auxiliary substances. The results of the paper indicate that 
these factors are relevant for convenience and compliance of the therapy. Pruszy-
dlo et al. (2008) find that in about a third of the cases two possible substitute 
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drugs in the German SHI market differ in one of the factors mentioned. The prob-
lem is aggravated by rebate contracts, as only one product is eligible. Therefore, 
problems with drug compliance due to rebate contracts are possible.  
The discussion about legal aspects of rebate contracts refers primarily to the regu-
lation of the corresponding tendering process. The main question is whether sick-
ness funds are companies, an opinion represented by Badtke (2007) among others, 
or corporations under public law, as argued by Natz (2008). In case, sickness 
funds are considered as private companies, they would fall under the anti-trust 
laws. This would limit the possibilities of sickness funds to create buying syndi-
cates. In opposite, if they were considered as corporations under public law, they 
would need to tender rebate contracts and need to consider specifications about 
the promotion of medium-sized businesses.  
As a result of the rising popularity of rebate contracts, pharmaceutical firms have 
to adjust their business strategies to remain competitive. Especially the shifting of 
the target group of decision makers from physicians to sickness funds leads to 
new challenges for the pharmaceutical producers. As Zeiner (2008a, 2008b, 
2008c) shows, producers of patent drugs try to intensify their relationship with 
sickness funds by not only offering medical products but also additional health 
services to the members of a sickness fund. These additional services can also be 
part of rebate contracts.  
In addition, pharmaceutical producers also express their fear of market cannibali-
zation as companies are excluded from large parts of the market, if they lose a 
tender.
8
 For pharmacists rebate contracts can be a reason for higher costs, since 
the number of different drugs that needs to be stored might increase.
9
  
The existing literature on rebate contracts helps us to understand the market envi-
ronment and the affected parties. However, the development of the theoretical 
                                                     
8
  See Pro Generika e.V. (2010) 
9
  See Bauer (2008), p. 350 
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model was inspired by the existing literature on another popular regulatory in-
strument, namely reference pricing (RP).  
Even though RP leads to another type of competition, we used some aspects of the 
theoretical discussion for our model approach. Zweifel und Crivelli (1996) model 
the introduction of reference prices in Germany in a Bertrand duopoly setting. In 
their model, they distinguish between two types of physicians that have different 
preferences for the original and the generic drug. Their results show that the pro-
ducer of the original drug can charge a higher price than the generic drug producer 
after reference prices were introduced.  
Cabrales (2003) uses a setting with vertically differentiated products that are 
chosen by the companies. The results indicate that the introduction of reference 
prices does not always work against the interest of the firms, as it can release the 
firms of the necessity to compete in quality.  
Merino-Castelló (2003) develops a model with two horizontally differentiated 
firms that decide about quality and price of their products. One firm produces the 
branded original drug, the other one the generic version. Merino-Castelló uses 
scenarios of Bertrand and Stackelberg competition to show that reference pricing 
is not sufficient to increase the market share of generics. However, the results 
show that the market entry of generics is a credible threat and forces the brand 
producer to reduce prices.  
Mestre-Ferrándiz (2003) models the introduction of reference prices in Spain. In a 
duopoly of two horizontally differentiated firms, the effect of the policy changes 
from drug related co-payments to a reference price scheme are analyzed. Due to 
the design of the Spanish reference price scheme, the price of the original drug is 
always located above the reference price while that of the generic drug is always 
below. The results indicate that a reference price scheme can lead to lower prices 
than a co-payment scheme. 
Miraldo (2005) examines the possiblity of collusive behaviour of pharmaceutical 
companies in the case of reference pricing. In her model, drug producers, both 
horizontally and vertically differentiated, can determine ex ante the reference 
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price by their own pricing policy. Following this, it is possible for the producers to 
collude in their price setting, even without direct cooperation by taking the 
reference price as a focal point. In Miraldo’s model, reference prices are not able 
to decrease prices to a lower level than without the reference pricing.  
Brekke et al. (2007) develop a model with horizontal and vertical differentiation 
of products. In their approach, competition exists between a producer of an origi-
nal (off-patent) drug, a generic drug producer, and a third firm that offers a thera-
peutically comparable but patent protected drug. The authors show that therapeu-
tic reference pricing, including comparable active ingredients in a joint reference 
price group, increases competition but also discourages innovations to enter the 
market.  
While our paper is inspired by the presented papers on reference pricing, we also 
incorporated a theoretical approach by Grilo et al. (2001). While the paper 
analyzes a different topic, the consumer behavior related to external factors of 
conformity and vanity, the presented spatial duopol model for consumer behavior 
can be used in our context. In their model, two shopping stores, that are 
horizontally differenated by their location, sell a homogenous product. The 
consumers are located on an interval between zero and one, however the possible 
position of the shops is not limited to this interval. If the position of one store was 
outside this range and prices were equal, it would lose the market. Hence, 
horizontal and vertical differentiation are incorporated in a single modelling 
approach.  
In the spirit of Grilo et al. (2001), a horizontally and vertically differentiated Ber-
trand duopoly model will be used. In our model, decisions about costs and quali-
ties are already made, therefore the firms compete only in price. The differentia-
tion of the firms represent their position relative to the preferences of patients or 
sickness funds (horizontal differentiation), but also (biased) expectations about the 
characteristics of the products (vertical differentiation). In contrast to the other 
authors mentioned, we expand the market by introducing a second group of pa-
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tients (respectively sickness funds) that are only price sensitive. Further details 
about the market setting will be discussed in the next section. 
VI.3 The Basic Model  
In this section, a simple model for the demand of generic drugs in the SHI market 
will be developed. The basic model provides the basis for the theoretical modeling 
of rebate contracts in the later part of this paper. 
We assume the existence of a therapeutic market for an active ingredient that is 
only available on medical prescription only. The market is dominated by generic 
drugs, while the product of the original producer - whose patent has expired - is 
not relevant in terms of sales.  
The consumers (patients) are heterogeneous in their demand behavior. Thus, the 
demand for the active ingredient can be separated into two markets.  
 Market Ⅰ is characterized by biased consumers who prefer one of the 
two products. The price is not the only criterion for their decision between 
the two products. 
 Market  captures the unbiased consumers who only react to the price of 
the products. Patients on this market will always choose the product that 
offers the lower price  
There are two producers   and   each offering a single product on both markets. 
For type   consumers, the products are differentiated in a horizontal-vertical fash-
ion as follows: 
 Firm   produces a branded generic drug that is well known by both physi-
cians and patients. The popularity of the drug allows the producer to 
charge higher prices without losing its complete demand. 
 Firm   produces a no-name generic drug. The only advantage of the no-
name generic drug compared to the product of manufacturer   can be its 
lower price, 
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For both markets, the demand of a consumer is assumed to be one product per 
period. For purpose of simplicity, we assume that the production costs are zero for 
both firms. This seems a reasonable assumption as marginal costs are negligible in 
the case of pharmaceuticals.
10
 In addition, as both firms are established in the 
market, fix costs are considered to be sunk. 
VI.3.1 The market of the biased consumers (marketⅠ) 
For consumers in market Ⅰ the generic drugs of Firms   and   are differentiated 
products. Although considered as equal under therapeutic aspects, they are per-
ceived differently by the consumers due to subjective factors. Such aspects are the 
popularity of the producers, the shape of a tablet or its color. Also, preferences of 
physicians can influence the perception of the patient for specific drugs.  
To express the diversity of the consumer we use a Hotelling’s location model and 
define the market similar to Grilo et al. (2001). As shown in Figure 21, the length 
of market Ⅰ is assumed to be  . Firm   is located at  , while Firm   is located at 
 . The consumers of market Ⅰ are distributed uniformly on the segment [0,1]. 
The total mass of consumers in market Ⅰ is assumed to be  . 
If a product differs in its characteristics from the position of a consumer, the devi-
ance creates costs for the patient. These mismatch-costs are described by the fac-
tor    , expressing the marginal loss in utility for every unit of difference be-
tween the position of the consumer and the location of the demanded product. As 
Figure 21 shows, all consumers would prefer the product of Firm  , if prices of 
the two products were identical. Thus, our model for the market of the biased con-
sumers (market Ⅰ) displays a combination of both vertical and horizontal product 
differentiation. 
                                                     
10
  See Schweitzer (2006), p. 144 
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Figure 21: The market for the biased consumers 
 
 
The total utility   of the consumer         is  
   
                                                          
                                             
  (1) 
where   is the utility of the plain medical benefit of the active ingredient for    
consumers and    respectively    are the prices charged by the manufacturers.
11
 
Excursus: Reason for the market position of Firm   
This excursus gives a variety of explanations for the differences in preferences by 
type Ⅰ consumers. Except for the consumer on position    , all consumers 
have a stronger preference for the product of Firm   than for the drug produced 
by Firm  . Consequently, in case of identical prices the consumers would always 
choose product  . However, from a clinical point of view, the products   and   
are homogenous goods. Therefore, the difference arises from subjective factors. 
Possible explanations are: 
                                                     
11
 We assume that   is high enough so that every patient will have a positive utility 
from buying one of the products.  
0 21
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B
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1. The separation between national pharmaceutical markets is relatively 
strong. Correspondingly, a firm that has its origins in the local market can 
establish a national image, which cannot be achieved by a foreign firm.  
2. The effectiveness of a medical product also depends on the placebo effect. 
A lower confidence in Firm   and its product can reduce the healing ef-
fect, leading to a weaker market position of  .  
3. Consumers might have gained a wider knowledge about Firm   due to 
other products. This leads to stronger confidence for product  . 
4. Physicians, whose opinion might be biased because of advertising of Firm 
 , can influence the preferences of patients for the products. 
VI.3.2 The market of the unbiased consumers (market ) 
The second group of consumers that are included in the model (type ) are indif-
ferent between the two generic products. Therefore, their consumption decision is 
solely based on the price          ) and their “medical need” for the product 
expressed in value terms. Thus, if              , type   consumers will not 
buy products from firm  . Moreover, if the medical need, denoted by        , is 
lower than           , the consumer or physician will choose an alternative 
therapy option, including self-treatment or no treatment at all. The medical need 
of the patient, described by  , is assumed to be uniformly distributed between   
and  . Similar to market Ⅰ, we assume that each patient only consumes a singular 
product   per period. The total mass of consumers in market  is assumed to be 
unity.
12
  
We can describe the utility   of a type  consumer as:  
         (2) 
                                                     
12
  Therefore, the total mass of consumers in the model (type Ⅰ and ) is two. 
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A consumer will buy the product if    . It follows that the demand function in 
market  is: 
                 (3) 
with                . If      , it is assumed that the firms will share the 
market on equal terms. 
VI.3.3 Benchmarks: Market equilibria without rebate contracts 
In a first step we investigate the open market and derive the market prices for the 
separate markets Ⅰ and , as well as the joint market without rebate contracts. If 
the firms were able to separate the different type of consumers, they could apply 
price discrimination and charge an individual price for each market. This will be 
shown in the following. 
VI.3.3.1 Equilibrium in the market for biased consumers (market Ⅰ) 
For the indifferent consumer    the utility from consuming product   is equal to 
the utility gained from product  , i.e.             
     . The equation is ful-
filled for: 
   
        
  
 (4) 
As defined in Section VI.3.1, the consumers are located between zero and one. 
However, in case of      , the position of the indifferent consumer would be 
larger than one. Therefore, we can derive the following demand functions for 
market Ⅰ: 
  
              
  
      
  
(5) 
and in consequence the profit functions of the manufactures (recalling that cost 
are supposed to be zero) are 
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  (6) 
          
   (7)  
Based on this, we can formulate the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: If       Firm   will never gain any of the biased consumers. 
The firms will choose a price that maximizes their profits given the price of their 
opponent. This leads to following equilibrium prices and profits: 
   
  
 
    
  
 
 (8) 
   
  
 
    
  
 
 (9) 
The indifferent consumer is located on    
 
 
, irrespective of the mismatch costs 
 . Correspondingly the demand for Firm   is   
  
 
 
 and the demand for Firm   is 
  
  
 
 
 in the equilibrium.  
The prices and profits are increasing in   and for all     it holds that    
      and         .  
The higher price of the product   results from the higher preferences of consum-
ers for product  , compared to product  . Hence, the consumers accept a higher 
price. 
VI.3.3.2 Equilibrium in the market of the unbiased consumers (market 
 ) 
Based on the demand function in equation (3) the two firms face three possible 
outcomes concerning their profits: 
   
 
 
 
 
      
              
 
 
 
      
               
              
  (10) 
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This is a classic Bertrand competition. Consequently, the equilibrium price for the 
firms are           . Since prices are identical, each firm will receive 
half of the demand, but profits are zero. 
VI.3.4 Equilibrium in the combined market 
In contrast to most other European countries, manufacturers in the German SHI 
market can set their sales prices for prescription drugs without restrictions. How-
ever, unless a rebate contract has been signed, they are bound to their official sales 
price. Also, the margins for pharmacists and wholesalers are set by legal regula-
tions.
13
 Therefore, only one nationwide market price exists for a prescription drug.  
Given these regulations, we have to show how Firms   and   act when each of 
them has to charge the same price to all of their consumers. In the case of sepa-
rated markets, equilibria in pure strategies have been found. This result does not 
necessarily hold for the combined market.  
If the mismatch costs   are low, we have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We 
find, that    
 
  
             are the minimum mismatch costs for an 
equilibrium in pure strategies to exist. This leads to our first proposition. 
Proposition 1 
If     , a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with       exists. In 
this equilibrium, Firm   serves most of the biased consumers. Firm   supplies 
only a small fraction of market Ⅰ, and all unbiased consumers in market  . In 
the case of      no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Consider        Following equation (3), Firm   receives the whole demand on 
market . Moreover,       implies that the profit functions of the firms are: 
                                                     
13
  In case of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals (OTCs), pricing and margins are free. 
The price legislation does not apply for hospital pharmacies either.  
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  (11) 
           
          (12)  
Consequently the reaction functions lead to the following equilibrium prices and 
profits that are denoted by bars: 
      
  
    
 (13) 
    
  
    
 (14)  
   
         
       
 (15)  
   
         
       
 (16)  
The indifferent consumer    of market Ⅰ is located at: 
            
    
    
 (17) 
The initial condition       is satisfied for all    . 
To prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium with the prices     and    , it has to 
be shown that the firms have no incentive to deviate from the expected equilib-
rium prices.  
We find that if Firm   sets a price      , it would lose the whole market of 
unbiased consumers (type  ) respectively half of it if      . Also, following 
Lemma 1,   would also lose its market share in market Ⅰ. Therefore, Firm   
never has an incentive to deviate from   . 
In case of Firm  , the situation is different. In the above equilibrium candidate, 
Firm   relinquishes the competition market . However, it is possible that Firm 
  can raise its profits by underbidding the price of Firm  . 
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Firm   prefers to underbid Firm   if: 
        
       Ⅰ
      
       
  (18) 
The right hand side of equation (18) is the profit of Firm   with a price that is 
infinitesimal lower than the price of Firm  : Firm    will then receive the whole 
market Ⅰ (see Lemma 1) and in addition it gets the complete market . 
Solving equation (18) for t leads to: 
  
 
  
           (19) 
Thus, we have shown that for     , our equilibrium candidate is indeed an 
equilibrium. However, for      Firm   has an incentive to lower its price be-
low the price of Firm  . In reaction to the price reduction of Firm  , Firm   will 
also decrease its price. Consequently, the firms will start a process of underbid-
ding. However, they will not reach a price level that equals the marginal cost, as at 
one point in the underbidding process, Firm   will gain higher profits by with-
drawing from market  . The reason is that even for        Firm   can make 
strictly positive profits in market Ⅰ by setting a strictly positive price, whereas 
for      its profits would vanish.  
In the Nash equilibrium for     , Firm   serves only the biased consumers in 
market Ⅰ and has no share in market . With rising mismatch costs  , the market 
share of Firm   in market Ⅰ falls to 
 
 
  as        
  
 
 
. 
Correspondingly, Firm   receives a higher market share in market Ⅰ as   in-
creases. Note that for   
 
 
 the price     is higher than 
 
 
, which is the optimal 
price of the market  in a monopolistic setting. 
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VI.4 Introduction of rebate contracts 
Section VI.3 described the characteristics of the markets where in Section VI.3.3 
the equilibrium prices in the separate markets as well as the joint market were 
derived. As stated in Section VI.3.4, German laws do not allow different prices 
for the same prescription drug in the pharmaceutical market. Therefore, the equi-
librium prices     and     are assumed to be the list prices of the product. They are 
assumed to be constant in the following. 
The rebate prices of the firms are assumed to be a percentage     of the list prices 
            ). For example,         denotes a rebate of 20 % by firm   con-
cluding the rebate contract. We will refer to     as the rebate element in the follow-
ing. Note that a higher rebate element means that a lower rebate is granted. In 
conclusion, the actual price paid by the sickness fund under a rebate contract is 
      . 
The assumption of stable list prices in the following is not implausible. If we as-
sume that the proportion between biased and unbiased consumers remains the 
same as in the case of the absence of rebate contracts, the list prices of the firms 
do not change. However, we assume that it is not possible or optimal for the firms 
to withdraw their products from the open market. 
The introduction of rebate contracts creates new options for the firms. By closing 
a rebate contract with a sickness fund, the firm gains market exclusivity for this 
sickness fund’s patients. Therefore, patients of the sickness fund receive products 
for which the sickness fund has a rebate contract. 
Rebate contracts also change the demand side of the markets. Instead of patients, 
sickness funds are now assumed to represent the demand for prescription drugs. 
Assuming that sickness funds act as perfect agents of their members, we find that 
they are either preference orientated or price driven. Sickness fund Ⅰ is assumed 
to be a representative of the biased consumers. In opposite, Sickness fund   
represents the interests of the unbiased consumers.  
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Section VI.4.1 will describe the scenario for an active ingredient based rebate con-
tract (API contract), where sickness funds issue a tender for the supply of their 
members with a specific active ingredient. Both Firms   and   can offer a con-
tract for their respective products. Based on these offers, the sickness funds select 
the firm that offers the highest consumer surplus for their members.  
Section VI.4.2 will expand the model and alter the characteristics of Firm  . Fol-
lowing this, Firm   will have the opportunity to give a rebate not only for a singu-
lar product but for its whole product portfolio, consisting of different active ingre-
dients (Portfolio contract). 
Due to the results of Section VI.3.4, the analysis is confirmed for the case     , 
since only under this condition an equilibrium in pure strategies exists in the open 
market. 
VI.4.1 Active ingredient based rebate contracts 
VI.4.1.1 Scenario 1a: Sickness fund Ⅰ issues invitations to tender for an 
active ingredient (API) based rebate contract 
As noted before, Sickness fund Ⅰ represents the group of biased consumers. 
Since sickness funds act as perfect agents of their members, Ⅰ will only accept a 
rebate agreement if it offers an equal or higher utility for its members compared to 
the utility without a rebate contract.  
Therefore Firm   has to offer a price        that fulfills: 
                             
  
 
 
 
                  
 
  
 
(20) 
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Similar, the condition for Firm   is: 
                                 
  
 
 
 
                  
 
  
 
(21) 
The right hand sides of the equations are identical, they express the cumulative 
utility of patients of Sickness fund Ⅰ without rebate contract. The patients located 
between zero and     consume drug  . Patients between     and one consume 
drug  . The left sides of the conditions (20) and (21) represent the cumulated util-
ity for all consumers under consideration of the offered rebate contracts of Firms 
  respectively  . Following the conclusion of a rebate contract, all members of 
Sickness fund   will either use drug   or drug  .  
The following Proposition 2 describes the equilibrium in the market of type   with 
rebate contracts. We define the critical value for  , where we observe a switch in 
the rebate regime as: 
   
 
 
            (22) 
As      , both      and      are possible, given the assumption that     . 
The equilibrium values of the rebate element    of Firm   in the different rebate 
regimes are denoted as: 
    
          
          
 
    
    
    
 
(23) 
Note that         for all      and         for all  
      .  
Proposition 2 
In case of an active ingredient based rebate contract (API contract), in equilib-
rium, Firm   offers a rebate element      if      and a rebate element     if     . 
In both cases Firm   will gain positive profits. Firm   offers a rebate of 100 % 
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(    ). However, this rebate is not sufficient to make Sickness fund Ⅰ choose 
Firm   compared to a contract with Firm  . 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Let     and     denote rebate elements of Firm   and   that just match the condi-
tions in (20) respectively (21) with equality: 
    
          
          
 (24) 
    
           
       
 (25) 
These two critical values are decreasing in   for all       Also, it holds that 
            for all    
 . Therefore Firm   always has to offer a lower rebate 
element (meaning a higher rebate) than Firm   to compensate the higher mis-
match costs of the patients. 
While the rebate element of Firm   is always greater than zero with           
 
 
, Firm   would need to offer a negative rebate element for   
 
 
         . 
In this case, Firm   would incur a loss with a rebate contract and would refuse to 
compete in the tender process. 
However, even though Firm   does not make an offer for a rebate contract, it can 
still be profitable for Firm   to conclude a rebate contract to gain market exclusiv-
ity.  
Under the assumption of     , Firm   has to offer a rebate to Sickness fundⅠ 
that fulfills equation (20) to win the tender. Following this,     is the minimum and 
also the optimal rebate element for Firm  . A higher rebate would not expand the 
demand for drugs and thus only diminish profits.  
As Firm   receives the whole market in case of a rebate contract, the profit is:  
           
              
       
 (26) 
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It can be shown that for all     , it holds       . Consequently, Firm   will 
always offer a rebate contract even if it does not compete with Firm  . The reason 
for the higher profit is the increase in demand for their product and the possibility 
of Firm   to conduct a price discrimination between Sickness fund Ⅰ and . 
In the case of         the rebate contract is profitable for both firms. If the 
firms offered their critical rebate elements of     and     respectively in the first 
bidding round, the sickness fund would be indifferent and both firms would have 
a chance of 
 
 
 to receive the rebate contract.  
However, it is obvious, that this result cannot be an equilibrium. Both firms have 
an incentive to deviate from (       ) as the firm offering a slightly higher rebate 
will receive the whole market. Consequently, the other firm will counter with a 
higher rebate.  
Thus, a Bertrand competition emerges, in which Firm   is in a better position than 
Firm  , due to the preference structure of Sickness fund Ⅰ. Since members of Ⅰ 
are assumed to have a preference for product  , the net price (     ) of Firm   
must be lower than the net price         of Firm  . 
Given Firm   would offer a rebate of 100 %       , the reaction of Firm   can 
be expressed as: 
                
 
 
             
 
 
 (27) 
The right hand side of the equation displays the utility of the consumers in case of 
a rebate contract with Firm   and        . The left hand side is the utility for a 
contract with Firm  . Expression (27) leads to the critical 
    
    
    
 (28) 
and the profit 
            (29) 
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The rebate lies between 
 
 
      and the profit    of Firm   is greater than 
zero. The results indicate that Firm   can outpace Firm   even if Firm   gives a 
100 % rebate.  
As shown in proof of scenario 1a, for     , Firm   would have to offer a rebate 
element      to win the tender. However, the maximum rebate element it will 
offer is     , which is analogous to a rebate of 100 %. Firm   could offer a 
rebate element     to generate an equal utility for Sickness fund Ⅰ. However, the 
sickness fund would not accept it. Firm   has to give the lower rebate element     
to make Sickness fund Ⅰ indifferent to the open market situation.  
For the case of     , Firm   faces the opposite situation. A rebate element       
would be sufficient to match the utility in the open market case. Yet, Firm   has 
to give         to outbid the offer of Firm   in this case. 
VI.4.1.2 Scenario 1b: Sickness fund  issues invitations to tender for an 
active ingredient (API) based rebate contract 
In this scenario, Sickness fund   offers an active ingredient based rebate con-
tract. The sickness fund represents consumers whose consumption decision de-
pends only on the price of the products. 
Note that in market   the price reduction due to a rebate contract will increase 
the demand for the product. This means that Sickness fund   will transfer the 
savings of the rebate contract to the patients (in the form of lower co-payments or 
insurance premiums). Also, physicians will prescribe the drug more often because 
rebates are considered in the efficiency evaluation of their drug budgets. This im-
plies welfare gains due to rebate contracts. 
Considering this, the following Proposition 3 describes the equilibrium in the 
market of type  with rebate contracts.  
Proposition 3 
For all      there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with         
     for both firms.  
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Proof of Proposition 3 
Like sickness fund Ⅰ, sickness fund   will only accept a rebate contract that 
offers at least the same utility for its members than in the situation without a con-
tract.  
If a rebate element    is granted and firm   is chosen, the consumer surplus of the 
sickness fund  is:  
              
       
 
 (30) 
As Firm   is not present in market  before the introduction of rebate contracts 
due to its higher list price, it always has an incentive to offer a rebate to enter the 
market. Note that Firm   might also have an incentive to give a rebate. Firm   
will only offer a rebate immediately, if the list price     is higher than the profit 
maximizing monopoly price 
 
 
. This holds for all   
 
 
 and as our model is limited 
to      with    
 
 
, Firm B will always offer a rebate element. 
As every (reasonable) combination of strictly positive rebate element and list 
price will generate positive profits and increase the utility of the Sickness fund , 
the firms will start a race of underbidding until they reach                
 . As a result, every firm will make zero profits and will conclude a rebate con-
tract with Sickness fund  with a probability of 
 
 
.  
As we have seen so far, rebate contracts reduce net prices     . Yet, only in case 
of market   we reach a price equal to marginal costs and the firms have equal 
chances to win the contract. In contrast, on market Ⅰ, Firm   keeps its advantage 
regarding the preferences of the consumers and will always win the bid. Thereby, 
the net prices on market Ⅰ will not reach the level of the marginal cost. 
However, API contracts are only one possible form of rebate contracts. Instead, 
some sickness funds do not offer tenders for a single ingredient, but for the whole 
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product portfolio of pharmaceutical producers. This kind of contracts, called port-
folio rebate contracts, will be discussed in the next section. 
VI.4.2 Portfolio rebate contracts 
So far, we assumed that each firm produces only one single drug. Although the 
majority of generic producers sells only a small number of different drugs, there 
are a few large firms that have a portfolio up to over 200 different active ingredi-
ents.
14
  
We now assume that Firm   is a brand name generic producer that also offers a 
variety of drugs besides product  . These other products are bundled as “product 
 ” with price   . The combination of product   and product   forms the portfolio 
of Firm  . In contrast, Firm   is supposed to be a small producer that only has a 
single product in its portfolio. In consequence, only Firm   can offer portfolio 
rebate contracts to sickness funds. 
On the open market the demand for the portfolio   is: 
            (31) 
We assume that        is the demand for the product  . If Firm   had a monop-
oly in the market, the price for product   would be 
 
 
. Therefore, we assume    
 
 
. Note that the maximum demand for product s is defined as one. This underlines 
the importance of our main products   and   compared to products represented 
by product  .
15
 
In the following we compare the portfolio contract to the situation where the sick-
ness funds offer a single API contract for product   or   and no contract for 
product  . Yet, an API contract for product   could also be possible. However, 
                                                     
14
  See INSIGHT Health (2009) 
15
  It is quite common that even large portfolio firms earn a major part of their overall 
profits from the sales of only a few products. 
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such kind of contract seems to be unlikely. There are several reasons for this as-
sumption. In the case Firm   has a monopoly for product  , it has no incentive to 
offer any rebate because it will not increase its profits. If Firm   faces competition 
for product  , it might still not want to conclude a rebate contract for this product 
alone due to transaction cost. In contrast, a joint rebate contract for products   and 
  might save on transaction costs. 
If Firm   offers a rebate contract, we assume that a rebate element    is chosen 
that is identical for product   and  . We also assume that a rebate leading to a 
lower net price will expand the demand for product   (similar to market   for 
product  ).  
VI.4.2.1 Scenario 2a: Sickness fund Ⅰ issues invitations to tender for 
portfolio rebate contracts and Firm   can offer a portfolio contract 
Similar to the previous scenarios, Firm   has to offer a rebate that will make 
Sickness fund Ⅰ at least indifferent to the situation without a contract. Therefore, 
Firm   must fulfill the following condition (compare condition (20)): 
                             
      
 
 
 
              
  
 
                  
 
  
            
    
 
 
(32) 
The term              
      
 
 expresses the utility of the sickness fund for 
product   after the rebate. It can be expanded to: 
                                      
      
    
    
 
    
 
 (33) 
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The first term expresses the utility of the sickness fund in the open market. The 
second is the utility gain through the lower price for the same quantity. The third 
term represents the utility gain through the higher amount of consumed products. 
The first term of (33) can be subtracted from both sides of condition (32) and the 
right side of the latter becomes identical to that of condition (20): 
               
 
 
                           
      
    
    
 
              
  
 
                  
 
  
 
(34) 
Since Firm   only offers a single product, it faces the same condition (21) as in 
Scenario 1a. 
Again there are two critical values     and     (see equation (8) and respectively (43) 
in Appendix 1), with         for     , such that the following holds:  
Proposition 4 
Firm   will offer a portfolio contract with rebate element      if      and the re-
bate element     if  
      . In both cases Firm   will gain positive profits, 
even higher than under an API contract for product   and no rebate contract for 
product  . In contrast, Firm   cannot make a contract offer that makes sickness 
fund Ⅰ better off compared to the portfolio contract proposal of Firm  . 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The critical rebate element     for which (34) holds with equality can be seen in 
equation (43) in Appendix 1. It can be shown that         holds for all    
 . 
For Firm   the critical rebate elements remains     (see equation (25). If      , we 
have shown in section VI.4.1.1, that the critical rebate element must be smaller 
than zero. Therefore, Firm   will not make a bid for the contract. If      , Firm   
will lower its rebate element down to     .  
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Because Firm   cannot offer a portfolio contract, Firm   has three choices. It 
could refrain from offering a rebate , offer an API contract for product  , or it 
could bargain a rebate contract for product   and product  .  
The results of section VI.4.1.1 already indicated that an API rebate contract in-
creases profits, compared to the situation without rebate contracts. Consequently, 
the decision is reduced to the choice between an API and a portfolio contract. 
The Firm   will prefer the portfolio contract if: 
                         
                  
                    
            
   
(35) 
It can be shown that the portfolio profit is always higher than the API profit for 
     and      
 
 
. The reason for the higher profits is the larger consumed 
amount of product  . In case of the API contract for product  , Firm   can com-
pensate the utility loss of sickness fund Ⅰ due to the switching from Firm   to 
Firm  , only through price reduction. With the portfolio contract, the sickness 
fund is also compensated by the demand expansion of the portfolio market. The 
results indicate a welfare increase on the market of product  . Firm   can sell 
product   for a higher price (      ) and therefore overcompensate the profit loses 
for the remaining products of the portfolio. 
For         again an underbidding process between the two firms occurs, until 
the rebate element where Firm   can outpace Firm  .  
Similar to (27) Firm   can offer a rebate that fulfills the following condition: 
                             
      
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
            
    
 
 
(36) 
The critical rebate     element that matches both sides is derived in equation (43) in 
Appendix 1. 
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Again Firm   makes higher profits with the portfolio contract compared to the 
API contract. In conclusion, Firm   will receive the whole market Ⅰ, as a rebate 
factor      of Firm   would not lead to a higher benefit for the sickness fund.  
A portfolio contract leads to higher profits for Firm   compared to an API con-
tract or the open market. The reason is the increased demand on the market of 
product  . In case of an API contract Firm   can only increase the surplus of the 
consumers by lowering its price. It now sells more products (the ones sold before 
by Firm  ), however the total amount of products stays the same. It can be shown 
that, if a price reduction on the market for product   led to no increase in demand, 
Firm A would be indifferent between an API contract and a portfolio contract. 
The profit gain due to the rebate contract for product   would be consumed by the 
loss for product  . With an increase in the demand the consumers are not only 
better off by the lower price but also more consumers are willing to buy product  . 
The increase of the demand for these products overcompensates the loss due to 
lower prices.  
VI.4.2.2 Scenario 2b: Sickness fund   issues invitations to tender for 
portfolio rebate contracts and Firm   can offer a portfolio contract 
In this scenario Firm   can offer a portfolio contract to Sickness fund  . The 
sickness fund will accept that offer if the following condition is fulfilled: 
              
       
 
              
      
 
             
     
 
            
    
 
 
(37) 
This means, the accumulated utility in case of a rebate contract (left hand side of 
(37) must be at least as high as in the market equilibrium without a rebate con-
tract. 
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As before the firms will start a competition of underbidding and condition (37) 
can be changed to the case were     : 
              
       
 
              
      
 
         
 
 
            
    
 
 
(38) 
As in the results of scenario 2a the term            
    
 
 can be separated 
out of expression (38). Thus, the right side expresses the prescribed consumer 
surplus for Sickness fund  in condition (30) for the case when     . 
Therefore, we can express the condition for Firm   as: 
              
       
 
                           
      
    
    
 
         
 
 
 
(39) 
The following Proposition 5 describes the equilibrium in the market  if Firm   
is able to offer a portfolio contract. Contrary to Proposition 3, the equilibrium 
value      (see equation (45) in Appendix 2) of Firm   will now be greater than 
zero: 
Proposition 5 
Firm   will offer a portfolio rebate element         for all    
  that will lead to 
positive profits for Firm  , even higher than in case of an API contract for product 
  and no rebate contract for product  . In contrast, Firm   cannot offer a rebate 
element      which generates a higher consumer surplus for Sickness fund   
than the offer of Firm  . 
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Proof of Proposition 5 
Similar to Section VI.4.1.2 the introduction of rebate contracts leads to an under-
bidding process. While Firm   can offer a portfolio rebate contract, Firm   cannot 
offer a comparable rebate due to the lack of a larger product portfolio.  
Consequently, Firm   increases the utility for members of Sickness fund   and 
still realizes profits. Therefore, Firm   has to match condition (39). The right 
hand side of the equation shows the benefit of the sickness fund with a rebate of-
fer      by Firm  . The left hand side shows the utility in case of a contract 
with Firm    As a result we receive the critical rebate element      of equation (45), 
which can be found in Appendix 2. 
The rebate element      lies between 0 and 1 for    
  and      
 
 
. Firm   
now gains a profit on the market for product  . Still, it has to be evaluated if the 
profit growth for drug   compensates the profit loss for products  . Thus, Firm   
will offer the rebate      if 
                                       
                            
            
                      
 
(40) 
It can be shown that the left side of equation (40) is higher for all      and 
     
 
 
. Therefore Firm   prefers the portfolio contract. 
Compared to the offer by Firm        , Sickness fund   loses benefit on the 
market of product   (respectively  ) if it accepts the bid of Firm  . But Firm   
compensates the sickness fund with a benefit gain on the market for product  .  
VI.4.3 Recapitulation of the results on rebate contracts 
In the previous sections, we have shown four different scenarios for rebate con-
tracts. Table 33 summarizes the results for each scenario. In three of them, Firm   
receives the rebate contract and can increase its profits. In contrast, Firm   does 
not make any profit. Only in one scenario Firm   has a 50% chance of winning 
the tendering process for a rebate contract, but its profits would be zero. 
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The sickness funds improve their utility or are, at least, indifferent. In the market 
of Sickness fund Ⅰ the increase of total welfare depends on the mismatch cost  . 
In the market of Sickness fund  total welfare always increases, independent of 
the value of   (note that following Proposition 1 our solutions considerations are 
confined to     ). 
Table 33: Summary of the tendering results 
 Sickness fund Ⅰ Sickness fund  
API contract Firm   wins and gains higher 
profit than without a rebate 
contract. 
Firm   and Firm   have a 
chance of 50% to win the 
contract. They make no prof-
its. 
For      total utility of sick-
ness fund increases, for      
total utility remains the same 
as without a rebate contract. 
Sickness fund receives maxi-
mum consumer surplus of 
product   or  , independent of 
the value of t. 
Total welfare increases, if 
mismatch cost are high 
enough. 
Sickness fund receives the 
maximum possible total wel-
fare. 
Portfolio contract Firm   wins and gains higher 
profits than with API rebate 
contract. 
Firm   wins and gains higher 
profits than with a API      
contract. 
For      total utility of sick-
ness fund increases, for      
total utility remains the same 
as without a rebate contract. 
Sickness fund receives a sur-
plus gain equal to to the API 
contract. 
Total welfare increases, if 
mismatch cost are high 
enough. In general, the total 
welfare is higher than under 
API contract due to higher 
profits of Firm  . 
Total welfare increases, as the 
maximum total welfare of 
product   plus the former 
profit of Firm   for product s 
is shared between firm and 
sickness fund. 
 
The results show that the biased consumers, represented by Sickness fund Ⅰ, will 
always receive the product of Firm  . In contrast, the unbiased consumers repre-
sented by Sickness fund  will either receive product   or  .  
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Based on the results, Firm   will always prefer the portfolio contract because of 
the higher profits of this option. In contrast, the sickness funds are indifferent be-
tween the API and the portfolio contract. However due to the higher profits, Firm 
  obtains the possibility to convince the sickness funds to favor portfolio con-
tracts by giving a slightly higher rebate. 
Under these circumstances, the portfolio contract would always be the superior 
rebate contract option. Therefore, our analysis of the API contracts seems unnec-
essary. However, as we can see for the portfolio contract, Firm   would gain a 
monopolistic position not only for the API contract (where it is intended) but also 
for their remaining products consumed by the insurants of the sickness funds. In 
the long run this would lead to a monopolistic position for firm   in the whole 
SHI system. The legislature has recognized this issue and changed the legal 
framework for rebate contracts accordingly. Following 2009, portfolio contracts 
only fulfill the legal requirements for a rebate contract in very rare cases. We will 
discuss this in further detail in Section VI.5. 
In regard to the total welfare of rebate contracts, the results are mixed. In the mar-
ket of sickness fund Ⅰ, the welfare gain depends on the value of the mismatch 
cost  . Firm   always loses its profits, independently of  . Firm   sells at a lower 
price but can increase its output and in sum increase its profits. The utility of the 
sickness fund increases when mismatch cost are low       and remain the same 
when mismatch cost are high (    . It can be seen from the profit functions (26) 
and (29) of Firm   that in case of the API contract profits are increasing in  . 
Consequently, the profit gain for Firm  , compared to the profit loss for Firm  , 
increases when t gets higher. This leads to a total welfare increase when   is larger 
than 
 
 
. As we have shown in expression (40), the profits under a portfolio contract 
are always higher than under an API contract. Therefore, the profit gain of Firm   
is even more higher relative to the profit loss of Firm   than in the case of the API 
contract. However, unlike for the API contract, the critical  , where the welfare 
increases, depends now also on price    of product  . If Firm   has a monopoly 
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for product     
 
 
 , the total welfare is larger compared to the situation without 
rebate contracts when   > 1.3514. 
In case of the market of sickness fund  , the welfare effects are more intuitive. 
With the API contract, the actual price       is zero. Therefore all patients with a 
medical need can consume the good and the sickness fund receives the maximum 
welfare in the market. When the model is extended to portfolio contracts, the wel-
fare gain is even higher than under the API contract. In the case of portfolio con-
tracts, Firm   needs to match with its offer the same consumers surplus as under 
the API contract as the actual price of Firm   will be again        . Therefore, 
the total consumer surplus is the same as under the API contract, yet Firm   can 
increase its profits, since the gain for product   is higher than the loss for product 
 . 
In the following section the political implications of these results will be dis-
cussed. 
VI.5 Interpretation of the results in relation to the German pharmaceuti-
cal market 
In a market for generics with free price setting, it is expected that prices are close 
to the marginal cost of production, as generic drugs are goods whose substitutabil-
ity and (therapeutic and pharmacologic) homogeneity are the preconditions for 
market entry. But the need for regulatory instruments like reference pricing and 
the Aut-Idem rule
16
 show that the market prices are usually above marginal costs.
 
In reaction to reference pricing the firms are forced to lower their prices. Also, the 
                                                     
16
  Aut-Idem (latin: or the same) rule in Germany: As long as the physician has not ex-
plicitly excluded “Aut-Idem” on the receipt, the choice of the pharmacist is limited 
to the three cheapest drugs with the same active ingredient, package size, strength, 
application form and indication. If the physician has stated a specific drug on the re-
ceipt and not just the nonproprietary name (INN), the pharmacist may also dispense 
the drug on the receipt. When there is a rebate contract and Aut-Idem is not excluded 
by the physician, the pharmacist has to dispense the rebated drug (see Spitzenver-
band Bund der Krankenkassen (2009) 
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Aut-Idem rule intensifies the price competition between the different producers. 
But even then the firms have still the possibility to grant rebates in case of a rebate 
contract. 
Hotelling’s location model was used to explain the price differences between the 
various brands of a generic drug. The model was helpful to explain why the oc-
curring prices lie above marginal costs by assuming the existence of subjective 
preferences of both patients and physicians for specific generic drugs. 
As mentioned in the introduction, experts are divided between two different opin-
ions how rebate contracts could change the market of the SHI system. One group 
expects an increase of competition and lower prices due to rebate contracts. The 
other fraction fears a squeeze out of small producers and therefore, in the long 
run, higher prices due to an oligopolistic or monopolistic market situation. 
Our results show that both sides have reasonable arguments for their position. Our 
model predicts lower reimbursement prices for the sickness funds but also the 
tendency for monopolization. Of course, our model is only a simplification of the 
existing forms of contracts. In particular, we assume that firms just grant a simple 
rebate on the price of a drug. In reality, the German law allows far more complex 
rebate contracts. For example, firms are allowed to close contracts that include a 
general rebate on the price and an additional rebate for the increased amount of 
demand they generated due to the rebate contract. However, this does not alter the 
general requirement that the firms have to generate at least the same consumer 
surplus for the sickness funds as without a rebate contract. However, this condi-
tion again favors the bigger firms, as they can make better comprehensive offers. 
As a result, smaller producers could be discouraged to operate in the market.  
In concern to the negative aspects of rebate contracts, we found that especially 
portfolio contracts reduce the chances for small producers. This danger was al-
ready acknowledged by the legal institutions in Germany. Since a 2009 court de-
cision, sickness funds are considered as corporations under public law and there-
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fore are obliged to tender Europe-wide.
17
 Also they have to divide the contract in 
lots to make it easier for medium-sized businesses to participate in the tender. 
Consequently, the German Federal Social Insurance Authority prohibits portfolio 
contracts and appeals to the sickness funds to re-tender their rebate contracts.
18
 
Based on the court decision and the opinion of the German Federal Social Insur-
ance Authority, the legislator concretized the Book V of the Social Code at the 
beginning of 2011. The duration of a contract should be two years. The variety of 
providers shall be taken into consideration. Our results indicate that these legal 
changes are reasonable. 
While the legislator wants to avoid a declining number of producers in the market, 
a decrease in competition does not necessarily need to occur. Currently there are 
at least three pharmaceutical companies in Germany that correspond to the Firm   
in our model (large portfolio and seen as a brand producer by consumers). With 
the introduction of rebate contracts, the firms would either underbid themselves to 
a rebate of 100 % or we might see a persistence of high prices (including rebate) 
when the German patients have a high preference (high mismatch cost) for spe-
cific branded generics. 
A relatively high number of unbiased consumers could lower the power of the 
branded generics producers, because it gets more unattractive to give up the de-
mand of the unbiased consumers in favor of higher prices charged to the biased 
consumers. However, they can use rebate contracts on the market of the unbiased 
consumers to improve their general market position. Before the rebate contract, 
only non-branded generic producers of type   supplied the consumers on the 
market. With the API contract firms of type   will still not make profits but nei-
ther will the former incumbent. Thereby branded generic producers can make it 
unattractive for small firms to compete on the German SHI drug market. If the 
brand firms can generate positive profits on other markets of their portfolio, they 
                                                     
17
  See Court of Justice of the European Communities (2009) 
18
  See Plate (2009) 
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might even accept losses on markets of unbiased consumers in the short run to 
drive small competitors out of the market. Hence, the market access for new firms 
is an import aspect for contestability of the generic market. As Natz (2008) points 
out, the existence of rebate contracts allows foreign pharmaceutical producers to 
enter the German market more easily, as they can focus their key account man-
agement on the sickness funds and not the heterogeneous mass of physicians. 
Therefore, even with no local firms of type   in the market, small foreign produc-
ers can be a continuous threat for the established market participants. 
Another possible strategy for brand firms could be collusive agreements concern-
ing rebate contracts. The larger, established firms in the market could agree that 
for every sickness fund only one of them offers a rebate. The result would depend 
on the number of repeated games (frequency of tenders, number of sickness 
funds), the potential of the firms to threat the (possible) competitors in the market, 
and the duration of a rebate contract. A deeper analysis is beyond the focus of this 
paper but it seems reasonable to expect that the options to collude diminish as 
market entry for new competitors becomes cheaper and the duration of a rebate 
contract decreases. 
Reference pricing, which is an important aspect of the German generic market, 
was not addressed in this paper. Reference prices foremost influence the price 
setting on the open market. The German reference prices are based on the existing 
sales prices in the market and have to take into account that a minimum amount of 
different drugs is available for the intended reference price.
19
 In our model, refer-
ence prices would set a maximum price for Firm   or a kink in the demand for 
product  . However, it would not change the general advantage of Firm   to set a 
higher price than Firm  . In addition, for the case of a discount contract the refer-
ence price does not play a role, as discounts are not considered in the calculation 
of the reference prices. 
                                                     
19
  For further details about the calculation of the German reference prices see 
Schumacher and Greiner (2008) and Stargardt et al. (2005) 
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When we compare the results of the theoretical literature on reference pricing with 
our results, we find that the German rebate contracts are a radical regulation in-
strument. It exerts a stronger pressure on prices than reference pricing, but it can-
not level out the differences in market power between the firms.  
The analysis of the rebate contracts left out cases where the mismatch cost are 
      . The reason is the non-existence of a stable list price     in the com-
bined market without rebate contracts. A deeper analysis of this interval would 
have distracted from the intrinsic idea of this paper to show the interaction be-
tween the firms and the sickness funds in the rebate market. However, it should be 
noted that rebate contracts, if they are possible for values of   smaller than   , 
might stop the occurring circle of price decreases and increases, as with the exis-
tence of a rebate contract, changes in list price will not help to regain market 
share. 
VI.6 Conclusion 
Rebate contracts are a relatively new concept in the German market. Policy mak-
ers were immediately confronted with demands by the pharmaceutical industry to 
repeal them. Primarily installed to reduce the expenditures of the sickness funds, 
rebate contracts are able, under specific circumstances, to reduce the level of re-
imbursement of drugs to the level of marginal drug cost. However, in most cases a 
price markup will remain, because large and preferred producers can outperform 
smaller competitors before marginal costs are reached. Hence, rebate contracts 
bear the danger that smaller competitors are excluded from the market, leading to 
market concentration. Yet, it is questionable, whether these arguments are suffi-
cient enough to withdraw the legislation for rebate contracts. But the legislator 
reacted with more specific frameworks and virtually forbid portfolio contracts. 
The results of the paper indicate that the effects of rebate contracts depend on the 
market framework. By setting the proper regulatory framework, rebate contracts 
can lead to savings and avoid monopolistic market positions.  
  224 
First, to prevent the negative aspects of rebate contracts, the contestability of a 
market has to be sustained. This can be difficult because the rebate contracts di-
minish the incentives of pharmaceutical companies to produce drugs when they 
do not participate in any of these contracts.  
Second, only single active-ingredient contracts should be allowed. With portfolio 
contracts, smaller producers are heavily disadvantaged as they cannot compete 
with the diversity of the larger firms.  
Third, the duration of a contract should not be too long, otherwise the excluded 
firms will most likely leave the market and new competitors cannot enter. The 
renegotiation of the contracts gives an incentive to remain in the market and the 
sickness fund might anticipate cost savings in the productions process through 
higher rebates.  
Finally, also the demand side should be examined. It should be observed if the 
decreasing number of sickness funds, primary due to a number of mergers and the 
creation of buying syndicates by smaller sickness funds lead to oligopolistic struc-
tures on the demand side. However, as sickness funds are bound to regulations for 
governmental authorities the possible risks for a gross distortion of the pharma-
ceutical market should be small. It is also questionable whether one producer 
would have the capacity to supply medicines to about 70 million insurants in the 
SHI system.  
In conclusion, we find that the rebate contracts have a great potential for savings, 
but possibly not to the expected extent. A sufficient framework is needed to un-
fold the potential. The market is still under development and in upcoming years, 
an empirical evaluation of the market is needed to show how the market picture is 
affected by this new regulatory instrument. 
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VI.7 Appendix 
VI.7.1 Appendix 1 
Rebate elements in Scenario 2a 
In Section VI.4.2.1 we describe the Scenario 2a: Sickness fund Ⅰ issues invita-
tions to tender for portfolio rebate contracts and Firm A has the possibility to offer 
a portfolio contract. The rebate offer of Firm   depends on the possibility of Firm 
  to offer a rebate as well. For      Firm   will submit a rebate element     , 
but for      Firm   could satisfy the condition in equation (21) only with a re-
bate element     , therefore it will not participate in the tender. As a result the 
are at least two different outcomes for the rebate element    of Firm  . 
In case of     , the rebate element    of Firm   has to satisfy the condition (34). 
Solving that condition at equality leads to two solutions: 
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(42) 
But only   
  satisfies the conditions of our model that        for all    
  
and      
 
 
. Therefore   
  is the only feasible solution and we define it as our 
critical value:       
  . 
For     , the rebate element   of Firm   has to satisfy the condition in equation 
(36). There are two solutions for    that satisfy the condition: 
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and 
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(44) 
As before only one of the solutions satisfies the conditions of our model. Here it is 
  
  and we define it as the critical value,       
 . 
VI.7.2 Appendix 2 
Rebate elements in Scenario 2b 
In section VI.4.2.2 we describe the Scenario 2b: Sickness fund  issues invita-
tions to tender for portfolio rebate contracts and Firm   has the possibility to offer 
a portfolio contract. The rebate offer of Firm   depends on the offer of Firm  . 
The two firms are in a race of underbidding. Due to its portfolio, Firm   has the 
advantage to outrun Firm   and still make profits. Hence, Firm   needs to satisfy 
the conditions about the consumers surplus of Sickness fund   in expression 
(39), where Firm   offers a rebate of 100% (     . Solving at equality gives 
two solutions: 
  
  
     
  
    
        
  
    
 
 
            
     
  
    
 
 
 
  
     
  
    
 
   
(45) 
and 
  
  
     
  
    
        
  
    
 
 
            
     
  
    
 
 
 
  
     
  
    
 
   
(46) 
The condition     
    holds for all      and      
 
 
. In case of   
  the 
condition is only fulfilled for   
 
 
            . In consequence, Firm   
could choose between two possible rebate elements in this case. But naturally, as 
both rebate elements lead to the same consumers surplus for Sickness fund  , 
Firm   would only offer the rebate element that leads to higher profits. As de-
scribed in equation (40) the profit of Firm   is                            . It 
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can be shown that for   
 
 
        the rebate element   
  always generates 
higher profits. Therefore, we can define   
  as the critical rebate element        
 . 
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VII. Concluding remarks 
The goal of this study was the evaluation of the effects of the implementation of 
regulative instruments on key stakeholders of the SHI drug market. The study 
focused particularly on three regulative instruments which were implemented be-
tween 2004 and 2007. The thesis analyzed the effects of the implementation of 
reference pricing, of the possibility to exempt drugs from patient related co-
payments, and of rebate contracts on pricing strategies and market shares of dif-
ferent types of pharmaceutical producers, the prescription behavior of physicians, 
and the strategic behavior of sickness funds in negotiations processes.  
Thereby, the results indicate that the observed regulative instruments have lead to 
the desired results from the perspective of the legislator. However, it could be 
shown that these effects sometimes differ between sub-groups of the stakeholders.  
The implementation of reference pricing was analyzed from various perspectives. 
As the regulative instruments primary aim at prices, pharmaceutical producers are 
the main target of the analysis. The results of the thesis show, that various types of 
pharmaceutical producers, in detail patent, original, and generic drug producers, 
are affected differently from the implementation of a joint reference price. Patent 
drug producers lower their prices to a smaller degree than original and generic 
drug producers. A possible explanation is a kind of (subjective) utility advantage 
of patent drugs, which original and generic drugs do not posses. Also, the results 
indicate that competition effects generic drugs stronger than patent or original 
drugs.  
Beside the effects on the pricing behavior, the thesis also analyzed how the market 
shares of original and generic drugs are affected by the implementation of refer-
ence pricing. The results show, that reference pricing has a positive effect on the 
market shares of generic drugs, and therefore a negative one for the corresponding 
original drug. However, the demand effect is smaller than for the other analyzed 
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regulative instruments. Also, the results indicate that the demand reaction differs 
for sub-groups of generic drugs, as branded generic drugs benefit more than non-
branded generic drugs.  
Analyzing the implementation of reference pricing from the perspective of the 
prescribing physician, the results indicate, that the probability of a drug change 
increased after the reference price implementation. However, similar to the market 
share reactions, the effect was overall smaller in comparison to the effects of other 
regulative instruments.  
Overall, as reference pricing was mainly targeting drug prices, it seems compre-
hensive that both the demand for drugs and the prescription behavior of physi-
cians was not strongly affected. Therefore the analysis shows that the instrument 
has full field its goal, to force pharmaceutical producers to lower their drug prices.  
Second, the effects of the implementation of the possibility to exempt drugs from 
patient related co-payments were analyzed. Observing from the perspective of the 
pharmaceutical producers, especially the targeted generic producers, the results 
indicate that the instrument has a positive effect on the demand for generic drugs 
that lower their prices below a certain level of the corresponding reference price 
to achieve the co-payment exemption.  
Interestingly, while the effect on the demand of generic drugs partizpating in the 
possiblity of co-payment exemption is stronger than the effect of reference pric-
ing, it is not significant different for branded and non-branded generic drugs. 
Shifting the perspective to the prescribing physicians, the results show that the 
implementation of the possibility to exempt drugs from patient related co-
payments increased the probability of a prescription change for the patient more 
than reference pricing.   
While the possibility of co-payment exemption also targeted the prices of phar-
maceutical producers, the effects differ from reference pricing. This can be ex-
plained by the different focus group of the regime. Unlike reference pricing, co-
payment exemption emphasized on low priced generic drugs. Consequently, this 
type of drugs should mainly benefit from the implemenation of the regulation. 
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The demand reactions estimated in the thesis confirm this. Also, the instrument 
also suggests to physicians to prescribe, if possible, co-payment exempted drugs 
to lower the financial burden of their patients. The positive effect on the probabil-
ity of a change in drug prescription, that was estimated in the thesis, provides evi-
dence that physicians follow this suggestion.  
At last, the implementation of the newest major regulative instrument, rebate con-
tracts between pharmaceutical producers and sickness funds, was analyzed from 
various perspectives. However, unlike in the case of the two previously studied 
regulative instruments, the effects are not only examined from the point of view of 
the pharmaceutical producer or the prescribing physician but also from the per-
spective of the involved sickness funds. This new perspective is necessary, as 
unlike before, sickness funds do play an active role in the configuration of the 
regulative instrument.  
While rebate contracts also target the prices of pharmaceutical drugs, the effects 
are not observable, as the price reductions appear in form of discounts that are 
private information. In addition, the effects of rebate contracts are much different 
in comparison to the previous presented regulations. While both, reference prices 
and co-payment exemption, targeted only prices but did not affect the competitive 
mechanisms of prescription drug market, the situation is different for rebate con-
tracts. In return for the offering of a discount, pharmaceutical producers, until now 
mostly generic drug producers, receive a quasi monopolistic market position for 
the market of insured persons of the contracted sickness fund.  
Therefore, pharmaceutical producers that are part of a rebate contract should be 
able to increase their market position. The results of the thesis confirm this, as the 
effect of the implemenation of rebate contracts on the demand of partizipating 
generic drugs is strongly positive, yet weaker for branded than for non-branded 
generics. However, the demand increase for drugs under rebate contract is only 
possible through the extensive willingness of physicians to allow the exchange of 
prescribed drugs with rebated drugs. The analysis of the prescription behavior of 
physicians shows, that the implementation of rebate contracts lead to the single 
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largest increase of changes of the dispensed drug for the patient. Both the perspec-
tive of the pharmaceutical producers and the physician show that rebate contracts 
help to reduce drug expansions through the increase of the demand for rebated, 
and therefore, cheaper drugs.  
However, critics of rebate contracts fear that the instrument will lead to an oli-
gopolistic market structure and therefore to a fewer number of competitors and a 
higher price level in the future. The results of a theoretical analysis, conducted in 
this thesis, show that this danger is not completely unfounded. However, the re-
sults also indicate that pharmaceutical firms will not be able to use their (poten-
tial) monopolistic power by offering a large product portfolio, if mismatch and 
market access costs are low and portfolio contracts are not allowed. Under these 
rules, following the theoretical analysis, competition will not diminish but sick-
ness funds will still receive the savings through rebate contracts. The current ef-
forts by the legislator, especially concerning the rejection of portfolio rebate con-
tracts, indicate that the political system is well aware of the risks for the competi-
tiveness of markets through rebate contracts. 
In conclusion, the empirical and theoretical analysis of the impact of the various 
regulative instruments on the different stakeholders shows that most of the in-
struments achieve their goals as expected. The analysis did not show any signifi-
cant anomalies or flaws that lead to strong market malfunctionings. However, it 
should be noted, that the implemented instruments mainly affected the drug prices 
and not the demand for drugs. While the prices of drugs decreased constantly in 
the past years, in the same time period, the quantity of drugs prescribed and dis-
pensed has increased strongly, leading to increasing drug expenses for the SHI 
system. While a part of this development has to be attributed to changes in mor-
bidity or to catch-up effects, another part can be considered the result of induced 
demand. Therefore future regulative instruments should also consider the demand 
aspect instead of only focusing on drug prices. 
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